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THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis examines issues relating to the complicity of legal persons in international 
crimes.  Specifically, this thesis addresses multinational corporations (hereafter MNCs) 
that aid and abet international crimes such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide.  This thesis discusses these issues with reference to MNCs in the extractive 
industries, that is, oil, gas or mining MNCs, that operate within conflict-affected areas or 
weak-governance zones in Africa.  
Currently, international criminal law does not recognise the complicit liability of 
corporations or any other legal persons.  This is of grave concern at a time when 
business enterprises are increasingly being accused of complicity in international crimes.  
Models of corporate liability can be found in most domestic jurisdictions, but 
international jurisdictions have yet to develop instruments that address the issue.  
Regrettably, the domestic jurisdictions, where these kinds of crimes occur, have not been 
known to enforce criminal sanctions on culpable persons – whether natural or legal 
persons.  Therefore, these issues should be addressed in international forums where 
domestic jurisdictions prove inadequate.  There is a need for a doctrine of corporate 
liability in international criminal law to address this issue.  Hence, this thesis 
recommends that the International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC) is the preferred 
institution to deal with the problem of complicit organisational liability in international 
crimes.  This thesis further recommends that the ICC Rome Statute should be revisited 
by the ICC State Parties in order to develop an appropriate framework of liability which 
takes into account the characteristic forms of corporate complicity in international 
crimes. 
Chapter 1 of this thesis provides an overview of the extent of the research problem.  
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Chapter 2 examines whether there should be criminal liability for business complicity in 
international crimes.  Chapter 3 discusses the rationale for corporate criminal liability 
with respect to corporate complicity in the commission of international crimes in the 
ongoing exploitation of natural resources in conflict-affected areas or weak-governance 
zones in Africa.  Chapter 4 investigates the jurisdictional forums to deal with the 
problem of corporate complicity by investigating where a corporate entity complicit in 
international crimes could be prosecuted.  This thesis examines existing international, 
regional, and domestic forums.  Chapter 5 commences the discussion on how a corporate 
entity complicit in international crimes could be prosecuted by examining organisational 
liability doctrine.  Chapter 6 continues this discussion by examining complicity doctrine, 
focusing on liability for aiding and abetting international crimes.  Chapter 7 concludes 
the discussion on how to deal with corporate complicity in international crimes; Chapter 
7 proposes draft legislation to address the research problem at an international forum 
such as the ICC.  Chapter 8 provides the thesis conclusion.  
Thesis keywords: organisational complicity, organisational liability, multinational 
corporations, legal persons, international crimes, international criminal law, criminal 
law, human rights law, tort law, extractive industries, conflict-affected areas, weak-
governance zones, Africa.  
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STYLISTIC GUIDELINES 
The following stylistic guidelines have been used in writing this thesis: 
 The referencing style of the Australian Guide to Legal Citation (3rd edition) has 
been adopted.  
 Australian English Language spellings have been used unless the primary or 
secondary sources relied upon other spellings.  For example: offence not offense; 
organisation not organization; and conceptualise not conceptualize. 
 The word ‗Judgment‘ is deliberately capitalised in this thesis to comply with the 
way in which the ad hoc Tribunals use the word.  
 Different spellings are used for the word ‗Judgment‘ to reflect the practices of the 
institutions under discussion.  In the majority of instances:  
- The ICTY uses ‗Judgment‘;  
- The ICTR uses ‗Judgement‘; 
- The ICC and the Panels of Judges use both spellings. 
 The phrase ‗international institutions‘ is used to collectively describe judicial 
bodies such as: Panels of Judges, Extraordinary Chambers, Special Courts, and 
Special Tribunals. Granted, the Iraq High Tribunal and the Sierra Leone Special 
Court are hybrid institutions in that they largely blend international and domestic 
criminal law in their legal instruments; however, for ease of reference, the 
collective phrase ‗international institutions‘ will be applied throughout this thesis.   
 The term ‗international legal instruments‘ is used when referring to the legal 
documents pertaining to international institutions. The ICC Rome Statute is an 
international treaty; however, it is described as an international legal instrument 
for ease of reference when collectively discussing all the documents pertaining to 
the international institutions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Thesis Introduction 
„War, in general, is a money making business.‟1 
1.1 The scope of this thesis 
Complaints about the complicity of multinational businesses in human rights violations 
have increased significantly in the last sixty years. 2  Complicit perpetration in 
international crimes by multinational businesses is alleged to have included the provision 
of finance, infrastructure, materials, and logistical support.3 
Some complaints have concerned individual business people.4  For example, the Dutch 
business executive Guus Kouwenhoven of the Oriental Timber Corporation was 
prosecuted in the Netherlands for his role in facilitating war crimes committed during the 
Liberian civil war of 1999–2003.5  At the time, Guus Kouwenhoven was the part owner 
                                                 
1
 Florin Jessberger and Julia Geneuss, ‗Introduction‘ (2010) 8(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
695, 695.  
2
 International Commission of Jurists, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) volume 1, 1 
<http://www.icj.org>. International Commission of Jurists hereafter referred to as ICJ. With respect to 
reports alleging the involvement of multinational businesses in human rights violations, this thesis 
relies upon empirical research sourced from multi-stakeholders in the international community, for 
example, the ICJ, the United Nations, Maplecroft, Global Witness, Amnesty International, and Human 
Rights Watch. 
3
 See generally, ICJ, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) volume 2, 19 
<http://www.icj.org>. 
4
 See, jurisprudence from Military Tribunals established in the aftermath of the World War II. These 
historic cases lay the foundations for corporate criminal liability whereby corporate executives were 
held liable for facilitating crimes by the Nazi Regime; for example, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two 
Others (‗The Zyklon B Case‘) 1–8 March 1946, Law Reports of War Criminals, Vol I. 
5
 In 2006, Guus Kouwenhoven was sentenced to eight years by the Dutch District Court.  The sentence 
was overturned in 2008 by the Appeal Court. The appeal was quashed by the Supreme Court in 2010 
and the matter sent back for retrial. For detailed analysis of the case see, Wim Huisman and Elies van 
Sliedregt, ‗Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, International Crimes and Corporate Complicity‘ 
(2010) 8(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 803, 810–815.  
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and president of the Oriental Timber Corporation, which had been granted over one and 
half million hectares of timber logging concessions by the then President of Liberia, 
Charles Taylor.  Guus Kouwenhoven, working through his company the Oriental Timber 
Corporation, traded with the Liberian government knowing that they relied upon the 
substantial revenue from the timber industry to illegally procure weapons in violation of 
a United Nations arms embargo and that such weapons were used to perpetrate war 
crimes.6 
A natural person could be prosecuted for the commission of international crimes in either 
domestic or international jurisdictions.  There is, however, a major barrier to the 
prosecution of the corporate entities through which individual business people 
commonly operate.  International criminal law does not currently recognise the liability 
of multinational corporations or that of any other legal persons.  Corporate liability is 
now recognised in most domestic jurisdictions. 7   However, it has no international 
recognition.  This omission in international criminal law has become of increasing 
concern. It has prompted calls in the international community for corporate 
accountability as a response to what has been described as ‗some of the most egregious 
                                                 
6
 See, Global Witness Report, Bankrolling Brutality (2010), 6 <http://www.globalwitness.org>. To date, it 
appears that Dutch corporate entities have not been prosecuted in criminal cases concerning grave 
breaches of extraterritorial international law, for commentary on this, see generally Nicola M C P 
Jägers and Marie-José van der Heijden, ‗Corporate Human Rights Violations: The Feasibility of Civil 
Recourse in the Netherlands (2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 832, 862–866. 
Interestingly, Article 51 of the Dutch Criminal Code provides for the prosecution of legal persons with 
respect to the commission of criminal offences. For discussion on this, see generally, ICJ, Access to 
Justice: Human Rights Abuses Involving Corporations – The Netherlands (2010), 6–15 
<http://www.icj.org>. 
7
 See generally, Allens Arthur Robinson, „Corporate Culture‟ as a Basis for the Criminal Liability of 
Corporations (2008); Lex Mundi Business Crimes and Compliance Practice Group, Business Crimes 
and Compliance Criminal Liability of Companies Survey (2008); Anita Ramasastry and Robert C 
Thompson (eds), Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for 
Grave Breaches of International Law – A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions (FAFO, 2006); FAFO, 
Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of 
International Law (2004). 
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corporate conduct across the world.‘8 
This thesis examines whether, and how, international criminal law should recognise 
corporate liability.  Its focus is on multinational corporations operating in the extractive 
industries in ‗conflict-affected areas‘ or ‗weak-governance zones‘ 9 in Africa.  These 
corporations are usually involved in oil, gas, or mining operations.  
This thesis also examines how rules of secondary liability may need to be adapted to 
reflect the characteristic modes of business complicity in international crimes.  There are 
issues respecting the scope of secondary liability that arise in connection with the 
potential liability of individual business people as well as corporate entities.  However, 
resolving these issues is crucial for any program of criminalising corporate conduct to be 
effective.  
The writer‘s interest in this research lies primarily with the liability of those legal 
persons who are complicit with the principal offender.  Therefore, this thesis will not 
focus on the liability of the principal offender, regardless of whether that principal 
offender is a legal person or not.  For example, Blackwater was a security agency 
contracted to provide security services to American diplomatic nationals in Iraq.  In the 
past, Iraqi civilians have been killed in the crossfire when Blackwater, and other security 
agencies, have used what has often been criticised as ‗disproportionate force‘ to protect 
the people that they were guarding.  Although the potential criminal culpability of 
private security agencies presents serious matters of international concern,10 it is not the 
                                                 
8
 ICJ, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) volume 1, 1 <http://www.icj.org>.  
9
 The terms ‗conflict-affected areas‘ or ‗weak-governance zones‘ are explained later at 1.2.3.  
10
 See, The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies. The Montreux Document 
stipulates recommendations for State responsibility to exercise control over private military and 
 –  4  –  
focus of this research.  This research is primarily concerned with investigating complicit 
criminal responsibility of any multinational businesses that actually hire such security 
agencies. 
In summary, this thesis investigates: (i) the need for a doctrine of corporate liability in 
international criminal law, as a response to misconduct by multinational corporations in 
Africa; (ii) the jurisdictional forums that would be appropriate to the prosecution of 
multinational corporations for conduct occurring in Africa; (iii) the forms of corporate 
liability that may be suitable, particularly with respect to the operations of multinational 
corporations; and (iv) the amendments that may be needed to the law of complicity for 
international crimes in order to accommodate the characteristic forms of corporate 
involvement.  
The writer largely adopts descriptive and analytical methods to provide the reader with 
an overview of debates about whether there should be criminal liability for business 
complicity in international crimes, the rationale for corporate criminal liability, 
jurisdictional forums, and doctrines of organisational liability and complicity. 
Furthermore, the method of research applied throughout this thesis includes 
interpretation of international treaty obligations in accordance with the Vienna 
convention on the law of treaties.  
To contribute to this emerging area of law, the writer also assesses what the law 
currently is. With respect to this, the writer goes on to identify what the law should be.  
The thesis concludes with draft amendments to the Rome Statute of the International 
                                                                                                                                                
security companies to ensure that they adhere to International Humanitarian Law. 
<http://www.icrc.org >. 
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Criminal Court.11 
1.1.1 Overview of the current situation concerning the complicity of multinational 
businesses in international crimes in Africa 
On the whole, multinational corporations play both positive and negative roles in the 
development of society.  Mary Robinson, former United Nations Commissioner for 
Human Rights, observes: 
… impacts on human rights do not only occur from a state perspective.  The role of 
non-state actors such as multinational enterprises has increasingly been 
acknowledged. The footprint of a multinational company on society can be 
enormous, both in a positive and in a negative sense.12 
On the one hand, multinational corporations positively contribute to the economic and 
social advancement of the jurisdictions within which they operate.  For instance, these 
corporations wield substantial economic power to the extent that some of them possess 
greater wealth than the countries where they are located.  Often, it is these corporations 
that are in a better position to provide basic public services, which are ordinarily made 
available by governments.13  In Sierra Leone, for example, MNCs provide much needed 
employment prospects, training and education of corporate personnel, as well as 
                                                 
11
 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome Italy, 15 June–17 July 1998, known as the Rome Statute, 
(hereafter referred to as ICC Rome Statute). 
12
 Mary Robinson, ‗Foreword‘ in Dr. Olga Lenzen and Dr. Marina d‘Engelbronner (authors), Human 
Rights in Business: Guide to Corporations Human Rights Impact Assessment Tools (January 2009) 
<http://www.aimforhumanrights.org>. 
13
 Interview: Claire Mallinson, Director, Amnesty International Australia in Agnes King, ‗Put People First‘ 
(August 20–26, 2009) Business Review Weekly, 46. In a number of countries, private corporations are 
responsible for the provision of basic public services such as the provisions of water, telephone, 
electricity and household gas. Michael K Addo, ‗Human Rights and Transnational Corporations – An 
Introduction‘ in Michael K Addo (ed), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 7. 
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development of the communities where they operate.14 
Yet, in spite of such positive contributions, it is also sometimes alleged that 
multinationals have negatively impacted societies within which they operate through 
human rights abuses.  MNCs have been accused of illegally possessing land coupled 
with inadequate compensation to the rightful land owners, forcibly transferring civilian 
populations, destroying ritual or cultural sites without conferring with the local 
communities, and violating basic labour rights.15  Some of these human rights violations 
may have even amounted to crimes against humanity.16  
For example, the Canadian multinational oil corporation Talisman Energy faced legal 
action from the local community while extracting oil in Sudan.  A class action lawsuit 
was lodged in the United States District Court pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute.17  The 
plaintiffs alleged that Talisman facilitated crimes against humanity in Sudan around 
1998.  These crimes were alleged to have been carried out by the Sudanese Government 
at the time Talisman were building supporting infrastructure, such as roads and airports, 
leading up to their extraction site.18  
Armed conflicts in largely destabilised African countries have been fuelled by a number 
                                                 
14
 For example, see generally, Adusei Jumah, Sierra Leone: As Seen Through International Economic and 
Social Indicators (2009) UNDP, 17 <http://www.sl.undp.org/1_doc/indicators_sl.pdf>. 
15
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report (2007): Transnational 
Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, 152 <http://www.unctad.org>. 
16
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report (2007): Transnational 
Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, 152 <http://www.unctad.org>. 
17
 See, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc., (Docket No. 07-0016-cv) U.S.C.A. 2
nd
 
Circuit, 2 October 2009; the Alien Tort Statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. Section 1350.  
18
 See, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy Inc., (Docket No. 07-0016-cv) U.S.C.A. 2
nd
 
Circuit, 2 October 2009; this action was brought pursuant to the United States Alien Tort Statute, but 
the claim was rejected by the District Court which found Talisman lacked the requisite mens rea.  
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of factors, one of which is the struggle to control natural resources.19  Much of the 
African continent boasts vast deposits of natural resources.20  The presence of these 
natural resources has led to a significant number of African countries becoming the ‗new 
frontier for the extractives sector.‘21  The extractive industry is dominated by oil, gas or 
mining corporations, be they publicly or privately owned corporations.  These 
multinational extractive corporations largely operate in conflict-affected areas 
characterised by unstable local environments where governance and the rule of law is 
weak or non-existent, 22  or the governments face difficulty enforcing internationally 
recognised human rights.23  Granted, natural resources are not the only source of conflict 
in the African continent; however, the exploitation of these resources has contributed 
disproportionately to the on-going conflicts in the region.  A World Bank report, which 
assessed the correlation between natural resources and violent conflict, indicated that the 
struggle to control natural resources at times sparks or prolongs conflict.  Specifically, 
the World Bank report found: 
Natural resources are never the sole source of conflict, and they do not make 
                                                 
19
 See generally, Jonathan M Winer and Trifin J Roule, ‗Follow the Money: The Finance of Illicit 
Resource Extraction‘ in World Bank Report, Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (eds), Natural Resources 
and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (2003), 161–215 <www.worldbank.org>; see also, Michael 
L Ross, ‗What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?‘(2004) 41(3) Journal of Peace 
Research 337, 337–356. 
20
 For example, oil, diamonds, tantalum, uranium, manganese, iron ores, coffee, timber, coal, rubber, 
bauxite, and gold. See generally, Jonathan M Winer and Trifin J Roule, ‗Follow the Money: The 
Finance of Illicit Resource Extraction‘ in World Bank Report, Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (eds), 
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions (2003), 164 <www.worldbank.org>; 
also, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative website for details on the resources found in most 
EITI countries, <www.eiti.org>. 
21
 Alyson Warhurst, ‗Insight: Human Rights are a Business Issue‘ (14 December 2007) Businessweek 
<http://www.businessweek.com>.  
22
 Alyson Warhurst, ‗Insight: Human Rights are a Business Issue‘ (14 December 2007) Businessweek 
<http://www.businessweek.com>; see also, World Bank governance data available at 
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/>. 
23
 Maplecroft, Media Release, ‗Human Rights Risk Extreme throughout much of Asia and Africa‘, 3 
<http://www.maplecroft.net/HR09_Report_Press_release.pdf>. 
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conflict inevitable. But the presence of abundant primary commodities, especially in 
low-income countries, exacerbates the risks of conflict and, if conflict does break 
out, tends to prolong it and makes it harder to resolve.24 
Reports alleging the involvement of multinational corporations in egregious human 
rights violations have increased to such an alarming extent that the international 
community has responded with a number of initiatives.  For example, in July 2005 the 
United Nations Secretary General appointed a Special Representative to investigate the 
responsibility and accountability of corporations in such violations.25  The 2006 interim 
report from the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises26 
found that two-thirds of the allegations about corporate human rights abuses related to 
extraction corporations that were complicit in crimes against humanity. 27 
The extent of the problem may be indicated by the protective measures that have been 
devised by international civil groups and ‗global risks intelligence consultancies‘.28  This 
has included initiatives spearheaded by International Alert, 29 the Danish Institute for 
                                                 
24
 World Bank Report, Ian Bannon and Paul Collier (eds), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: 
Options and Actions (2003), ix <www.worldbank.org>. 
25
 See, UN Media Release, ‗United Nations Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of the United States 
John Ruggie Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises‘ (28 July 2005), SG/A/934, <http://www.un.org>. See also official 
mandate, Commission on Human Rights, Protection of Human Rights (15 April 2005) UN Doc: 
E/CN.4/2005/L.87. 
26
 Hereafter referred to as UNSRSG. 
27
 UNSRSG Interim Report, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (22 February 2006) UN Doc: 
E/CN.4/2006/97. The UNSRSG‘s Final Report was released in 2011, see UNSRSG Final Report, 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‗Protect, 
Respect and Remedy‘ Framework (21 March 2011) UN Doc: A/HRC/17/31. 
28
 Maplecroft is an example of a global risks intelligence consultancy which advises businesses on 
political, economic, social and environmental risks affecting their global business practices.  
29
 International Alert, Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries (March 
2005) <http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/conflict_sensitive_business_practice_section_1.pdf>. 
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Human Rights,30 Rights & Democracy,31 and Maplecroft.32  Tools for ‗Human Rights 
Impact Assessment‘33 have been developed to align business activities with emerging 
principles of good governance. These HRIAs assess the business activities of 
multinational corporations operating in conflict-affected areas or weak-governance zones 
where the corporations are likely to be complicit in human rights violations.  HRIAs 
typically assess the difference between the obligations made by a State regarding the 
protection of human rights with the reality of how such rights are actually respected in 
practice.34  In doing so, HRIAs identify those rights that are not protected by a State.  
This is significant because States bear the primary responsibility to respect and protect 
human rights pursuant to international law.  Hence, HRIAs differ from other types of 
impact assessments in that they stem from a State‘s international obligations to protect 
human rights.35  Despite the value of the HRIAs, ultimately (as the discussion shows 
throughout this thesis), enforceable models of liability are preferred, and should continue 
to be pursued.  
With respect to HRIAs, Maplecroft has compiled a comprehensive list of ‗risk 
                                                 
30
 Danish Institute for Human Rights, Human Rights Compliance Assessment Tool 
<http://www.humanrightsbusiness.org/?f=compliance_assessment>. 
31
 Rights & Democracy, Getting it Right: A Step by Step Guide to Assess the Impact of Foreign 
Investments on Human Rights (November 2008) <http://www.dd-
rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/Getting-it-right_HRIA.pdf>. 
32
 Maplecroft, Human Rights Risk Tools (2009) <www.maplecrfot.com>. 
33
 Hereafter referred to as HRIAs. 
34
 Rights & Democracy, Getting it Right: A Step by Step Guide to Assess the Impact of Foreign 
Investments on Human Rights (November 2008), 2 <http://www.dd-
rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/Getting-it-right_HRIA.pdf>. 
35
 Rights & Democracy, Getting it Right: A Step by Step Guide to Assess the Impact of Foreign 
Investments on Human Rights (November 2008), 2 <http://www.dd-
rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/Getting-it-right_HRIA.pdf>. 
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indicators‘,36 summarised below in Table 1.  It has suggested that, depending on the 
presence of such risk indicators, if grave human rights violations occur in countries 
where a corporation is engaged in business activities with State or non-state actors, then 
the corporation could very well find itself complicit in those crimes. 
Table 1 – Risk indicators applied in the HRIAs 
(Source: compiled from Maplecroft <http://www.maplecroft.com>) 
Using these HRIA risk indicators, the global risk intelligence consultancy considers that 
many African countries, as shown in Appendix 1, pose extreme risks and high risks for 
corporate complicity in human rights violations.  From 2011 to 2012, there were at least 
                                                 
36
 For an in-depth analysis on the various HRIA tools available where the authors provide a useful 
comparison of the various risk indicators applied by International Alert, the Danish Institute for 
Human Rights, Rights & Democracy, and Maplecroft, see generally, Dr. Olga Lenzen and Dr. Marina 
d‘Engelbronner (authors), Human Rights in Business: Guide to Corporations Human Rights Impact 
Assessment Tools (January 2009) Aim for Human Rights, 33 <http://www.aimforhumanrights.org/>. 
Risk Indicators Prime examples of factors to consider when 
conducting the Human Rights Impact 
Assessment  
Human Security Risks Is there: 
extrajudicial or unlawful killings, 
disappearances, kidnappings, torture, internal 
displacement & refugees, child soldiers, security 
forces & human rights violations?  
Labour Rights and Protection Risks Is there: 
child labour, forced or involuntary labour, 
trafficking, absence of freedom of association & 
collective bargaining, discrimination, poor 
standards of working conditions?  
Civil and Political Rights Risks Is there: 
arbitrary arrest & detention, absence of freedom 
of conscience, expression and religion, absence 
of freedom of speech & press, evidence of 
human rights defenders, female rights, 
indigenous peoples & minority rights?  
Risks Associated with Access to 
Remedies 
Is there: 
business integrity & corruption, judicial 
independence, judicial effectiveness, judicial 
monitoring and reporting environment?  
  
 –  11  –  
29 countries worldwide considered extreme risks for the occurrence of grave human 
rights violations.  Of those, 12 extreme risk countries were in Africa and included, inter 
alia: Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Central African 
Republic.  At least 58 countries worldwide posed high risks – those in Africa included 
27 countries, inter alia: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Kenya, Niger, and Algeria. 
The most common natural resources which originate from Africa‘s extreme-risk and 
high-risk countries are oil, gold, diamonds, iron ore and copper, the relevant countries 
being Chad, Central Republic of Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte D‘Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Liberia, and Niger.37  
See Appendices 2 and 3 for a full list. 
Africa‘s natural resources generate billions of dollars for the extractive industry.38  These 
resources provide the much needed raw materials that are used for the sustainable 
development of the global economy.39  For example, energy minerals, such as coal, 
uranium, gas, and oil, are essential for the production of electricity, organic chemicals, 
and processed fuels.  Metallic minerals, such as iron ore, tantalum, titanium, gold, 
platinum, copper, lead, and magnesium, are used for the production of aerospace 
robotics, jewellery, and electronics.  Non-metallic minerals, such as clay, gypsum, sand, 
diamonds, and gems, are used for the production of ceramics, filters, and construction 
materials.  Appendix 4 provides a list of these minerals and their uses, and shows just 
                                                 
37
 This does not assume that there are no natural resources found in non-African continents. For example, 
there are oil fields throughout parts of the Middle East, Europe, and South America. 
38
 For example, see Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative Report, Overview of EITI Reports 
(2010), 3 <http://eiti.org> for an overview of the revenues reported by companies and governments 
operating in a number of the African Extreme- and High-Risk Countries. 
39
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report (2007): Transnational 
Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development, 83 <http://www.unctad.org>. 
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how essential they are for all global economic sectors.  
According to research conducted by Maplecroft in 2009, the DRC exhibited the worst 
record of human rights violations globally.40  Maplecroft published its Human Rights 
Risk Report in 2009.  It applied a set   of specific indices to measure the potential risk of 
complicity for corporations engaged in business in countries that posed human rights 
risks.  Maplecroft ranked the DRC as an Extreme Risk Country.  The DRC scored 0.39 
(on a scale of 0–10 where 0 represented higher risks and 10 lower risks) during the 
period of 2007–2008 alone.41  In ranking the DRC, Maplecroft took into account the risk 
indicators summarised in Table 1 above.42 
The DRC, commonly referred to as a ‗paradox of plenty‘,43 is rich in natural resources.  
These resources include: diamonds, coltan, copper, cobalt, and gold.44  The struggle to 
control these resources has led to egregious human rights violations.  For instance, 
Africa‘s richest goldfields are located in the north-eastern Ituri District of the DRC, 
where soldiers and armed rebel groups have been engaged in battle since 1998, the 
ultimate aim being the control of gold mines and trade routes.  The armed struggle for 
                                                 
40
 Maplecroft, Media Release, ‗Human Rights Risk Extreme throughout much of Asia and Africa‘, 3 
<http://www.maplecroft.net/HR09_Report_Press_release.pdf>. The 2010 Human Rights Risks Atlas 
indicated that DRC was ranked third on the list, while Somalia was second and Afghanistan first. By 
the end of 2011, DRC was ranked second on the list, while Sudan was first and Somalia third. See, 
Maplecroft, Media Release, ‗Arab spring uprisings, African ―land grabs‖ and the economic downturn 
causing global increase in human rights violations, reveals Maplecroft Risk Atlas‘ 
<http://www.maplecroft.com/about/news/hrra_2012.html>. 
41
 Maplecroft, Media Release, ‗Human Rights Risk Extreme throughout much of Asia and Africa‘, 3 
<http://www.maplecroft.net/HR09_Report_Press_release.pdf>.  
42
 Maplecroft, Media Release, ‗Human Rights Risk Extreme throughout much of Asia and Africa‘, 3 
<http://www.maplecroft.net/HR09_Report_Press_release.pdf>. 
43
 See, DRC Country Profile on Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative website 
<http://eiti.org/DRCongo>. 
44
 See generally, United Nations Environmental Programme <http://www.unep.org> and World Reach/ 
Exploring Africa, Agricultural and Mineral Resources: African Countries 
<http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu>. 
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control continues to this day.45  International crimes committed in the Ituri District, such 
as widespread rape, torture, executions, and arbitrary arrests, were particularly attributed 
to the unfolding violence surrounding the control of gold resource extraction sites.46  
Multinational extractive corporations operating in the Ituri District were accused of 
being complicit in international crimes committed by rebel forces during the process of 
gold mining explorations. 47   For example, South African mining multinational 
corporation AngloGold Ashanti was one of the first multinational corporations to engage 
in gold mining activities in the Ituri District.  It has been alleged that rebel forces used 
profits from the sale of gold to AngloGold Ashanti to purchase weapons and fund their 
criminal activities.48  The allegation is also made that AngloGold, in the course of its 
mining activities, provided logistical support to the Front des Nationalistes et 
Integrationnistes (National Integrationist Front) rebels.49  Some of the alleged FNI rebel 
leaders are currently standing trial before the ICC.50 
                                                 
45
 Human Rights Watch Report, The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo (2005), 1 
<http://www.hrw.org>. 
46
 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC (8 September 2003), 4 <http://www.icc-cpi.int>. 
47
 For example, see generally discussion about mining activities in early 2000 by AngloGold Ashanti in 
the Ituri District in Brandon Prosansky, ‗Mining Gold in a Conflict Zone: The Context, Ramifications, 
and Lessons of AngloGold Ashanti‘s Activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‘ (Spring 
2007) 5(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 236, 241–242. 
48
 See generally, Human Rights Watch Report, The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo (2005) 
<http://www.hrw.org>. 
49
 For details see, Wim Huisman and Elies van Sliedregt, ‗Rogue Traders: Dutch Businessmen, 
International Crimes and Corporate Complicity‘ (2010) 8(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
803, 818. Front des Nationalistes et Integrationnistes (National Integrationist Front) hereafter referred 
to as FNI. Huisman and Sliedregt point out that prior to the rebel movement in the Ituri district, 
AngloGold had legitimately obtained mining concessions from a Congolese State-owned mining 
corporation. 
50
 See for example, trial of  Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, who is allegedly a former FNI leader, he is charged 
with war crimes and crimes against humanity for crimes perpetrated in the Ituri District, The 
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges) (International Criminal Court, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008). 
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1.1.2 Challenges posed by the current situation 
There are a number of regulatory initiatives that address the activities of multinational 
corporations in general – for example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development‘s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which is discussed further in 
Chapter 2.  There are also numerous regulatory initiatives dealing with the extraction and 
trade of natural resources by MNCs operating in conflict-affected areas or weak-
governance zones (for example, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights).  
The greatest difficulty with most of these regulatory initiatives is that they are commonly 
described as ‗soft law‘; they do not create binding legal obligations.51  
Although there are several established international institutions with the jurisdiction to 
prosecute complicit perpetrators of international crimes, none of these institutions 
address organisational liability.  The International Criminal Court52 is a prime example of 
such an international legal institution.  The ICC is the first permanent international 
criminal court.  The Court came into existence in 2002 as an independent international 
institution with the primary objective to ‗end impunity for the perpetrators of the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community.‘53  There are also other ad hoc 
international institutions whose jurisdiction it is to prosecute complicit perpetrators of 
international crimes.  In Africa,54 for instance, these include the International Criminal 
                                                 
51
 Patrick Macklem, ‗Corporate Accountability under International Law: The Misguided Quest for 
Universal Jurisdiction‘ (2005) 7 International Law Forum du droit international 281, 283. 
52
 International Criminal Court (hereafter referred to as ICC) <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
53
 ICC, ‗About the Court‘ <www.icc-cpi.int>.  
54
 Outside Africa, there are other ad hoc international institutions established with the jurisdiction to 
prosecute complicit perpetrators of international crimes. Refer to: the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter referred to as ICTY) <www.icty.org>; the Iraqi High Tribunal 
(hereafter referred to as IHT), (formerly Iraqi Special Tribunal for the Prosecution of Crimes against 
Humanity), see, Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs for updates on legal proceedings 
<http://www.mofa.gov.iq>;  the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
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Tribunal for Rwanda55 and the Sierra Leone Special Court.56 
The drawback with these international institutions is that they only exercise jurisdiction 
over ‗natural persons‘.  None of the institutions are currently empowered with the 
jurisdiction to prosecute ‗legal persons‘. 57  As a result of this limitation, although 
complicit individuals within an organisation may be prosecuted (being natural persons), 
in most circumstances, the organisation itself (being a legal person) may continue to 
legally operate elsewhere while perpetrating further international crimes.58 
1.1.3 Research limitations  
There are a number of research limitations.   
For instance, the manner in which corporate complicity in the commission of 
international crimes may be tackled varies. There are a range of approaches, which may 
                                                                                                                                                
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (hereafter referred to 
as ECCC) <www.eccc.gov.kh>; and, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (hereafter referred to as STL 
<www.stl-tsl.org>. 
55
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereafter referred to as ICTR) <www.ictr.org>. 
56
 Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereafter referred to as SCSL) <www.sc-sl.org>. 
57
 See individual criminal responsibility provisions established by international instruments and treaties 
from international institutions: Article 25 of the ICC Rome Statute; Article 6, Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States (hereafter referred to as ICTR Statute); Article 6, Statute of the Sierra Leone 
Special Court (hereafter referred to as SCSL Statute).  This also is true of ad hoc institutions outside 
Africa: refer to Article 7, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereafter referred to as ICTY Statute); Article 15, Law of the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal (hereafter referred to as IHT Statute). The IHT Statute was translated by the Centre 
for Transitional Justice; Article 29 new of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of 
Democratic Kampuchea (hereafter referred to as ECCC Law). The ECCC Law was translated by the 
Council of Jurists and the Secretariat of the Task Force. 
58
 See generally, Anita Ramasastry, ‗Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon – An 
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations‘ 
(2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of International Law 91, 96. 
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be adopted to address the research problem.  
One approach is criminal liability. This thesis focuses on the criminal characteristic of 
corporate involvement in crime; hence the notion of corporate criminal liability is 
discussed at length.   
Another approach is civil liability. This approach is briefly examined in the discussion 
relating to matters brought before United States District Courts where victims have 
invoked the Alien Tort Statute 59  in civil actions against multinational corporations 
accused of aiding and abetting torts in violation of customary international law.60   
Administrative penalties provide another approach. These are briefly discussed, though 
they tend to be imposed in domestic jurisdictions that have not adopted the traditional 
models of corporate criminal liability.61   
Yet another approach is seen through regulatory initiatives.62  These initiatives are the 
result of lengthy discussions on a multilateral basis with respect to the issue of regulating 
the business activities of multinational corporations. They have increased in popularity, 
particularly among companies and sectors that are either sensitive about their brand or 
highly visible in the market.63   
Finally, corporate education is another approach to deal with the research problem. 
                                                 
59
 United States Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1350. 
60
 See discussion on tort principles and US tort legislation at 4.2.1 of this thesis. 
61
 See discussion on this issue at 3.2.1 and 5.2.2 of this thesis. 
62
 See discussion at 2.3 of this thesis on regulating the business activities of multinational corporations 
generally as well as discussion on specific regulation of the business activities of multinational 
corporations operating within the extractive industries.  
63
 John G Ruggie, UNSRSG, ‗Next Steps in Business and Human Rights‘ (Speech delivered at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 22 May 2008). 
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Corporate education is driven by a number of sectors.  For instance, governments are in a 
position to create and adopt public education initiatives that address the problem of 
corporate complicity in international crimes.64  Also, the private sector not only learns 
valuable economic lessons through the market, but it also gains insight from the 
deterrent effect of imposing criminal sanctions with respect to pernicious corporate 
conduct.65  The non-governmental sector is also involved in corporate education. This 
sector has engaged in numerous research activities aimed at providing innovative 
solutions to such social problems.66 
Regarding all these varied approaches, this thesis identifies their shortcomings insofar as 
they justify the need for the recommendations made here.  The focus of this thesis is 
corporate criminal liability.  This is not to say that this thesis rejects any of the 
alternative approaches; the views expressed here may even be complimentary.  However, 
it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain how to strike to a balance between the use 
of criminal prosecutions and the alternative approaches which may be invoked either by 
socio-political actors or by prosecutors.  Furthermore, the notion of holding a corporate 
entity criminally responsible for international crimes should be resorted to as an 
available option when dealing with egregious cases rather than applied indiscriminately 
in all cases.  
Another limitation with this research is that it does not investigate the practical realities, 
such as political, financial, and procedural considerations, which would need to be taken 
                                                 
64
 See for example, Australian Human Rights Commission, ‗Making a Difference on Human Rights in 
Business‘ <www.hreoc.gov.au>. 
65
 See discussion on general deterrence at 3.2.1 of this thesis. 
66
 See for example the various documents referred to in this thesis by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International. 
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into account when attempting to hold multinational corporations accountable for 
egregious human rights violations.  With respect to this, the issue of corporate liability in 
the sphere of international criminal law is worth revisiting because as the discussion in 
this thesis shows the doctrine of corporate criminal liability is now widely recognised in 
most domestic jurisdictions.67  Indeed, there would be numerous steps involved to bring 
about the ideas discussed here.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed 
examination on the complex workings of both domestic and international institutions and 
the manner in which they would implement legislative change.68  
Yet another limitation with this research is that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
investigate how the law of substantive crimes might best be utilised against corporate 
complicity.  For example, the notion of corporate complicity in the war crime of 
pillaging, revisited by academics in more recent years, illustrates this point.  The 
allegation is made that corporations who extract and trade illicit natural resources are 
providing the principal perpetrators with the means to continue criminal activities in 
conflict-affected areas.   
The war crime of pillaging is well established in international criminal law and most 
domestic criminal jurisdictions. 69  Following World War II, the IMTs convicted a 
                                                 
67
 See discussion at 5.2.3 and 5.3.3 of this thesis. 
68
 Though, the discussion at 7.5 of this thesis provides an overview of the ICC Rome Statute provisions 
which deal with the procedure that may be followed by State Parties considering amending the statute. 
69
 James G Stewart, ‗Atrocity, Commerce and Accountability: The International Criminal Liability of 
Corporate Actors‘ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 313, 320. See, Article 6(b) of the 
IMT Charter criminalised the plunder of public or private property.  Identical prohibitions were also 
reflected in Article 2(b) of the CCL 10. Since the IMT trials, war crimes of pillaging or plundering – 
synonymous terms – have been prohibited in the legal instruments of the ad hoc international tribunals 
and special courts. See, Article 3(e) of the ICTY Statute, Article 4(f) of the ICTR Statute, Article 3(f) of 
the SCSL Statute, Articles 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v) of the ICC Rome Statute, and Article 13(2)(Q) 
and Article 13(4)(E) of the IHT Statute.  
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multitude of businessmen for pillaging natural resources as well as raw materials. 70  
James Stewart argues that, despite the jurisprudence from the IMTs dealing with this 
crime, international and domestic courts have failed to use this precedent to address the 
problem of corporate pillaging. 71   Stewart attributes this shortcoming to what he 
describes as legal amnesia. 72   Presently, some ongoing conflicts are predominately 
financed by the illicit trade in natural resources.73  Stewart alleges that multinational 
businesses in the extractive industries have significantly contributed to such ongoing 
conflicts.  According to Stewart, multinational businesses ‗play an indispensible role by 
extracting or purchasing the illicit resources.‘74  Stewart observes that there have been 
many instances in the last few years where business entities operating in Africa should 
have been held liable for the war crime of pillaging.  Stewart points to the findings of a 
United Nations Panel of Experts on the illicit trade in diamonds in Angola as an 
                                                 
70
 James G Stewart, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillaging of Natural Resources (Open 
Society Justice Initiative Publication, 2010) 10. See also, Andrew Clapham, ‗The Complexity of 
International Criminal Law: Looking Beyond Individual Responsibility to the Responsibility of 
Organizations, Corporations and States‘ in Ramesh Chandra Thakur (ed), From Sovereign Impunity to 
International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (United Nations University 
Press, 2004) 237 discussing cases such as Trial of Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und 
Halbach and Eleven Others, US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 17 November 1947–30 June 1948, 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Vol X, where the Krupp firm plundered machinery from 
factories in the Netherlands. 
71
 James G Stewart, ‗Atrocity, Commerce and Accountability: The International Criminal Liability of 
Corporate Actors‘ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 313, 318. 
72
 James G Stewart, ‗Atrocity, Commerce and Accountability: The International Criminal Liability of 
Corporate Actors‘ (2010) 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice 313, 318. 
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example.75  It is claimed that businesses obtained vast amounts of diamonds from the 
notorious rebel group known as the National Union for the Total Independence for 
Angola.76  UNITA did not have legal title in the diamonds, yet they sold the diamonds to 
corporations and individuals, and then used the proceeds of sales to sustain their illegal 
activities.77 
However, the writer is of the view that the forum for addressing pillaging should not be 
the sole basis for dealing with the issues addressed in the research problem.  The issues 
discussed in this thesis are much wider than pillaging.  It may be appropriate to rely 
upon the provisions for the war crime of pillaging to deal with the increasing problem of 
organisational complicity in international crimes in some circumstances.  However, a 
major concern with this approach is that it requires a nexus requisite to an armed 
conflict.78  The corporate crimes that are discussed in this thesis take place not only in 
conflict-affected areas but also in weak-governance zones that are not necessarily 
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 For a discussion on the challenges that this raises see, ICJ, Corporate Complicity in International 
Crimes (2008) volume 2, 42, <http://www.icj.org>.   
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embroiled in conflict.79  The ICJ has surmised that ordinarily pillage is known as theft if 
it is not committed in the context of an armed conflict. 80   Granted, as the ICJ has 
observed, theft is indeed a crime that is prohibited in most domestic criminal 
jurisdictions.81  Nevertheless, prosecuting MNCs in domestic jurisdictions for aiding and 
abetting the theft of natural resources does not seem to reflect the gravity of their 
complicit perpetration in international crimes, which is really the heart of the issues 
discussed here.  Another concern is that modern day multinational corporations are 
commonly accused of complicity in crimes against humanity more often than complicity 
in war crimes.  Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a more detailed 
discussion examining corporate complicity in the war crime of pillaging. 
1.2 Terminology 
The writer proposes, for consistency and convenience, the following definitions for the 
terms used in this thesis. 
1.2.1 Business forms 
There are a number of business forms:   
a) Companies 
Incorporated companies operate as either proprietary companies or public 
companies. Specifically, proprietary companies are those that are registered 
pursuant to the provisions in the relevant corporations‘ legislation.82  This is 
                                                 
79
 Refer to definition of weak-governance zones at 1.2.3 of this thesis. 
80
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the position in Australia and most domestic jurisdictions that have company 
law provisions in place.83  Also, in Australia for instance, public companies are 
simply those companies other than proprietary companies.84 
There are four types of companies: companies limited by shares,85 companies 
limited by guarantees, 86  unlimited liability companies, 87  and no-liability 
companies.  No-liability companies are particularly relevant to the discussion 
in this thesis because they are unique to the mining sector.  With respect to this 
business form, these are mining companies that do not impose liabilities on 
their shareholders with respect to unpaid shares.88  In Australia, for example, 
only those companies whose sole objects are for mining purposes may operate 
through this business form.89 
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b) Corporations 
A corporation is a ‗legal entity created by a charter, prescription, or 
legislation.‘90  A corporation differs from other business entities in that it is 
treated as a separate legal entity by the law.91  
The terms ‗company‘ and ‗corporation‘ have different meanings.  The former 
does not have a definite legal meaning and it is spoken of in broad terms, 
whereas the latter is more precise and used to describe incorporated legal 
entities. 92   (This thesis adopts a similar approach when it uses the terms 
‗multinational businesses‘ and ‗multinational corporations‘, respectively.) 
c) Partnerships and joint ventures 
Partnerships are informal businesses; they are set up by persons who carry on 
business together with a view of making a profit.  Unlike companies, 
partnerships are not considered a separate legal entity.93 
Joint ventures are similar to partnerships.  Joint ventures are created to 
undertake a specific task in a specific time.94  Hence, one of the characteristics 
of a joint venture that distinguishes it from a partnership is that the former is 
                                                                                                                                                
disposal of ores, metals, minerals or other products of mining; (d) the carrying on of any business or 
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 ed, 1998) 99. 
92
 J F Corkery and Bruce Welling, Principles of Corporate Law in Australia (Scribblers Publishing, 2008) 
2–3. 
93
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ad hoc.95  The joint venturers combine their resources and share joint profits, 
but retain their separate identities throughout the venture initiative.96 
d) Multinational corporations 
A multinational corporation is also known as a transnational corporation or a 
multinational enterprise.  It is a commercial entity that is engaged in business 
activities in more than one State.97  Ordinarily, in the extractive industry for 
example, the headquarters of an MNC could be located in one State while 
operating business activities in other States through subsidiaries, partnerships, 
or joint ventures.98 
e) Other business forms 
There are other businesses forms.  These include sole proprietorships, 
cooperatives, incorporated associations, unincorporated associations, trusts, 
and franchises.99  However, the discussion of these specific business forms 
falls outside the scope of this thesis, as MNCs in the extractive industries, 
generally, do not operate through such business forms. 
1.2.2 Complicity 
Complicity is defined as: ‗the involvement of a person with an offence committed by 
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another which renders the person criminally liable for that offence …‘.100 
There are a number of modes of participation in crimes committed by other persons that 
establish liability in international criminal law.  These varied modes of criminal 
participation, used interchangeably at times, amount to ‗complicity‘.  These modes of 
participation include, inter alia: aiding and abetting; secondary or accomplice liability; 
encouraging; ordering; planning; procuring; counselling; instigating; facilitating; and, 
inciting.101 
1.2.3 Conflict-affected areas or weak-governance zones 
‗Conflict-affected areas‘ are those that are predominately rife with violence, armed 
conflict, or other risks of harm to the peace and security of civilians.102  These conflict-
affected areas are associated with widespread human rights abuses that amount to 
breaches of national or international law.103  
‗Weak-governance zones‘ are characterised by the failure of governments to safeguard 
political, economic and civic institutions, resulting in dysfunctional management of the 
public sector, debilitating public services, and egregious human rights violations.
104
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1.2.4 Criminal law 
Criminal law is a body of law that defines criminal offences and establishes the 
punishment for criminal offenders.105 
1.2.5 Extractive industries 
The phrase ‗extractive industries‘ traditionally describes activities in oil, gas, or mining 
operations.106  
1.2.6 Human rights 
Human rights are rights enshrined in what is commonly referred to as the International 
Bill of Rights.107  These rights include civil, political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights.  Human rights laws exist to promote and protect such rights. 
1.2.7 International crimes 
International crimes are acts defined as criminal pursuant to international law.  Defining 
acts as international crimes creates an international obligation on all legal or natural 
persons to refrain from the commission of those crimes.108 
There is ‗no definitive list‘ of international crimes, 109  as they are entrenched in 
international treaties and international customary law.  International crimes include those 
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of most serious concern to the international community, such as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, piracy, slavery, and torture.110  
1.2.8 International criminal law 
International criminal law is comprised of international law and criminal law. 111  
International criminal law imposes criminal liability for violations of international law.  
This body of law criminalises those offences referred to as international crimes.112  
1.2.9 Legal persons 
Legal persons are also referred to as ‗juridical persons‘, ‗juristic persons‘ or ‗personnes 
morales‟.113  A ‗juristic person‘ is defined as:  
… an entity, such as a corporation that is recognised as having legal personality 
(i.e. it is capable of enjoying and being subject to legal rights and duties).  It is 
contrasted with a human being, who is referred to as a natural person.
114
 
The actual technical term ‗legal person‘ is not defined in most legal dictionaries.  The 
term is, however, commonly defined in the context of a specific area of law, such as 
corporations law or taxation law.115 
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Examples of legal persons include: corporations, municipalities, partnerships, political 
parties, sovereigns, States, trade unions, trusts, churches, international organisations, and 
non-governmental organisations.116  
1.2.10 Liability of legal persons 
a) Derivative liability 
Derivative liability of legal persons is attributed from the culpability of an 
individual within an organisation.  There are two forms of derivative liability: 
vicarious liability, and identification liability.  Under vicarious liability, the 
organisation is liable for the actions of its individuals where those individuals 
are acting within the scope of their employment or authority.  The theory of 
identification liability differs slightly in that organisational liability is only 
established through the culpability of specific individuals who act as the 
‗directing minds‘ of the organisation.  For example: members of a board of 
directors and senior management.117 
b) Non-derivative liability 
With non-derivative liability, the organisation is treated as a separate legal 
                                                                                                                                                
person is an artificial legal person and is sometimes referred to as a body corporate …‘; (b) ‗Taxation 
law: All types of legal persons, as well as anything that in practice is treated as … a separate legal 
identity in the same way as a legal person does, are generally considered to be an entity for taxation…‘ 
116
 See generally, Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic 
Society (University of California Press, 1986); Janet McLean, ‗Government to State: Globalization, 
Regulation, and Governments as Legal Persons‘ (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
173, 174; Andrew Clapham, ‗The Complexity of International Criminal Law: Looking beyond 
Individual Responsibility to the Responsibility of Organisations, Corporations and States‘ in Ramesh 
Chandra Thakur (ed), From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for 
Justice in a World of States (United Nations University Press, 2004) 233. 
117
 See generally: Eric Colvin and Sanjeev Anand, Principles of Criminal Law (Thomson Carswell, 3
rd
 ed, 
2007) 122–133, Stephen Tully (ed), Research Handbook on Corporate Legal Responsibility (Edward 
Elgar, 2005) 147–152, James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths 
LexisNexis, 2003) 146–153. 
 –  29  –  
entity in its own right.  Hence, the culpability of the organisation itself, as 
opposed to the culpability of its individuals, is of primary concern.  Non-
derivative liability is established on the basis of ‗corporate policies, 
procedures, practices and attitudes; deficient chains of command and oversight; 
and corporate ―cultures‖ that tolerate or encourage criminal offences.‘118 
This form of liability is generally described by academics as ‗organisational 
liability‘.  However, the writer uses the term ‗non-derivative liability‘ to avoid 
confusion with organisational liability, defined below.  The writer also uses 
the term ‗non-derivative liability‘ to distinguish this from derivative liability. 
c) Organisational liability 
The writer uses the term ‗organisational liability‘ throughout this thesis when 
literally referring to the liability of an organisation.  The term ‗organisation‘, 
used in this context, refers, generally, to all manner of legal persons unless 
otherwise specified.  
1.2.11 Principal perpetrator 
A ‗principal perpetrator‘ is defined as: ‗the chief actor in the commission of a crime, that 
is, the person who directly commits the criminal act …‘.119  For the purposes of this 
thesis, the phrase ‗principal perpetrator‘ is used solely to differentiate a perpetrator that 
is criminally responsible for actually committing an international crime from one that is 
culpable through complicity in the same crime. 
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A ‗perpetrator‘ is defined as: ‗a person who commits a crime or offence…‘.120  
The term ‗principal‘ has several meanings in the English Language and is defined widely.  
However, the term includes: ‗the person who actually carries out a crime‘.121 
1.2.12 Regulatory initiative 
The term ‗regulatory initiative‘ is a broad term that this writer uses to describe major 
attempts at regulating the activities of multinational businesses.  These kinds of 
measures include international legal instruments and agreements as well as attempts at 
self-regulation initiated by multi-stakeholders in the international community.122  
1.2.13 Tort law 
Tort law allows injured parties to commence a civil action against a wrongdoer – that is, 
a legal or natural person, seeking damages or compensation for injuries sustained in the 
commission of wrongs,123 including international crimes.124 
1.3 Structure of this thesis 
Should there be jurisdiction over complicit organisational liability in international crimes?  
Where and how should an organisational entity that is complicit in international crimes 
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be prosecuted?  To answer these questions, this thesis discusses the rationale for 
corporate criminal liability, possible jurisdictional forums, organisational liability and 
complicity doctrines, and proposes draft legislation to amend the ICC Rome Statute. 
a) Criminal liability for business complicity in international crimes  
The nature of the corporate form has changed significantly over the centuries, 
more so during the last fifty years due to the globalisation trend.125  Oftentimes, 
modern corporations are accused of exercising unparalleled power in a manner 
that generally inflicts harm upon individuals and society.126  This has included 
corporate complicity in international crimes.  The extent of this growing 
problem supports the notion that international criminal law should exercise 
jurisdiction over corporations that are complicit in international crimes.    
Chapter 2 discusses whether there should be criminal liability for business 
complicity in the perpetration of international crimes. 
b) The rationale for corporate criminal liability 
The idea of holding a corporate entity criminally responsible for international 
crimes has been widely debated and continues to be controversial.  This thesis 
examines the notion of corporate liability as well as the complexities of 
multinational corporations which pose practical difficulties to the enforcement 
of any finding of liability. 
Chapter 3 discusses the rationale for corporate criminal liability. 
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c) Jurisdiction 
There are a number of forums from which to address the research question.  
These include: 
This thesis discusses these international, regional and domestic forums.  
Allowing for the principle of complementarity,131 this thesis proposes that the 
ICC is the preferred forum to deal with the liability of complicit multinational 
corporations, but only where domestic jurisdictions prove inadequate.  
Moreover, the Court‘s jurisdiction would need to be broadened to include legal 
persons.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis investigates where an organisation that is complicit in 
international crimes could be prosecuted.   
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d) Corporate liability doctrine 
Assuming that domestic jurisdictions prove inadequate to deal with complicit 
organisational liability, how would international forums, such as the ICC, 
address this issue?  This thesis discusses the organisational liability doctrine 
by examining the models of corporate criminal liability found in most 
domestic jurisdictions to determine which is preferred to transplant 
internationally within the ICC Rome Statute.  
There are at least two competing models of corporate criminal liability found 
in most domestic jurisdictions, specifically: the derivative liability model,132 
and the non-derivative liability model. 133   This thesis proposes that non-
derivative liability is the preferred model for corporate criminal liability.   
Chapter 5 discusses how an organisation that is complicit in international 
crimes could be prosecuted by examining organisational liability doctrine. 
e) Complicity doctrine 
Multinational corporations, be they publicly or privately owned business 
entities, are not the principal perpetrators at the heart of most egregious human 
rights violations.  Instead, they tend to be complicit perpetrators in such 
violations.134  Most often, complicit perpetration in international crimes by 
MNCs is in the form of aiding and abetting.  This has generally been done 
                                                 
132
 Derivative liability has two variations: vicarious liability and identification liability. These variations 
are discussed further throughout this thesis. See also generally, James Gobert and Maurice Punch, 
Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003) 146–153. 
133
 For an example of this model, see, Part 2.5, Division 12 of the Australian Criminal Code (Cth) 1995. 
This model is discussed further throughout this thesis. 
134
 FAFO, Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave 
Violations of International Law (2004) 12. 
 –  34  –  
through the provision of finance, infrastructure, materials, and logistic 
support.135 
According to customary international law established by ad hoc tribunals,136 
the material elements for aiding and abetting the commission of crimes are 
satisfied when an accused person provides practical assistance, encouragement, 
or moral support for the commission of a crime.137  Furthermore, it must be 
shown that the provision of such practical assistance, encouragement, or moral 
support bore a substantial effect on the crime.138  As for the mental element, it 
must be shown that the complicit perpetrator had knowledge that their actions 
would assist the commission of the crime.139  This is commonly referred to as 
the ‗knowledge‘ test. 
The ICC Rome Statute takes a different approach from customary international 
law in its aiding and abetting provisions.  It adopts what is commonly referred 
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to as the ‗purpose‘ test.140  Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute adopts the 
phrase ‗for the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime‘.141  The 
ICC Rome Statute does not explain the phrase further; understandably, this has 
generated much debate as to what the term ‗purpose‘ means when adopted in 
this manner.  There are a number of interpretations put forward by leading 
academics and international criminal law practitioners.  However, those 
interpretations tend to exclude both complicit multinational corporations and 
individual business people from falling within the purview of Article 25(3)(c) 
of the ICC Rome Statute. 
There are alternative forms of complicity in the commission of crimes, which 
are explored later in this thesis.  For instance, some academics propose that 
multinational corporations could be liable for contributing to a crime by a 
group of persons pursuant to Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Rome Statute.142   
Chapter 6 continues the discussion on how an organisation that is complicit in 
international crimes could be prosecuted by examining complicity doctrine.      
                                                 
140
 This purpose test is also applied at the IHT and the Panels of Judges with Exclusive Jurisdiction over 
Serious Criminal Offences Established within the East Timor District Courts (hereafter referred to as 
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 See, Hans Vest, ‗Business Leaders and the Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility under 
International Law‘ (2010) 8(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 851; see also, Norman 
Farrell, ‗Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors: Some Lessons from the International 
Tribunals‘, (2010) 8(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 873. 
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f) Recommendations 
This thesis recommends that the ICC State Parties should revisit the ICC 
Rome Statute in order to include jurisdiction over complicit legal persons.  For 
this reason, the thesis proposes draft legislation to extend the existing Article 
25 of the ICC Rome Statute provision that deals solely with individual 
criminal responsibility.  Specifically, organisational criminal liability 
provisions are proposed; these could be incorporated into the ICC Rome 
Statute as Article 25B.  The thesis also proposes amendments to Article 
25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute to do away with the purpose test altogether, 
that is, the wording ‗for the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a 
crime …‘.  This would widen the applicability of the aiding and abetting 
provisions to include characteristic forms of corporate complicity in crimes, 
which at present are excluded by virtue of the restrictive definition.  This 
would bring the ICC Rome Statute provisions on aiding and abetting in line 
with customary international law.143  Finally, the thesis proposes Article 77B, 
which would stipulate the appropriate punishments and penalties for legal 
persons.  This new provision would extend the existing provision found in 
Article 77 of the ICC Rome Statute that currently deals with the applicable 
penalties meted out on natural persons. 
Chapter 7 concludes the discussion on how an organisation that is complicit in 
international crimes could be prosecuted by proposing draft legislation to 
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 Article 30(1) of the ICC Rome Statute stipulates a general mental element. The provision states: ‗Unless 
otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime 
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knowledge.‘ 
 –  37  –  
address the problem. 
g) Thesis conclusion 
Chapter 8 summarises the thesis chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Criminal Liability for Business Complicity in International Crimes 
„It matters what we do. But it also matters how we do it, and whether it works.‟ 144 
2.1 Chapter introduction 
The previous chapter briefly outlined the research problem and identified the major areas 
of legal doctrine addressed by this thesis. This chapter addresses the issue of whether 
there should be criminal liability for business complicity in international crimes.  Three 
core questions emerge with respect to the examination of this issue: 
1. What does it mean to allege business complicity in international crimes? 
2. What is currently being done to regulate the business activities of 
multinational businesses?  
3. Is the current regulatory approach sufficient? 
2.2 What does it mean to allege business complicity in international crimes? 
Numerous multinational businesses operate globally through business enterprises or 
supply chains.145  These multinational businesses often operate in countries embroiled in 
armed conflict, or they operate where crimes against humanity occur.146  This is more 
commonly the case with those businesses operating in the extractive industries.  They 
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 Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, ‗Keynote Speech‘ (Paper presented at GOJIL International Conference: 
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<http://www.oecd.org>. 
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also operate in weak-governance zones where the countries face socio-economic 
challenges.  Some of these challenges include waning economies, poor employment 
conditions, and dominant foreign direct investors, coupled with inadequate corporate 
social responsibility standards.147   
Regrettably, instances of corporations inflicting harm upon individuals and society in the 
course of their business activities are increasing. 148   This has resulted in corporate 
activities coming under the spotlight now more than ever in the twenty-first century.  
Corporate behaviour that was once trivialised or brushed aside is now of major concern 
to the international community at large,149 to the extent that the UNSRSG applauded the 
campaign efforts of civil rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, among others.  These groups have continually mounted pressure and campaigned 
on legal and political international platforms calling for complicit corporate entities to be 
held liable for the often criminal consequences of their actions.150  
Corporations are, typically, not the principal perpetrators in the commission of 
international crimes; instead, they tend to be complicit perpetrators.151  In most instances, 
the principal perpetrator is often a State entity, a notorious rebel group, another 
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 Michael J Gilbert and Steve Russell, ‗Globalisation of Criminal Justice in the Corporate Context‘ 
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and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including 
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 –  40  –  
organisational entity, or even an individual.152   
International bodies153 and leading academics have discussed the problem of corporate 
complicity in international crimes;154 however, what constitutes complicity has neither 
been uniform nor static. 155   Generally, the ordinary language meaning of the term 
‗complicity‘ originates from the Latin complicāre meaning ‗… ―folding together‖, an 
entwining; but it is also an intricacy, a complexity; and finally, and more conventionally, 
it is being party to or involved in wrongdoing, as an accomplice, in a ―bad 
confederacy‖.‘156  The term ‗complicity‘ also has a strict legal meaning.  It is defined in 
legal dictionaries as: ‗the involvement of a person with an offence committed by another 
which renders the person criminally liable for that offence …‘.157  In this context, there 
are a number of modes of participation in the commission of crimes that, used 
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 See, Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
265. 
153
 For example, the UN Global Compact, <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>; also, ICJ, Corporate 
Complicity in International Crimes (2008) 3 volumes <http://www.icj.org>. 
154
 For example, Andrew Clapham, ‗State Responsibility, Corporate Responsibility, and Complicity in 
Human Rights‘ in Lene Bomann-Larsen and Oddny Wiggen (eds), Responsibility in World Business: 
Managing Harmful Side-Effects of Corporate Activity (United Nations University Press, 2004); 
Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, ‗Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses‘ 
(2001) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 339; Anita Ramasastry, ‗Mapping the 
Web of Liability: The Expanding Geography of Corporate Accountability in Domestic Jurisdictions‘ 
(October 2008) <http://198.170.85.29/Anita-Ramasastry-commentary.pdf>; Anita Ramasastry, 
‗Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon - An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and 
their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations‘ (2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of 
International Law 91; Rachel Chambers, ‗The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing 
Law on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses‘ (Fall 2005) Human Rights Brief 14; Margaret 
Jungk, ‗A Practical Guide to Addressing Human Rights Concerns for Companies Operating Abroad‘ 
in Michael K Addo (ed), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations (Kluwer Law International, 1999).  
155
 UNSRSG Report, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development „Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of 
Influence” and “Complicity”‟, UN Doc, A/HRC/8/16 (15 May 2008), [70]. 
156
 Scott Veitch, ‗Complicity‘ (1999) 5(2) Res Publica 227, 227; note italicised emphasis appears in the 
original source. 
157
 Peter Butt (ed), Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis, 3
rd
 ed, 2004). 
 –  41  –  
interchangeably, amount to complicity.  These include, inter alia: ordering, instigating, 
soliciting, inducing, inciting, aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise, planning, 
preparing, attempting, and conspiracy. 158   Of these complicit modes, multinational 
corporations are often accused of aiding and abetting international crimes. 159  Corporate 
complicity in international crimes has included the provision of finance, infrastructure, 
materials, and logistical support. 160   To illustrate the point, suppose an MNC 
manufacturing mobile phones were to source natural resources, such as coltan,161 from a 
buying house that obtained the resources from African local traders in the extractive 
industries.  There could be a risk of complicity in any egregious human rights violations 
perpetrated in extracting that coltan.162  This would happen if, for instance, warlords 
illegally controlling the mining site, or the security forces protecting it, committed 
widespread or systematic abuses, such as torture, sexual violence, or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment. 163   Depending on the circumstances, these criminal acts may 
amount to crimes against humanity, as prohibited under Article 7 of the ICC Rome 
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Statute.164  This illustration shows why MNCs should be mindful of potentially falling 
within the purview of international criminal law when sourcing products or services 
from supply chains that acquire natural resources originating from conflict-affected areas 
or weak-governance zones.165 
In addition, business enterprises may be liable for aiding and abetting crimes against 
humanity, even though they did not participate in the entire plan or attack.  Business 
enterprises may even find themselves liable for a single act involving human rights 
abuses that amount to international crimes.166  A business could be liable if it provides 
assistance for just one attack that is part of widespread or systematic attacks, and does so 
with the knowledge that it is assisting such attacks.167  By way of illustration, the ICJ 
cautions that: 
… if a company offers trucks, the use of airstrips, fuel, helicopters, shelters or 
buildings or provides services that substantially assist the principal perpetrator to 
carry out one act such as killing, unlawful destruction of houses, rape or other acts 
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of torture, and this act forms part of a widespread or systematic attack, there may be 
a basis for criminal liability of the company representative for aiding and abetting 
crimes against humanity.168 
The situation with Australian multinational corporation Anvil Mining illustrates this 
further.  Anvil was accused of complicity in international crimes when it provided 
logistic support for the commission of crimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo.169  It 
is alleged that, in October 2004, a small group of insurgents occupied the DRC mining 
town of Kilwa.  Anvil evacuated its staff from the region and provided charter planes 
and trucks to transport the pro-government military to protect the company‘s mining 
operations.  The military then secured the mining site, but launched attacks against the 
people of Kilwa, who were believed to have been sympathetic to the insurgents.  The 
military recaptured the town; it also committed crimes of mass execution, arbitrary arrest, 
rape, and torture. 170   Later, a handful of military officials were charged with the 
commission of crimes, including war crimes.  Three employees of Anvil Mining were 
also charged with aiding and abetting the criminal offences perpetrated by the military.171  
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2.3 What is currently being done to regulate the business activities of 
multinational businesses? 
In recent years, the international community has played an increasing role in attempts to 
regulate the activities of multinational businesses.  Multi-stakeholders in the 
international community have engaged in lengthy discussions on a multilateral basis 
with respect to this issue.  This has resulted in the creation of largely voluntary 
frameworks that encourage corporations to apply a set of human rights guidelines or 
principles to their daily operations.172  Most of these initiatives have, to some extent, 
added value and influenced the way in which MNCs do business.173  Business enterprises 
in the oil and gas industries have been at the forefront in adopting voluntary codes as 
part of their corporate social responsibilities.174  Regulatory initiatives with respect to 
MNCs have been introduced in both domestic175 and international176 jurisdictions; the 
discussion in this thesis will focus on the latter.   
Generally, in international jurisdictions, the regulation of multinational businesses has 
included initiatives such as, inter alia: the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, revised in 2011; the Equator 
Principles, launched in 2006; the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human 
Rights, adopted in 2003; and, the United Nations Global Compact, launched in 2000.  
More specifically, regulation of MNCs within the extractive industries has included 
initiatives such as, inter alia: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Principles, 
adopted in 2003; Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, established in 
2000; and, the Kimberley Process, launched in 2000.  These general and specific 
initiatives are discussed in detail below.  A major concern with these initiatives is that 
they have not developed adequate implementation strategies or efficient sanctions.  With 
respect to this shortcoming, the regulatory initiatives are often seen as ‗soft law‘.  The 
term ‗soft law‘ is used because the initiatives do not place legally enforceable obligations 
on the parties.177  Soft law is widely criticised and depicted as window dressing, or law 
that falls short on the dimensions of legalisation.178  This gap in the current regulatory 
initiatives creates a concern when it comes to addressing corporate accountability for 
human rights violations.179  Hence, in assessing these initiatives it becomes apparent that 
there is a need for tougher measures to regulate the activities of multinational businesses. 
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2.3.1 Regulating the business activities of MNCs – generally 
The initiatives discussed here generally deal with the regulation of multinational 
corporations; they are also relevant to those MNCs specifically operating in the 
extractive industries. 
a) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (revised in 2011) 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 180  has 
developed a number of international instruments that deal with the liability of 
complicit corporations.181  A prime example is its Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, which were crafted in 1976. 182   Since then, these have been 
revised on several occasions, the most recent in mid 2011.183 
Human rights are one of many issues that the Guidelines address.  They 
implore business enterprises to adopt more effective policies and appropriate 
management control systems to: respect human rights; avoid contributing to 
human rights violations; avoid being linked to abuses through their business 
operations, products, or services; follow due diligence on human rights issues; 
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and, put policies in place that respect rights.184  In doing so, the Guidelines 
reflect non-derivative liability in that the corporate culture and policies of the 
multinational enterprises are of primary concern (the principles of this doctrine 
are discussed later in this thesis). 
In addition, the Guidelines establish national contact points to deal with issues 
pertaining to corporate conduct.185  Global Witness v Afrimex (UK) Ltd186 is an 
example of how the NCPs deal with the corporate social responsibilities of 
MNCs.  The matter involved a complaint brought by Global Witness who 
alleged that Afrimex Ltd, a British corporation, had breached the Guidelines 
when it bribed rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and also 
purchased various minerals from mining corporations in the DRC that 
employed child and forced labour.  The British NCP, in its official findings, 
came to the conclusion that Afrimex had contributed to the engagement of 
child and forced labour.  Also, it was found to have failed to adequately ensure 
that its business operations complied with occupational health and safety 
standards. 187   In doing so, Afrimex breached the Guidelines. The NCP 
delivered an official statement that, after approval by the Minister for Trade 
and Consumer Affairs, would be placed in the public libraries of the House of 
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Commons and the House of Lords.188  The assumption could be made that this 
was done to deter corporations that do not wish to incur public disapproval or 
damage to their reputations.  No further steps were taken against Afrimex.  
Hence, a major concern with the Guidelines is that, because they are voluntary, 
they are not legally enforceable. This is a limitation expressly provided in the 
Guidelines themselves.189 
b) The Equator Principles (2006) 
The Equator Principles190 are a set of guidelines launched by leading banks, 
and aimed at financing projects with capital costs of US$10 million or more.191 
There are ten principles in total, at least two of which are relevant to the 
discussion here.  Principle 2 deals with the social and environmental 
assessment for proposed projects.  To obtain funding, each project is classified 
as either a Category A192 or Category B project.193  The classification takes into 
account the particular social and environmental impacts and risks for that 
project.  This includes, among other indicators, ‗protections of human rights 
and community health, safety and security (including risks, impacts and 
management of the project‘s use of security personnel).‘ 194   Principle 3 
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addresses compliance with the overall applicable social and environmental 
standards, assessed by applying the International Finance Corporation 
Standards, 195  as well as industry-specific environmental, health, and safety 
guidelines.196 
As much as the EPs provide useful guidelines for project financing, they could 
also cover the financing of higher-end projects below the stipulated monetary 
limit, and broaden their criteria to apply to all risk categories, not just 
Category A projects.197  Moreover, the EPs, which account for up to 80 per 
cent of the global financing of commercial projects,198 are voluntary. 
The challenge with project financing, in general, is with respect to the criminal 
responsibility that may arise from the provision of financial services to 
business enterprises that may be complicit in international crimes. 199   The 
commercial financier‘s liability may be too remote.  In this view, there may be 
instances where there are allegations of armed groups located in countries that 
are rich in natural resources who ‗self-finance‘ their criminal activities in on-
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going conflicts by trading such resources with individuals and companies.200  It 
is believed that these groups perpetrate serious crimes to control the areas 
where they operate and to exploit the natural resources they obtain.201  The 
rules of secondary liability could result in the complicity of companies (as 
well as individuals) who trade with such groups202 – but what of the liability of 
those who financed the companies themselves?  One could argue that these 
commercial financiers are actually supporting the commission of crimes by 
keeping the project going.  In this regard, the commercial financiers could be 
liable for aiding future crimes, assuming they had anticipated that this would 
be the likely result.203  However, it seems doubtful in these circumstances that 
commercial financiers would be held liable for the commission of future 
crimes.  Unless it could be shown that they had significantly facilitated the 
commission of future crimes, they would not be considered complicit in a 
perpetrator‘s crimes.  This may cast the net of liability far too wide to attribute 
criminal responsibility.204  
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c) United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights (2003) 
The United Nations‘ Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights205 
were developed by the former Sub-commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights.206  The Norms are a draft UN instrument.  They 
require that States should bear the primary duty to protect human rights 
standards. Additionally, transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises bear a legal duty to protect human rights by virtue of their business 
activities and spheres of influence.207  The Norms, written in language similar 
to that adopted in most treaties, 208  are best described as codes of conduct 
relating to corporate social responsibility.209  For example, paragraph two of 
the Norms cautions business enterprises not to benefit from or find themselves 
caught up in war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or other similar 
violations of international law.  Furthermore, paragraph 12 proposes that 
businesses steer clear of such entanglements by upholding the fundamental 
freedoms enshrined in the International Bill of Rights in the course of their 
business dealings.  
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A major drawback with the kinds of obligations drafted by the Norms is that 
they fall short of articulating precisely how businesses can actually go about 
integrating such expectations into their business activities.210  
Also, the UN Human Rights Council did not adopt the Norms.211  They were 
superseded by the UNSRSGs ‗Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework‘.212 
d) United Nations Global Compact (2000) 
The United Nations Global Compact is a corporate citizenship and 
sustainability initiative that focuses on human rights, labour, environment, and 
anti-corruption.213  This platform encourages multi-stakeholder dialogue with 
respect to its ten principles.  The first two are relevant to this thesis, and 
address the issue of businesses and complicity in human rights violations.  The 
first principle states that ‗businesses should support and respect the protection 
of internationally proclaimed human rights.‘214  The second principle implores 
businesses to ‗make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.‘215  
With regards to these principles, the UN cautions that businesses, depending 
on the exact nature of their activities, could, in fact, find themselves liable for 
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complicity in international crimes.  The UN states: 
Human rights issues have become increasingly important as the nature 
and scope of business has changed. Different actors have different roles 
to play and it is important for business to be aware of the contemporary 
factors that have made human rights an organizational issue … where an 
international crime is involved, complicity may arise where a company 
assisted in the perpetration of the crime, the assistance had a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of the crime and the company knew that its acts 
would assist the perpetration of the crime even if it did not intend for the 
crime to be committed.216 
With respect to corporate complicity, the Global Compact provides that there 
are at least three forms of this: direct, beneficial, and silent.217  In essence, 
these involve corporations directly or indirectly assisting the principal 
perpetrator/s, or benefiting in some way from the perpetration of a crime.218 
Direct complicity is said to take place when the complicit legal person assists 
the principal perpetrator, and actively participates in the human rights 
violations.219  According to the Global Compact, an example of this would be 
if a company ‗assists in the forced relocation of peoples in circumstances 
related to business activity.‘220  For another example, Anvil Mining‘s actions 
in the provision of logistic support to secure its mining site in the DRC, 
                                                 
216
 The UN Global Compact website, <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
217
 UN Global Compact <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>.  
218
 For general discussion with respect to the links between the concepts of direct, beneficial and silent 
complicity and concepts of complicity in criminal law see, Andrew Clapham and Scott Jerbi, 
‗Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses‘ (2001) 24 Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review 339, 340–349. 
219
 UN Global Compact, Commentary on ‗Principle 2: Businesses should make sure they are not complicit 
in human rights abuses‘ <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
220
 UN Global Compact, Commentary on ‗Principle 2: Businesses should make sure they are not complicit 
in human rights abuses‘ <http://www.unglobalcompact.org>. 
 –  54  –  
discussed earlier, would take the form of direct complicity.221 Of the three 
forms, direct complicity most closely reflects the criminal culpability incurred 
for aiding and abetting international crimes. 
Beneficial complicity 222 is where a corporation gains some advantage from 
human rights abuses perpetrated by someone else.223  As the Global Compact 
states, this occurs when there are ‗violations committed by security forces, 
such as the suppression of a peaceful protest against business activities or the 
use of repressive measures while guarding company facilities.‘ 224   The 
difficulty with this category of organisational complicity is that, on its own, 
beneficial complicity is not likely to incur criminal liability.   Merely gaining a 
benefit from human rights abuses would probably, at most, result in negative 
public perception of the corporation.225 
Silent complicity occurs when a corporation fails to query systematic or 
continuing human rights violations in the course of its business dealings with 
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the appropriate authorities.226  According to the Global Compact, an example 
of this is evidenced by ‗inaction or acceptance by companies of systematic 
discrimination in employment law against particular groups on the grounds of 
ethnicity or gender could bring accusations of silent complicity.‘ 227   Like 
beneficial complicity, the mere silent presence of a corporation in an 
environment of human rights violations is unlikely to incur criminal 
liability.228  However, the corporation may be liable if it could be shown that 
its silence substantially contributed to the commission of the crime, and the 
principal perpetrator saw the corporation‘s presence as authorising or 
exhorting the criminal activity229 – for example, if corporate personnel are at 
the scene or in the vicinity of the crime.230  
2.3.2 Specific regulation of the business activities of MNCs operating within the 
extractive industries 
The regulatory initiatives discussed here are specific to those multinational corporations 
operating within the extractive industries. 
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a) Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Principles (2003) 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative231 is an international scheme 
established in 2002 by governments and the private sector to enhance the 
management and good governance of natural resources.  This is achieved by 
encouraging the publication and corroboration of government revenues 
obtained from the extractive industries.232  
The EITI is governed by wide-ranging principles and criteria that emerged in 
2003, and finalised by the EITI Board in 2007.  For example, the first 
principle recognises that mismanaged wealth generated from the natural 
resources sector can negatively impact economic and social growth. 
Alternatively, when managed appropriately, such natural resources could 
combat poverty and pave the way for sustainable development. 233  
Additionally, one of the many EITI criteria purports that payments made by 
companies to governments should be published regularly; likewise, 
governments should publicly make available details about revenues generated 
from extractive companies.234  
One of the major strengths of the EITI process is that it makes a significant 
amount of information available about revenues from the sale of minerals to 
ordinary citizens. 235   This may be viewed positively as an opportunity for 
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governments implementing EITI to form social contracts with their people.236  
However, the reality, at least with some of the EITI African signatories, is that 
accurate reporting on revenues seems unlikely given that a number of these 
countries are plagued by corruption, civil unrest, or oppressive governments.237  
Besides, the EITI implementation process is voluntary, and there are no 
measures in place to stop misappropriation of State revenues stemming from 
the extractive industries, or incentives to implement safeguards against such 
malpractice.238  Moreover, the initiative fails to penalise wrongful behaviour 
on the part of any of its economic actors.239 
b) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (2000) 
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 240  have been 
incorporated in a number of agreements between corporations and host 
governments.241 The Voluntary Principles were introduced to assist extractive 
industry corporations to carry out their activities in an environment that 
ensured respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.242 
Of all the MNC regulatory initiatives, the Voluntary Principles are the most 
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detailed.243  They are divided into three categories, offering practical advice on: 
risk assessment; relations with public security; and, relations with private 
security. 244   For example, on the issue of risk assessment, the Voluntary 
Principles urge companies to:  
… consider the available human rights records of public security forces, 
paramilitaries, local and national law enforcement, as well as the 
reputation of private security. Awareness of past abuses and allegations 
can help Companies to avoid recurrences as well as to promote 
accountability. Also, identification of the capability of the above entities 
response to situations of violence in a lawful manner (i.e., consistent 
with applicable international standards) allows Companies to develop 
appropriate measures in operating environments.245 
A concern with the Voluntary Principles is that they fail to impose mandatory 
legal obligations upon the extractive MNCs.  They are voluntary as the name 
suggests, but there is no pressure to join the initiative.  Corporations that no 
longer want to be bound by such voluntary frameworks can easily opt out.246 
c) The Kimberley Process (2000) 
The Kimberley Process was initiated by Southern African diamond-producing 
States to combat the trade in conflict diamonds, and put an end to the 
financing of violence stemming from diamond revenue.247  The scheme was 
initiated in 2000 to support the international certification of rough diamonds, 
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and it is said to account for up to 99.8% of diamond production worldwide.248 
Participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme are required to 
meet minimum standards, which are itemised in Section IV of the Scheme.  It 
provides general recommendations for diamond mining activities carried out 
in conflict areas, and provides specific recommendations on: how to go about 
securing diamond mines; the licensing of small-scale diamond mining; the 
registration and licensing of buyers, sellers, exporters, agents or couriers of 
rough diamonds; the certification for export processes; the communication of 
import processes; and, the shipping of rough diamonds within free-trade zones. 
The recommendations in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme do not 
form the basis of a legally binding treaty.  This has led to the criticism that the 
certification process lacks teeth.249  The certification process does not sanction 
non-compliance by its members; neither does it have a regulatory body in 
place to enforce its standards. 250   Ultimately, the process is a certification 
initiative that deals with country compliance, not business compliance. 
2.3.3 Is the current regulatory approach sufficient? 
Examination of the existing regulatory initiatives shows they face numerous challenges 
to regulate the behaviour of multinational corporations.  The bulk of these initiatives 
were developed between 2000 and 2003.  Yet, in spite of them, allegations about the 
complicity of MNCs in the commission of international crimes continue to be an 
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increasing issue of concern.  In 2006, well after the international community adopted 
regulatory initiatives to prohibit corporate human rights abuses, the UNSRSG released 
an interim report that found – among other issues – corporations were complicit in the 
commission of crimes in a number of industrial sectors.  Top of the list were the 
extractive industries.251  According to the UNSRSG 2006 interim report, ‗the extractive 
sector is unique because no other sector has as enormous and as intrusive a social and 
environmental footprint.‘ 252   Moreover, the UNSRSG found that two-thirds of the 
allegations concerning corporate human rights abuses related to extractive corporations, 
which were often accused of complicity in crimes against humanity.253   
Given the many regulatory initiatives, and the increasing concern with corporate 
criminal liability, it is apparent that the initiatives have failed to create legally 
enforceable obligations that compel businesses to adhere to basic human rights 
standards.254  However, for the most part, the regulatory initiatives have not been entirely 
ineffective.  They have set standards for best practice for multinational corporations and, 
above all, have heightened the need for even tougher measures.   
A number of these regulatory initiatives contain provisions obliging States to criminalise 
conduct emanating from the extraction and trade of natural resources sourced from 
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conflict-affected areas.255  However, these instruments adopt an ‗indirect enforcement 
method‘.  This means that the obligation is not placed directly on the corporation, but the 
State, which is then required to criminalise corporate misconduct at a domestic level.256  
Granted, States bear a primary responsibility to protect human rights.  The reality 
remains though that some States – particularly those in conflict-affected areas or weak-
governance zones – are simply not in a position to do so.257  Although most domestic 
jurisdictions apply at least one of the corporate liability models,258 there are a number of 
reasons why they are not in a position to deal with misconduct carried out through the 
corporate form.  One reason is the economic influence exerted by MNCs; especially 
those operating in the extractive industries.259     
There can be little doubt that multinational corporations wield significant power and 
economic influence on the environments in which they operate. 260   As early as the 
seventeenth century, the British, Dutch, and French East India Companies, as well as the 
Hudson‘s Bay Company, were among the earliest companies to display the 
characteristics of today‘s multinational enterprises.261  The changing nature of corporate 
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power could be seen by mid-nineteenth century, as companies actively influenced the 
global economy.  This is evidenced by the significant increase in the number of 
companies that owned or controlled manufacturing activities in more than one country.262  
Since then, multinational corporations have grown to become powerful economic actors.  
It is estimated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development that, by 
2002, up to 29 of the 100 largest economies in the world were MNCs.263  UNCTAD also 
estimated in its World Investment Report (2002) that there were at least 65,000 MNCs 
operating worldwide.264  At that time, these corporations grossed sales of approximately 
US$19 trillion.  This represented 11% of the world‘s gross domestic product.265  In 2008, 
UNCTAD reported that the number of MNCs had increased worldwide to 79,000, with 
sales grossing US$31 trillion.266  In 2011, it was estimated that there were approximately 
80,000 MNCs operating worldwide, with at least 800,000 subsidiaries.267  What is also 
clear is that these large corporations were active in most industries: extraction, leather 
and footwear, information and communication, food and beverage, textile and clothing, 
automobile, electronics, medical and healthcare, cosmetics, and construction.  Moreover, 
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a common denominator connecting these industries was their reliance on the extractive 
industries.  For example, as illustrated in Figure 1 below, the apparel and footwear 
industries rely upon the extractive industries to supply them with rubber, a much-needed 
raw material, for the production of consumer-end products, such as sneakers.268  Hence, it 
appears that the extractive industries play a vital role in contributing resources to most 
economic sectors, which places them in a uniquely powerful position.269  
 
 
 
Despite their economic strength, multinational corporations do not always act 
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Figure 1 – The inter-relationship between extractive industries and other 
industrial sectors 
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responsibly or respect human rights.270  There are a number of reasons why corporations 
– particularly those engaged in the extraction of natural resources – may get caught up in 
international crimes.  Extraction activities require substantial capital investments.  At 
times, minimising the risk of losing such an investment seems to be one of the reasons 
why corporations will remain in country or an area that is prone to conflict, and 
consequently become involved in international crimes.271 Granted, in this context, MNCs 
expose themselves to risk by choosing to carry out their extractive activities in conflict-
affected areas or weak-governance zones.  
It appears that there is a need to seriously assess the activities of MNCs accused of 
complicity in international crimes and to ask: is this a crime?  And, if so, what should be 
done about it?  On the face, it seems that pernicious corporate conduct is a crime, and 
there is a pressing need for a doctrine of corporate liability in international criminal law 
to address the liability of complicit multinational businesses; particularly, in 
circumstances where domestic jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to prosecute the 
businesses.272  Regrettably, there are no multilateral or international judicial mechanisms 
in place in international criminal law to address this issue.  As a result, corporations aid 
and abet international crimes, and do so with impunity.    
2.4 Chapter conclusion 
The writer examined whether there should be criminal liability for business complicity in 
international crimes, and discussed what it means to allege business complicity in 
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international crimes, what is currently being done to regulate the business activities of 
MNCs, and whether the current regulatory approach is sufficient. 
The next chapter deals with the rationale for corporate criminal liability.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Rationale for Corporate Criminal Liability 
„… corporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be condemned. 
They therefore do as they like.‟273 
3.1 Chapter introduction  
The previous chapter examined whether there should be criminal liability for business 
complicity in international crimes. This chapter discusses the rationale for corporate 
criminal liability with respect to corporate complicity in the commission of international 
crimes in conflict-affected areas or weak-governance zones.  Essentially, all corporate 
actors who are responsible for corporate crimes should be held accountable, whether it is 
the corporate entity or the corporate personnel.274  This chapter is mainly concerned with 
the rationale for the culpability of the corporate entity itself.  
3.2 Rationale for corporate criminal liability 
The discussion that follows examines the issue of whether corporate criminal liability 
should be imposed at all, practical difficulties stemming from the nature of MNCs, the 
issue of unfairness to shareholders, and fundamental objections arising from the nature 
of criminal and international law.    
3.2.1 What is the point? 
Ostensibly, the liability of corporate personnel has held more appeal in criminal law than 
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looking beyond the individuals to the culpability of the corporate entity itself.275  On this 
view, the rationale sometimes advanced is that corporate crime is merely indicative of a 
corporate governance issue relating to a principal/agent problem, whereby the criminal 
offence essentially lies with deviant corporate individuals.276   
Generally, the idea of holding a corporate entity criminally responsible for international 
crimes has been widely debated and continues to be controversial.  Andrew Clapham 
recalls deliberations held at the 1998 UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court with respect to whether to include 
legal persons within the ICC‘s jurisdiction.  Clapham comments that the query raised by 
a number of delegates at that time was ‗what would be the point?‘.277   
There are a number of reasons why criminal liability should extend to the corporate 
entity and not be confined to the corporate personnel of the business enterprise.   
Firstly, imposing criminal sanctions on corporate entities is necessary to indicate 
society‘s condemnation of the corporate wrongdoing.278    Corporations have been known 
to engage in business activities that inflict harm upon society; hence, as societal actors, it 
is expected that by imposing criminal liability, corporations will be brought before the 
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most authoritative regulatory mechanism available in society.279    
Secondly, imposing corporate criminal liability is necessary to deter corporations from 
engaging in criminal activities.  Although explanations vary, criminal penalties that tend 
to be imposed sporadically, or even leniently, are seen as the leading reason for the 
failure to deter corporations from engaging in criminal activities. 280   The deterrence 
theory distinguishes between its general and specific forms.281  Specific deterrence is 
concerned with punishing criminals so as to deter them from committing criminal 
offences again.282  Corporate punishment could take a number of forms – for example, a 
corporate death penalty, or subjecting the entity to a probationary period during which 
the courts monitor its business activities.283  General deterrence is concerned with what 
effect punishing a specific offender will have on society at large, given that it might 
dissuade society from trying to engage in similar criminal conduct.284  Some see general 
deterrence as the more appropriate rationale for corporate criminal liability, and rightly 
so.  This is premised on the notion that corporate entities – through their senior 
management – tend to pay close attention to similar cases that have gone before the 
courts.  They do this when weighing up the risks and rewards of whatever business 
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activities they are about to engage in.285     
Thirdly, imposing corporate criminal liability would allow for sanctions against 
corporate assets – which, in turn, could generate funds for victims or their 
beneficiaries.286   On this view, corporate entities are likely to have substantially more 
assets than the corporate personnel.  This also increases the likelihood of securing funds 
when enforcing a court order.287   
Finally, extending liability to the corporate entity would be beneficial because culpable 
individuals are not always easily identifiable.288  At times, undesirable conduct is carried 
out through the business form, which inevitably makes it difficult to identify culpable 
individuals.  This uncanny ability of multinational enterprises to operate through various 
business forms poses challenges in attributing liability.  Also, large multinational 
corporations often experience considerable movement of business personnel through 
their global organisation.  They tend to experience a high turnover of corporate 
personnel.  Individuals come and go and are easily replaced in the global business 
operations.  This too, makes it difficult to identify culpable individuals.289   
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3.2.2 Are there practical difficulties stemming from the nature of MNCs? 
There are several characteristic features of multinational corporations.  These features, 
discussed below, include, inter alia: participating in large-scale, cross-border activities; 
adopting complex organisational structures; and, implementing wide-ranging internal 
control systems.  The discussion shows that, in some instances, a number of these 
characteristic features pose practical difficulties with respect to enforcing individual 
liability on corporate personnel.  In other instances, these characteristic features even 
make it difficult to identify culpable enterprises within the same corporate group; hence, 
legal theories such as ‗piercing the corporate veil‘ then become indispensible tools to 
identify the real controllers of the business enterprise. 
a) Participation in large-scale cross-border activities 
Multinational corporations participate in large-scale, cross-border activities.  
They essentially enjoy multi-jurisdictional status.  By definition, MNCs are 
commercial entities that are engaged in business activities in more than one 
State.290  The headquarters of an MNC could be located in one State while 
operating business activities in other States through subsidiaries or other 
contractual relationships.291  For instance, international sales are one of the 
many distinguishing features that make a company multinational in character.  
The most basic level of multinational activity occurs when a company 
manufactures goods in its own country that are then sold in another country by 
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its affiliated businesses.292   Also, goods may be manufactured in one country 
from materials primarily sourced from another country, then sold in other 
countries.293   
The economic boom experienced during the globalisation era largely 
influenced the emergence of multinational corporations, particularly in the 
aftermath of World War II.294  Since then, MNCs have been perceived as 
symbolising the globalisation phenomenon itself.295  Globalisation is defined 
as: ‗the worldwide trend of cross-border economic integration that allows 
businesses to expand beyond their domestic boundaries.‘ 296   One of the 
consequences of globalisation is that the inter-connectedness of global 
economies has created an environment in which businesses are capable of 
carrying out their activities anywhere in the world while engaging with anyone 
of their choosing.297  In this context, MNCs are powerful economic actors; they 
exercise tremendous economic power that, one could argue, largely runs 
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unchecked.298  They are not created by any single law; neither does any single 
law define the exact nature of their business activities. Nor are they regulated 
solely by the laws of one jurisdiction.299         
b) Adoption of complex organisational structures 
Multinational corporations typically adopt complex organisational structures.  
The term ‗organisational structure‘ literally describes the structure of an 
organisation.  To optimise their business activities, multinational corporations 
adopt a number of organisational structures; these are widely recognised by 
leading business management experts.300  Often, the organisational structures 
adopted by MNCs are seen as complex,301 and it appears that the type of 
organisational structure they adopt is driven by a number of factors, such as 
products, services, and the geographic location of their business enterprises. 
Typical organisational frameworks include: the export division structure; the 
international division structure; the worldwide geographic structure; the 
worldwide product structure; the worldwide matrix structure; and, the 
transnational-network structure. Generally, MNCs adopt at least one of the 
structures discussed here – but they are not mutually exclusive.  With regards 
to the export division structure, managers who desire greater control over 
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export operations will often create a separate export division when exports 
represent a significant growth in corporate sales.302  The export division often 
grows into an international division as corporate sales increase and the 
company establishes manufacturing operations across its domestic borders.303  
This is commonly known as the international division structure.  As for the 
worldwide geographic structure, the divisions of an MNC are represented by 
regions or large market countries in order to adopt multiple domestic or 
regional strategies. 304   Traditionally, the worldwide product structure is 
promoted as the ideal one for MNCs desiring to adopt an international strategy, 
because all product divisions throughout the world are responsible for 
producing and selling their own products and services. 305   The worldwide 
matrix structure is a complex hybrid one that places equal emphasis on both 
the geographic and product structures.306  Finally, the transnational-network 
structure is an emerging hybrid structure that has been hailed by the business 
community as the contemporary solution to the dichotomy between local 
demands and global economies of scale. 307   The transnational-network 
structure is best described as one that takes advantage of the location of its 
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subsidiaries combining its functional, product, and geographic arms that are 
scattered throughout the world.308 
To illustrate, BP is among the world‘s largest energy companies, with 
exploration and production in up to 30 countries. 309   BP‘s international 
headquarters are located in the United Kingdom – but, the company operates 
on six continents and its products and services are used in over 100 countries.  
BP‘s organisational structure is divided into three specific business segments: 
Exploration and Production, Refining and Marketing, and BP Alternative 
Energy. 310  These three business segments are managed by BP‘s Board of 
Directors and its corporate senior executives.311  In Africa, specifically, BP has 
engaged in joint ventures with local oil companies in Algeria, Angola, and 
Egypt where it provides management support, technical expertise, and 
training.312  For example, the Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company is one of the 
joint ventures BP operates in Egypt.  According to BP, the Gulf of Suez 
Petroleum Company is among the largest oil and gas extraction operations in 
the African / Middle Eastern region.313 The Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company 
was created as a result of a partnership agreement between BP and Egyptian 
General Petroleum Corporation, a State-owned commercial entity.314  BP also 
engages in retail and marketing activities throughout Southern Africa, trading 
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in lubricants, oil and gas products, and solar panels.315  Given its global reach, 
the writer assumes that BP has incorporated aspects of the various leading 
organisational structures discussed here in order to co-ordinate its global 
activities. 
c) Implementation of wide-ranging internal control systems 
Multinational businesses tend to adopt wide-ranging internal control systems 
with respect to the pattern of their decision-making.  These systems are 
commonly referred to as ‗design options for control systems‘.  Some of the 
leading design options for control systems include, inter alia: the cultural 
control system; output control system; the profit control output system; 
bureaucratic control system; and, the decision-making control system. 316  
These control systems are not mutually exclusive.   
Of these internal control systems, the cultural one is driven by the 
organisational culture that is used to control the corporate entity.317  This is 
implemented through formal organisational instruments such as: codes of 
conduct, codes of ethics, mission statements, vision statements, or corporate 
statements concerning management ideologies.318 
The cultural control system has emerged as the most desired control 
mechanism favoured by multinational corporations that have adopted a 
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transnational-network organisational structure. 319   Furthermore, the cultural 
control system is most relevant to the discussion in this thesis, which supports 
the notion of imposing corporate criminal liability where liability is diagnosed 
through questions about the culpability of the corporate entity itself.320     
These systems not only make it difficult to attribute individual liability but, at 
times, shield enterprises within the same corporate group.  To illustrate, these 
control systems allow parent companies (headquarters) to influence and 
control the activities of their businesses operations throughout the world.321  
This poses several challenges.  For instance, at times, the corporate culture 
promoted by the parent company may cultivate criminal offences by a 
subsidiary in another country.322  Regrettably, in some jurisdictions, a parent 
corporation located in one country may not necessarily be held liable for the 
actions of its subsidiary located in another, even where the former committed 
crimes through the latter.323  In such circumstances, the subsidiary becomes the 
scapegoat for the offence that more appropriately should be attributed to the 
parent company.324 
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d) Limited liability and the act of piercing the corporate veil 
Multinational corporations operate globally through a number of business 
forms.325  When MNCs enter foreign markets, they generally do so by adopting 
strategic business initiatives, such as foreign direct investment, joint ventures, 
and licensing agreements.326   
In the extractive industries specifically, the parent company of an MNC can 
operate in foreign countries by entering into contractual relationships, directly 
or indirectly through its subsidiaries, to form no-liability companies, 
partnerships, and joint ventures.  With respect to no-liability companies, these 
are attractive to shareholders in the extractive industries, because mining 
activities are generally perceived to be a risky undertaking. 327   Regarding 
partnerships and joint ventures, mining and petroleum companies operate 
through these business forms for a number of strategic reasons.  One reason is 
that most domestic jurisdictions often require foreign MNCs to team up with 
State-owned companies to carry out their exploration activities.328  
There are also instances where the business enterprises within the same 
corporate group have the ability to ‗disaggregate, dissolve or reconstitute‘329 
themselves.  In essence, parent companies strategically adopt or abandon 
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business enterprises to shield themselves from liability or risk to the corporate 
group.  This was somewhat the case, for example, with oil extraction giant 
Occidental, which renamed and sold one of its enterprises – Piper Alpha – 
following the disastrous North Sea oil rig explosion that resulted in 167 deaths 
of personnel and rescue workers.330  In effect, this strategic move by the parent 
company, Occidental, hampered efforts by relatives of the deceased who 
ultimately discontinued a private prosecution of the subsidiary business 
enterprise.331 
The notion that each business entity may be afforded its own legal personality 
could hamper efforts to hold the business enterprise, as a whole, 
accountable.332  Although the parent company and its subsidiaries may be part 
of the same corporate group, the company law applied in most domestic 
jurisdictions treats these business enterprises individually as distinct legal 
entities.333  This feature, commonly known as ‗separate legal personality‘, is a 
basic tenet of company law that is a cornerstone in the principle of limited 
liability.334 
With respect to some of the challenges posed by the principle of limited 
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liability, there is a concern that multinational corporations may try to shield 
themselves from legal responsibility arising from criminal activities carried 
out through their overseas business operations. 335   MNCs tend to operate 
through business forms that adopt intricate organisational structures to 
minimise their risk.  Often, these business forms will appear independent from 
the parent company,336 and this may place both the parent company and its 
subsidiaries in a position of impunity in some domestic jurisdictions.  
However, this obstacle is not insurmountable – piercing the corporate veil 
would be the most practical means to challenge the notion of limited liability. 
In essence, the act of piercing the corporate veil refers to circumstances where 
the courts look within the business form to ascertain the real controllers and 
hold the corporate shareholders accountable. 337   However, courts in most 
domestic jurisdictions will only consider piercing the corporate veil in 
exceptional circumstances.338  In Australia, for example, circumstances where 
this may occur include: 
(a) Where there is agency (the most popular category – 50% of the cases); 
(b) Where there are group (of companies) enterprises;  
(c) Sham or façade; 
(d) Fraud; and 
(e) Unfairness or injustice.339 
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There are a number of reasons for piercing the corporate veil and choosing to 
go after the parent company instead of its subsidiary, and Sarah Joseph 
suggests that one could be that the former would have substantially more 
assets to meet financial penalties imposed upon it than the latter.340  With 
respect to this point, MNCs ordinarily choose business forms that minimise 
their risks – for example, no liability companies that are set up for the sole 
purpose of mining activities.341  The act of piercing the corporate veil would be 
an indispensible tool for courts to access the real controllers of such business 
forms;342 especially those adopted to shield the MNC from legal responsibility 
arising from criminal activities carried out through its subsidiary.  
3.2.3 Would it be unfair to the shareholders? 
Who are the so-called shareholders of multinational corporations?  These are varied.  It 
is common to find that MNCs are wholly or partially owned by either the private sector 
or the public sector.343   
Ordinarily, privately owned multinational corporations are owned by a host of business 
actors, commonly referred to as shareholders or members.  These shareholders include, 
inter alia: individual business persons; small groups of investors; and, large groups of 
diversified investors (particularly MNCs trading on local and international stock 
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exchange markets).344  Private equity firms are at the forefront of the large groups of 
diversified investors who typically invest in MNCs.345  With respect to the extractive 
industries, privately owned MNCs have been known to monopolise the extraction of 
metallic minerals in the extractive sector.346  (Metallic minerals include gold, platinum, 
tantalum, and copper – see Appendix 4 for a full list.) 
In contrast, publicly owned multinational corporations are owned and managed by State-
owned commercial enterprises.347  Those operating in the extractive industries tend to be 
involved largely in extraction activities carried out in the oil and gas sectors where they 
play a key role in developing and transitioning economies.348  However, there are varying 
degrees of State involvement in the domestic business activities of MNCs in the 
extractive industries.  At times, the State operates through a State-owned company where 
it is the majority shareholder in a joint venture or partnership.349  At other times, the 
State-owned company only owns a small fraction of the joint venture or partnership.350    
A common argument put forward by critics of corporate criminal liability is that it would 
be unfair to the corporations‘ shareholders to sanction corporate assets.  The rationale 
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sometimes advanced is that shareholders are innocent actors who do not exercise control 
over the conduct of the corporate entity or its employees.351  The shareholder‘s role in the 
business enterprise is seen as passive – they are out of the management loop, so to 
speak.352  It is argued by some that shareholders elect the board of directors; however, the 
corporate entity is run by the board and not the shareholders.353  Therefore, corporate 
liability punishes blameless shareholders; this is seen by some as defying a liberal 
system of criminal justice.354  However, in reality, there are competing views about the 
role played by shareholders. On the one hand, some shareholders perceive themselves 
not as bystanders, but an integral part of the corporation‘s collective enterprise, and 
morally entangled in the corporation‘s policies and practices.355  On the other hand, there 
are those who view their role as mere speculators who simply keep tabs on their 
investments.356 
Indeed, it would seem that holding a multinational corporation criminally responsible for 
its actions – particularly where corporate assets have been sanctioned – would negatively 
impact its shareholders.  However, the criticism advanced by sceptics of corporate 
liability in this context does not take into consideration the critical role that shareholders 
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can, and should, play.  To a large extent, shareholders can monitor corporate activities.357  
This may be carried out in a number of ways.  Shareholders may play a more active role 
in corporate activities, they could oversee corporate behaviour, select exemplary 
corporate personnel – albeit board members – as well as positively influence appropriate 
corporate policy.358  Moreover, shareholders benefit from the positive and successful 
corporate activities.  It is only reasonable that they should bear some of the costs 
resulting from corporate wrongdoing.359  
3.2.4 Are there any fundamental objections arising from the nature of criminal law? 
At least three theoretical objections have been voiced to the notion of corporate criminal 
responsibility.  Firstly, there is an objection that corporate entities are incapable of 
possessing the requisite mens rea; they are amoral, and have no will of their own.360  
Secondly, an objection is that corporate entities are legal fictions; they cannot function 
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independently.361  Lastly, that corporate entities, per se, cannot be punished.362  In this 
context, the following discussion shows that legal developments over the past few 
decades have, indeed, overcome these theoretical objections to the notion of corporate 
criminal responsibility; corporate entities can be held at fault and punished.   
a) Could corporate entities possess the requisite mens rea? 
It is generally understood that the purpose of criminal law is to hold 
individuals responsible for morally reprehensible acts.363   This view is often 
promulgated by those who hold fast to the traditional maxim that ‗the deed 
does not make a man guilty unless his mind be guilty.‘364  Regardless, the idea 
that corporations might be found morally blameworthy has been problematic 
for centuries.  This is evinced by the views of Lord Chancellor Thurlow in the 
eighteenth century when he commented that, ‗corporations have neither bodies 
to be punished, nor souls to be condemned.  They therefore do as they like.‘365   
Such views are often relied upon by the critics of corporate criminal liability, 
who commonly argue that corporations are not real persons and, therefore, 
incapable of forming the requisite mens rea.366  
Indeed, criminal law requires that a crime involves both physical and mental 
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elements, known in law as actus reus and mens rea.367  Actus reus is defined as: 
‗all elements in the definition of the crime except the accused‘s mental 
element.‘ 368   Mens rea is defined as: ‗the mental element required by the 
definition of the particular crime – typically, intention to cause the actus reus 
of that crime, or recklessness whether it be caused.‘369  Intention, knowledge, 
and recklessness are indicative of mens rea.  Both the physical and mental 
elements must be present to establish the individual‘s criminal responsibility 
for perpetrating a crime.370  To illustrate, Article 7(1)(a) of the ICC‘s Elements 
of Crime provides that the actus reus that constitute the crime against 
humanity of murder include: ‗the perpetrator killed one or more persons; and 
the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against a civilian population.‘371  Article 7(1)(a) further provides that 
the mens rea for the same crime is: ‗the perpetrator knew that the conduct was 
part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population.‘372   
Establishing the requisite mens rea for criminal offences is seen as the crux in 
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attributing corporate liability, 373  and it is for this reason that attributing 
corporate criminal liability has long been problematic.  Criminal law has only 
responded to corporate criminality over the last century by developing models 
of corporate liability.  These models address the issue of how corporate 
entities could possess the requisite mens rea.  There are at least two competing 
corporate liability models: derivative liability, and non-derivative liability.374  
These corporate liability models are examined further in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis.  Briefly, under derivative liability, it is the actions of the corporate 
individuals that are of primary concern.  The culpability of the individuals is 
attributed to the corporate entity if it can be shown that the individuals acted 
either as the directing minds of the corporation – that is, senior managers 
(identification liability) – or acted within the course of their employment 
(vicarious liability). 375   Under non-derivative liability, the corporation is 
treated as a real entity that possesses a separate legal personality in its own 
right; hence, corporate liability is primarily diagnosed through questions about 
the culpability of the corporate entity itself. 376  In essence, a corporation‘s 
liability is established on the basis of its corporate culture, policies, and 
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knowledge.377   
b) Are corporate entities legal fictions? 
i. Nature of legal personhood 
Corporate entities can be held at fault in their own right.  Most domestic 
jurisdictions recognise that corporate entities are legal persons.  Legal 
personhood378 is defined as:  
… conceptualizing an organized body of individuals as a person, a legal 
person, or a legal entity, so that it might be treated at law as if it were an 
individual rather than an amalgamation of individuals …379 
Ordinarily, the word ‗person‘ is adopted to describe human beings.  Evidently, 
the legislature and judiciary have adopted a more technical meaning for a 
person.380  The law describes this person as a ‗legal person‘, ‗juristic person‘ or 
‗personne morale‘.  This distinguishes them from natural persons,381 who are 
defined in law as: ‗human beings in the ordinary sense.‘382  
Conferring legal personhood on corporate entities enables them to operate as 
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autonomous legal entities.383  In essence, the law treats a corporation as a 
separate legal person in its own right,384 one that enjoys rights and duties.385  
Registration is a required act to form a company386 – incorporation was the 
term commonly used to describe this process in the past.  Once registered, the 
company is considered a separate legal person.387  The concept of the company 
being a separate legal person is known as the ‗veil of incorporation‘.388  This 
enables a corporation to use its name to acquire property, engage in 
contractual obligations, and be held liable for criminal or tort offences. 389 
Having a legal personality also entitles a corporation to perpetual succession, 
long after its members, management, or employees have departed. This is an 
indispensible feature that facilitates trade.390   
The idea that a corporation could be regarded as a separate legal person with 
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distinct rights and obligations is a sine qua non of any corporate law model.391  
This principle was cemented in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd. 392   Aron 
Salomon and his family ran a private business.  They decided to incorporate 
their business by transforming it into a company that was limited by shares. 
Aron Salomon borrowed money from a mortgagee, which he then lent to the 
family business in return for shares.  The company went into liquidation.  
When the time came for the liquidator to pay the company debts, one of the 
contentious issues was whether Aron Salomon and the company were one in 
the same.  If they were, Aron Salomon would forfeit his right to payment as a 
valid debenture holder ahead of the unsecured debtors.  The Court held that 
the company was a separate legal entity.393  The Salomon precedent is well 
established as a leading authority applied in most common law jurisdictions; it 
has also been adopted in some civil law jurisdictions.394 
ii. The effect of the nominalist and the realist views of legal personality 
There are two competing philosophical views regarding the concept of legal 
personality: the nominalist and realist views.  The nominalist view, also 
referred to as the atomic view, 395  suggests that legal persons, specifically 
corporations, are fictitious, artificial persons and essentially nothing more than 
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a collection of individuals. 396   However, according to the realist view, 
corporations are, indeed, real and exist independently; they possess a separate 
legal personality in their own right.397  The realist view is also referred to as 
the ‗organic‘ or ‗holistic‘ view. 398   The realist view tends to reflect how 
ordinary people perceive companies. 399  According to James Gobert and 
Maurice Punch ordinary people do not think of a specific individual when they 
refer to companies such as IBM, BT, or ESSO. Though, in exceptional 
circumstances, they may identify Bill Gates with Microsoft or Virgin Blue 
with Richard Branson.  Despite these exceptions, there is still a consciousness 
that the decision-making processes of such companies tends to involve a lot 
more executives than the high-profile ones.400  
Regarding these competing views, William S Laufer makes the point that the 
legislature and judiciary have trouble applying principles of corporate 
personhood to criminal matters, despite the ease with which the same 
principles are applied when asserting corporate rights and privileges. 401  
Mordechai Kremnitzer echoes this sentiment, albeit with a touch of humour.  
Kremnitzer speculates that ‗if the corporation has enough mind and free will to 
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commit itself to a contract, where do the mind and the will disappear when we 
turn to the penal law?‘402  Both Laufer and Kremnitzer present an interesting 
point that requires further consideration.  Perhaps one reason for this 
inconsistency in legal approaches could be that the perception of legal 
personality in criminal law differs from that of corporate law.  Legal 
personality is important to these two diverse disciplines of law for different 
reasons.  For instance, in criminal law, the concept of legal personality is 
important because it is required to determine which corporate liability model 
will be applied when attributing criminal responsibility to the corporate 
entity.403  Whereas, in corporate law, the corporate entity is personified in 
order to be treated by analogy as an individual that enjoys rights and 
privileges.404 
With respect to how this issue is treated in criminal law, the competing 
concepts of legal personality – that is, the nominalist and realist views – 
determine the model of corporate liability that will be applied.  It is important 
to distinguish between these two views of legal personality, because they 
entail considerably different approaches in attributing criminal 
responsibility. 405   Although all the corporate liability models found within 
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most domestic jurisdictions could ultimately result in the liability of the 
organisational entity, the models differ in the approach taken to establish that 
liability.406  Based on the nominalist view of legal personality, a derivative 
approach is taken whereby the culpability of an individual, or specific 
individuals, is imputed to the organisation.  Whereas, the realist view adopts a 
non-derivative liability model in which the culpability of the organisation 
itself – as opposed to the culpability of its individuals – is of primary 
concern. 407   In such circumstances, there can be liability even where no 
individual may have committed an offence.408  
c) Forms of corporate punishment 
Corporations can, and should, indeed, be punished.  Although corporate 
entities cannot be imprisoned,409 most domestic jurisdictions apply a variety of 
corporate punishments and penalties.  These criminal sanctions include 
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measures such as: fines; imprisonment of senior management or members of 
the board of directors; corporate probation; and, corporate capital 
punishment.410   Of these forms of punishment, fines are the most common.411  
Granted, fines could just as easily be imposed through civil liability.  However, 
imposing a criminal fine not only punishes pernicious corporate conduct, but 
also attaches an undesirable stigma to the corporate wrongdoing in the 
commission of a criminal offence.412    
3.2.5 Are there any fundamental objections arising from the nature of international 
law? 
The issue of whether business enterprises are appropriate subjects for criminal liability in 
international law remains controversial.  Presently, a difficulty is that the conferral of 
legal personality on corporations, as well as multinational ones, is still blurred in 
international law. 413   Arguably, the lack of clarity on this issue has created a legal 
vacuum.414  It would seem that there is a pressing need for the international community 
to dispel scepticism as to whether corporate entities are equally as responsible as 
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individuals and States and, as such, should be required to observe jus cogens norms.415   
Traditionally, having international legal personality bestows an entity with rights, duties, 
and capacities pursuant to international law.416  Historically, States were the only subjects 
of international law.417  This view, which was well established by the early 1900s, largely 
influenced the development of international law.  It was premised on the hypothesis that 
‗international persons‘ originated from the concept of the Law of Nations.418  Hence, at 
that time, international law only applied to States. 
The traditional view shifted somewhat after World War II, whereupon customary 
international law was conferred on natural persons.  This not only enabled natural 
persons to possess rights and duties, but also provided the capacity to maintain those 
rights by bringing their claims before international bodies.419  With regard to some of the 
duties conferred upon natural persons, it is now widely recognised in customary 
international law that natural persons can be held liable for perpetrating international 
crimes.  The IMTs established in the aftermath of World War II are attributed to this 
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development. 420   Today, the concept of natural persons being held responsible for 
breaching core international crimes is one of the cornerstones of international criminal 
law.421  Individual criminal responsibility provisions are contained in the statutes of the 
ICC, as well as ad hoc tribunals and special courts established within the last sixty 
years.422  This period has seen an increase in corporations that have amassed great power; 
their influence is felt throughout the global economy.423  Approximately, fifty-one per 
cent of the 100 top economies worldwide are corporations; States only account for forty-
nine per cent.424  Yet, the issue of whether corporations are subjects of international law 
at all is still widely debated.425  The UNSRSG remains hopeful.  In his 2007 interim 
report, the UNSRSG, John Ruggie, remarked that the long drawn-out debate as to 
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whether corporations were subjects of international law was giving way to new 
realities.426  Moreover, Andrew Clapham argues that corporations should have similar 
duties under international criminal law as those imposed on natural persons. 427  
According to Clapham, the absence of an international forum to prosecute corporations 
does not imply that corporations do not have any international legal obligations.428  
The same arguments could be made with respect to multinational corporations.  
Presently, the issue of whether MNCs have international legal personality continues to 
be controversial.429  The argument is made by Nicola Jägers, and rightly so, that in the 
absence of express provisions conferring such, a good starting point is to ask if MNCs 
enjoy rights and duties as well as the capacity to enforce these pursuant to international 
law. 430   MNCs enjoy rights under international law, and there are a number of 
jurisdictional forums where multinational corporations could bring claims before 
                                                 
426
 UNSRSG Interim Report, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of 
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, UN Doc: A/HRC/4/35 (19 February 2007) 8 
[20].   
427
 Andrew Clapham, ‗State Responsibility, Corporate Responsibility, and Complicity in Human Rights 
Violations‘ in Lene Bomann-Larsen and Oddny Wiggen (eds), Responsibility in World Business: 
Managing Harmful Side-Effects of Corporate Activity (United Nations University Press, 2004) 51–52. 
428
 Andrew Clapham, ‗State Responsibility, Corporate Responsibility, and Complicity in Human Rights 
Violations‘ in Lene Bomann-Larsen and Oddny Wiggen (eds), Responsibility in World Business: 
Managing Harmful Side-Effects of Corporate Activity (United Nations University Press, 2004) 57. 
429
 See, Andrew Clapham, ‗The Question of Jurisdiction under International Criminal Law over Legal 
Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court‘ in Menno T 
Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds), Liability of Multinational Corporations under International 
Law (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 143–160, 179–190. 
430
 Nicola Jägers relies upon the test laid down in Reparations for Injuries in the Service of the United 
Nations [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 178–179, see, Nicola Jägers, ‗The Legal Status of the Multinational 
Corporation under International Law‘ in Michael K Addo (ed), Human Rights Standards and the 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 264. Anna-Karin 
Lindblom also falls back on this same test to determine if non-governmental organisations are subjects 
of international law, see, Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organisations in International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 87–88.  
 –  97  –  
international bodies to enforce such rights.431  For example, MNCs may appear as parties 
lodging a complaint before regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights.  
Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms is such an example.  The provision applies to the rights of legal 
persons (and natural persons) to protect their property and have peaceful enjoyment of 
their possessions.   
There are a number of regulatory initiatives that have been introduced by the 
international community in the last few years that impose obligations on MNCs with 
respect to human rights.  Some of these contain provisions dealing with corporate 
criminal liability and, in some instances, they even oblige States to criminalise corporate 
misconduct.432  In recent years, it appears that the international community seems to be 
shifting its attention to conferring international personality on non-State actors.433   
As discussed previously, MNCs can enforce their rights before some regional forums – 
however, as for enforcing duties, the argument could be made that while presently there 
is no jurisdictional forum in international law that deals with MNCs who perpetrate (or 
are complicit in) international crimes, this should not detract from the need to hold them 
accountable. 434  MNCs may be prosecuted in domestic jurisdictions.  In cases where 
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domestic jurisdictions prove inadequate, international or regional institutions should 
address the issue.  In such circumstances, the argument is made in this thesis that the 
ICC is a preferred forum to deal with this issue and, given time, the Court may very well 
extend its jurisdiction to include legal persons.435 
On the whole, it would appear that multinational corporations not only enjoy rights and 
duties, but also there are judicial forums where they can enforce their rights.  Taking 
these factors into consideration, the writer supports the view that MNCs are indeed 
subjects of international law.  Furthermore, it stands to reason that if MNCs are subjects 
of international law (and criminal law), then they are also subjects of international 
criminal law.436  It is widely recognised that international criminal law is comprised of 
international law and criminal law. 437   International criminal law imposes criminal 
responsibility for violations of international law.  This body of law criminalises grave 
offences, which are referred to as international crimes.438 
3.3 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter discussed the rationale for corporate criminal liability.  Specifically, it 
identified that there are a number of reasons for imposing corporate criminal liability.  
Also, the practical difficulties that stem from the nature of MNCs were examined, along 
with the issue of whether there was unfairness to shareholders where liability is imposed.  
Finally, the chapter discussed fundamental objections arising from the nature of criminal 
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and international law.  The writer concluded that corporations are capable of possessing 
the requisite mens rea, they are real entities, and, they can be held at fault and punished.  
The next chapter deals with possible jurisdictional forums to address the problem. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Scope of Liability for Organisational Complicity:  
Jurisdictional Forums 
„We have a world in which a handful of corporations, detached from any link to any 
place or community, have extended their power beyond the reach of most 
governments.‟439 
4.1 Chapter introduction 
The previous chapter examined the rationale for corporate criminal liability. 
 
This chapter investigates where an organisation that is complicit in international crimes 
could be prosecuted by exploring the preferred forum to deal with the research problem.  
This chapter discusses a number of jurisdictional forums.  The writer considers 
jurisdictional forums that may address corporate complicity in international crimes 
generally as well as those forums applicable to crimes perpetrated in Africa.  The writer 
examines existing international, regional and domestic forums that exercise jurisdiction 
over international crimes.  These include: 
1. Domestic jurisdictions applying domestic criminal legislation 440 or tort 
principles;441 
2. Regional courts (e.g. the African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights);442 
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Of the existing forums with jurisdiction over international crimes, this thesis proposes 
that the ICC is the preferred one to deal with complicit organisational liability in cases 
where domestic jurisdictions prove inadequate.  However, a major limitation with this 
forum is that the competence of the Court is currently limited to natural persons.444  
Hence, the ICC Rome Statute provisions that deal with individual criminal responsibility 
would need to be amended in order to exercise jurisdiction over complicit organisational 
liability. 
With respect to the term ‗jurisdiction‘, there are at least three dimensions to this: 
prescription, adjudication, and enforcement.445  Prescription relates to the authority of a 
State to establish laws that regulate criminal conduct.446  ‗Adjudication‘ concerns the 
power of a State to bring persons before its judicial forums.447  ‗Enforcement‘ relates to 
the power of a State to direct persons to observe the laws it has created. 448  These 
dimensions to jurisdiction over international crimes are explored throughout this chapter. 
Also, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is considered here.  This doctrine is 
ordinarily applied in common law jurisdictions where it is most popular; however, it is 
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less popular in civil jurisdictions to the extent that it is even constitutionally prohibited in 
some countries.449 According to this doctrine, a legal matter may be brought before a 
court in more than one domestic jurisdiction.450  Courts in common law jurisdictions 
apply this doctrine to determine whether or not to decline jurisdiction to hear a matter. 
The test ordinarily applied by courts is to consider whether there is ‗some other available 
forum having jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the action, i.e. 
in which the case may be tried more suitability for the interests of all parties and the ends 
of justice.‘451     
In theory, the application of this means that multinational corporations may be held 
liable for the commission of crimes in either their home State452 or host State.453  This 
may be attributed to the trans-border business operation of MNCs, which makes them 
peculiar in their nature. 454   MNCs are individual juridical persons comprised of 
individual business enterprises; these enterprises are subject to domestic legal systems in 
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the places where they operate. 455   Conversely, MNCs exist as an amalgamation of 
business enterprises that enjoy common business strategies and shared resources; yet, the 
MNCs function outside the control of any individual State.456  It is this autonomous 
nature of MNCs that makes them difficult to control.457  With respect to this challenge, 
Beth Stephens argues that while multinational corporations have evolved significantly 
over the past century, the legal structures regulating these business entities have tended 
to lag behind such evolvement. 458   Stephens is of the view that the existing laws 
regulating the activities of modern MNCs are more in keeping with outdated legal 
structures put in place to regulate nineteenth-century corporations.  Corporations of the 
past were largely based on single-nation structures. 459  Hence, Stephens opines, and 
rightly so, that ‗corporations are multinational while legal systems are still largely 
national, creating a disconnect between international corporate structures and the law.‘460  
Essentially, it appears that this is a case of modern-day regulators desperately playing 
catch-up with rapidly shifting industries in a global economy that is largely dominated 
by influential MNCs.  Regardless, subject to the principle of complementarity (discussed 
later in this chapter), the challenges posed by the legal doctrine of forum non conveniens 
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may be overcome by dealing with MNCs at an international institution such as the ICC 
in cases where domestic jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction.461 
4.2 Exploring the existing forums with jurisdiction over international crimes 
4.2.1 Domestic jurisdictions: criminal legislation and tort principles 
a) Criminal legislation 
i. Traditional principles of jurisdiction 
Natural and legal persons may be held liable for the commission of 
international crimes in both domestic and international jurisdictions on the 
basis of the traditional principles that trigger jurisdiction over crimes.  The 
jurisdictional tenets discussed in this thesis are: territorial principle, nationality 
principle, protective principle, passive personality principle, and universality 
principle.  Broadly speaking, the traditional principles of jurisdiction could be 
applied to regulate the criminal activities of multinational corporations in their 
home State or host State.  However, there are several challenges posed in 
applying these traditional principles of jurisdiction to MNCs.  For instance, 
these jurisdictional principles could be limited in their application, depending 
on the structure of the MNC.  Multinational corporations operate through 
various business forms and adopt complex organisational structures.  MNCs 
form contractual relationships, such as joint ventures, which go on to operate 
as separate legal entities with their own rights and duties.462    
The territorial principle encompasses two approaches: the subjective and the 
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objective.  The subjective territorial principle may be triggered by a State 
exercising jurisdiction over crimes that are perpetrated in another State if it 
can be shown that at least one of the elements of the crime were committed 
within the territory of the State that is asserting jurisdiction.463  In contrast, the 
objective territorial principle asserts that a State may exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes that were initiated in another State if it can be shown that at least one 
element of the crime was committed within the territory of the State asserting 
jurisdiction.464  To illustrate both these approaches: if a rocket were fired from 
one State into another, then the State from which the rocket was fired would 
exercise subjective territoriality jurisdiction to deal with the incident, while the 
State with the objects fired upon would exercise objective territoriality over 
the matter.465   
One of the difficulties of relying upon the territorial principle to exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes is that States tend to be reluctant to 
prosecute such offences perpetrated (or even initiated) within their 
territories.466  Robert Cryer suggests that this may be for political reasons.467  
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The State may simply be selective about its national prosecutions or, in other 
instances, it may fear that such proceedings could result in the State itself 
being put on trial. 468   Interestingly, this could very well be the case if a 
multinational corporation accused of complicity in international crimes were 
State-owned.  A number of dominant MNCs in the extractive industries are 
State-owned.469 
With respect to the thesis research problem, the host or home State could very 
well act on the territoriality principle to exercise jurisdiction over 
multinational corporations accused of complicity in international crimes.  
However, in all likelihood, the host State is unlikely to have the capacity to do 
so given that the MNC is operating in conflict-affected areas or weak-
governance zones.  Also, the home State tends to be reluctant to apply 
criminal sanctions to MNCs.  This may be attributed, in part, to circumstances 
where the State weighs the consequences of any domestic economic and 
political fallout that is likely to result over prosecutions concerning corporate 
misconduct for crimes perpetrated in a country that is seemingly far away.470 
Also, the home State would have to rely on the host State to provide witnesses 
or evidence pertaining to the alleged crimes. This kind of international 
cooperation seems unlikely given the preoccupation of the host State with the 
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challenges it faces in the conflict-affected area or weak-governance zone.    
The nationality principle entitles a State to regulate the behaviour of its 
nationals overseas.471  According to customary international law, nationality is 
defined as: ‗a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of reciprocal rights and duties.‘472  Additionally, a State 
has the discretion to decide who will be considered one of its nationals.473  
A major criticism of the nationality principle is that States, at times, apply it 
with partiality.474  For example, States tend to trigger the nationality principle 
in order to exercise jurisdiction over their armed forces in relation to 
allegations of crimes that may have been committed during an armed conflict 
overseas.475  Critics of the nationality principle argue that the courts might 
empathise with the armed forces from their own State, or bow to political 
pressure exerted to be lenient or acquit the armed forces.476 
With regard to the nationality principle and its application to multinational 
corporations, a State has the discretion to determine the nationality of a natural 
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person as well as a corporation.477  Traditionally, a State determines corporate 
nationality based on the location of the corporate headquarters or its seat of 
management.478  A State can ‗regulate legal persons organized or having their 
principal place of business abroad when such entities are owned or controlled 
by domestic organizations or nationals.‘479   
The BP illustration discussed earlier provides an example of how the 
nationality principle would be triggered.  The corporate headquarters of BP are 
located in the UK.  In theory, if BP, an extraction business entity, was accused 
of complicity in international crimes in Egypt, then it could be prosecuted in 
the UK, despite the fact that the crimes occurred overseas.  The principle 
would allow this, but in reality, it would depend on whether UK legislation 
provided for such prosecution. 
According to Sarah Joseph, a leading proponent of corporate liability for 
human rights violations, it is more realistic to pursue the parent company in its 
home State than to pursue a subsidiary in its host State.  This is because, in all 
likelihood, the home State is better placed to exercise jurisdiction over the 
parent company. 480   Joseph makes a compelling point; especially if one 
considers that the MNCs who are accused of complicity in international 
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crimes typically operate in conflict-affected areas or weak-governance zones 
where domestic courts face numerous socio-legal challenges.  Indeed, the 
home State could act on the nationality principle to exercise jurisdiction over 
MNCs accused of complicity in international crimes, though they tend to be 
reluctant to do so.481 
The protective principle recognises circumstances when a State‘s national 
interests are threatened.  This may occur even if the threat to the State is posed 
by non-nationals operating beyond its territory.482  States may rely upon the 
protective principle to protect themselves from such threat.483  Essentially, to 
safeguard national security, geographical integrity, or national economic 
interests, States may exercise the right to impose jurisdiction for criminal 
liability over foreign nationals for crimes committed overseas.484 Although the 
protective principle is firmly entrenched in international law, its application 
has been relatively rare.485 
A prime example of applying the protective principle to legal persons would 
be where a State sought to trigger jurisdiction to exercise control over a 
corporation that the State believed was engaged in the production of weapons 
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to threaten or invade its territory.486  In reality, though, States have tended to 
regulate these kinds of corporate activity through alternative avenues, such as 
imposing sanctions on the States in which the corporations operated.487  In 
another example, a State might trigger the protective principle to exercise 
jurisdiction over a multinational corporation where the State wanted to protect 
its national economic interests to prevent the pillaging of its natural resources 
– however, it could rely on the territoriality principle instead. 
The passive personality principle entitles a State to exercise jurisdiction over 
crimes committed against its nationals while abroad.488  The principle could be 
triggered even when both the crime committed and the accused person are 
outside the boundaries of the State asserting jurisdiction. 489   The passive 
personality principle is becoming less controversial,490 as States tend to assert 
this principle to enact anti-terrorism legislation to shield their nationals from 
acts of terrorism committed abroad.491  
States could rely upon the passive personality principle to trigger jurisdiction 
over terrorist crimes committed by multinational corporations against the 
State‘s nationals if it could be shown, for example, that the corporation was 
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funding terrorist activities.492 
The universality principle overrides the traditional view that a State could 
only prosecute a crime committed outside its territory if it was able to show a 
connection to the ‗crime, the perpetrator or the victim.‘493 The development of 
the universality principle has relaxed this restriction.494  Of late, it has become 
widely accepted that the principle confers upon every State the right to 
exercise unrestricted jurisdiction over serious crimes of universal concern495 
(e.g. war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide).496  Hence, universal 
jurisdiction over serious crimes is triggered regardless of the location of the 
crime, or the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.497  
The universality principle has been the most controversial of the traditional 
principles of jurisdiction.498  It has been widely referred to as a principle with 
no practical value in the prosecution of war criminals; 499  one of the more 
confused doctrines of international law; 500  a gap filler where other 
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jurisdictional principles have fallen short; 501  and a principle which is 
increasingly taking on a more dominant role on centre stage.502  
There are a number of observations to make here concerning domestic courts 
exercising criminal jurisdiction over international crimes:  
1. International crimes should trigger universal jurisdiction by nature of 
the seriousness of the crimes.  
2. Domestic jurisdictions bear an obligation to prosecute international 
crimes. 
3. A number of domestic jurisdictions have adopted the ICC Rome Statute 
provisions, or the provisions of other international legal instruments, 
prohibiting international crimes. 
4. A number of domestic jurisdictions have enacted provisions that allow 
for the prosecution of organisational entities in criminal matters.  Some 
of these jurisdictions include prohibitions against complicit involvement 
in those crimes. 
5. Domestic criminal law jurisdiction has, in effect, expanded to include 
the prosecution of legal entities for international crimes, but the 
international jurisdiction has not.  
Universal jurisdiction could easily be the jurisdictional principle that States 
rely upon to deal with complicit multinational corporations.503  This is because 
if a State were to apply the universality principle, it would not need to show 
that there is a connection between the complicit perpetrator and the State 
seeking to prosecute that perpetrator for the commission of crimes prohibited 
                                                 
501
 Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and 
the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) 106. 
502
 Menno T Kamminga, ‗Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross 
Human Rights Offenses‘ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 940, 941. 
503
 See generally discussion in, William A Schabas, ‗Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching 
the Accomplices‘ (June 2001) 83(842) International Review of the Red Cross 439, 453–454. 
 –  113  –  
under customary international law.504 
Most countries that have ratified the ICC Rome Statute have implemented the 
provisions into their domestic legal systems, thus, extending domestic criminal 
law jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes.505  Over 100 countries have 
ratified the ICC Rome Statute, which entered into force in 2002, and Appendix 
4 provides a full list of countries that have ratified it.  Briefly, as shown in 
Appendix 4, African countries that have ratified the Statute include: Lesotho, 
Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, and Namibia. European countries include: 
Denmark, Italy, and The Netherlands. Middle Eastern countries include: 
Jordan and Oman. Asian countries include: Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Japan.  
Canada, Costa Rica, and Argentina comprise some of the countries from the 
Americas to have ratified the ICC Rome Statute. 
According to research led by Professor Anita Ramasastry, there are a number 
of countries which have ‗fully incorporated‘ the ICC Rome Statute provisions 
into their domestic legal instruments. 506   The legal instruments from these 
countries prohibit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes – 
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essentially, mirroring the wording of the ICC Rome Statute.507  These countries 
include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, 
South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand.  France and 
Norway, who had pre-existing legislation that incorporated aspects of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, are yet to fully complete 
adoption of the ICC Rome Statute provisions.508 
Although it would seem that only a handful of countries have ‗fully 
incorporated‘ the ICC Rome Statute provisions on international crimes, 
domestic law in all jurisdictions already criminalises and prosecutes the 
underlying offences that constitute international crimes, such as genocide and 
crimes against humanity.509  For example, an underlying offence for crimes 
against humanity includes murder, and the offence of murder is generally 
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prohibited in all domestic jurisdictions.510  Furthermore, while some States 
require domestic legislation to fulfil their treaty obligations, other States have 
dispensed with this formality and directly apply international law within their 
domestic legal systems.511  
India, Indonesia, the Ukraine, and the United States, although not parties to the 
ICC or signatories of the Rome Statute, have adopted legislation incorporating 
some of the statutory provisions into their own domestic legislation.512  For 
example, the Indonesian Parliament passed Law No. 26/2000 in January 2000, 
which effectively implemented the ICC Rome Statute provisions into domestic 
criminal laws to allow the ad hoc Indonesian Human Rights Tribunal to 
prosecute perpetrators responsible for crimes committed in East Timor.513   
Additionally, the law of organisational liability applies in most domestic 
jurisdictions, as the criminal liability provisions found in these jurisdictions do 
not distinguish between natural and legal persons.514 
The following domestic jurisdictions have general provisions in place that 
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could apply to international crimes perpetrated by complicit legal persons: 
Australia, 515  Norway, 516  Belgium, 517  Canada, 518  France, 519  India, 520  The 
Netherlands,521 and the United Kingdom.522  
ii. Suitability of this domestic forum 
Domestic jurisdictions recognise a much broader scope of offences that 
amount to international crimes pursuant to international law.  For example, 
although piracy and terrorism fit this description, neither falls within the 
jurisdiction of the ad hoc international institutions or the ICC.  There are, 
however, numerous international legal instruments that prohibit piracy and 
terrorism, 523  with the offences addressed by regional and domestic courts.  
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Regardless, MNCs in the extractive industries tend to be accused of complicity 
in crimes against humanity rather than piracy or terrorism. 
There are several reasons why domestic jurisdictions are frequently seen as an 
inadequate forum to deal with multinational corporations complicit in 
international crimes.  With regard to the option of using domestic forums, it 
should be noted that although there are at least two competing traditional 
models of corporate liability, the doctrinal or theoretical approach to the 
corporate liability legislation varies in most domestic jurisdictions.524  Granted, 
these traditional models of liability are not mutually exclusive.  Some 
jurisdictions apply derivative liability, which is primarily concerned with the 
culpable actions of the corporate individuals; whereas, other jurisdictions 
apply non-derivative liability, which is diagnosed through questions 
concerning the culpability of the corporate entity itself.525  Moreover, domestic 
jurisdictions do not apply uniform corporate criminal liability legislation; 
some jurisdictions (though only a handful in comparison) do not even have 
corporate liability provisions in place.526   
The reality also remains that, in most cases where allegations are levelled 
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against complicit multinational corporations, these corporations have tended to 
be operating in conflict-affected areas embroiled in a state of internal or 
regional war.527  In other instances, the States in these areas have weak or 
illegitimate governments.528  The national courts, if they exist, face a number 
of challenges in dealing with organisational complicity in international crimes.  
First, they lack the necessary resources, such as facilities, finances, and 
adequately trained staff.529  Second, these countries are typified by the absence 
of the rule of law and lack independent judiciaries. 530   Also, since 
multinationals are often seen as essential to nation-building activities – such as 
providing much-needed investment, infrastructure, employment, and foreign 
exchange – there is an unwillingness to prosecute them.531  With respect to this, 
as previously discussed, when MNCs enter foreign markets, they generally do 
so by adopting strategic business initiatives; foreign direct investments are one 
                                                 
527
 See generally, Global Witness Report, Oil and Mining in Violent Places: Why Voluntary Codes for 
Companies don't Guarantee Human Rights (October 2007), 4 <http://www.globalwitness.org>. See 
also, allegations regarding secondary liability claims filed against multinational corporations in the 
United States pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute; for example, Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, et 
al, 96 Civ 8386 (KMW) (HBP), (April 23, 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, 
244 F Supp 2d 289 (March 19, 2003). 
528
 Anita Ramasastry, Mapping the Web of Liability: The Expanding Geography of Corporate 
Accountability in Domestic Jurisdictions (2008) <http://198.170.85.29/Anita-Ramasastry-
commentary.pdf>.  
529
 See generally, World Bank governance data available at http://www.worldbank.org; see also, Jelena 
Pejić, ‗Accountability for International Crimes: From Conjecture to Reality‘ (March 2002) 84(845) 
International Review of the Red Cross 13, 31. 
530
 FAFO, Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave 
Violations of International Law (2004) 22.   
531
 FAFO, Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave 
Violations of International Law (2004) 22–23. For general discussion on the role that MNCs play in 
the economic development of States through foreign direct investment, see, Alice de Jonge, 
Transnational Corporations and International Law: Accountability in the Global Business 
Environment (Edward Elgar, 2011) 1.   
 –  119  –  
of the strategies that they tend to adopt. 532   Corruption of the judiciary, 
compounded by a lack of independence, further reduces the likelihood of 
successful prosecution.533  In contrast, MNCs would not be in a position to 
manipulate judicial proceedings brought before an international forum.534   
In essence, it is the weak governance in the host State, and the reluctance of 
the home State to apply criminal sanctions to the MNCs, that leads to the 
conclusion that domestic jurisdictions are, perhaps, inadequate forums.  It is 
for these reasons that the ICC is the preferred forum to exercise jurisdiction 
over complicit organisational liability.  
b) Tort principles 
i. Tort principles in general 
Generally, tort law enables a wronged party to commence a civil action to 
claim damages against the wrongdoer, known in law as the tortfeasor.  The 
injured party in a tort claim must show: 
1. The claimant was injured, thus has sufficient standing (jus standi). 
2. The injured party suffered damage caused by the tortfeasor. 
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3. The tortfeasor breached a duty of care owed to the injured party.535 
There are at least three ways in which tort law might be applied to a 
corporation that found itself complicit in a tort committed by someone else.  
One way is if the business entity has entered into a joint enterprise with a 
tortfeasor.536  For example, if a corporation entered into a joint venture with a 
government agency, the corporation, which is known as a joint tortfeasor in 
such circumstances, would be held responsible for torts committed by the 
government agency, its partner, if those torts were carried out to further a joint 
plan, such as mining extraction activities. 537   Alternatively, a complicit 
corporation could be liable if the corporation fails to act on its duty of care to 
protect persons from being injured, or its duty to control those persons 
inflicting injury in circumstances where the corporation has a special 
relationship with the injured person or the person inflicting the injury. 538  
Finally, a complicit corporation may be held liable for torts committed by 
independent subcontractors, but only in exceptional circumstances. 539   For 
example, if a corporation contracted a government agency to clear access 
points leading into a mining area, the corporation may be under a duty to take 
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reasonable precautions to ensure the safety of the people in that area.540 
ii. US tort legislation 
The United States Alien Tort Statute is a prime example of domestic 
legislation invoked in a civil action dealing with violations of customary 
international law.  The entire United States Alien Tort Statute, hereafter 
referred to as the ATS, states: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.541 
The ATS has a number of distinguishing features. 542   First, the aggrieved 
persons, or their representatives, do not have to be United States citizens; the 
ATS is empowered with jurisdiction to hear claims made by aliens of the 
State.543  Second, the tort offences need not have occurred within the United 
States.544  Third, the tort offences must be violations of the law of nations or a 
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to the ATS.   
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treaty of the United States.545  
The ATS dates back to 1789 when the statute was passed as part of the First 
Judiciary Act. It remained dormant for almost two hundred years until 1980 
when the statute was relied upon in Filártiga v Peña-Irala.546  The suit was 
brought in a US Federal Court, although it involved a seventeen-year-old 
Paraguayan national allegedly tortured to death in Paraguay by a state 
official. 547   The US Federal Court found that ‗torture‘ amounted to a tort 
committed in violation of the law of nations, and allowed the matter to 
proceed pursuant to the ATS provisions. 548   This decision was significant 
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discussing Filártiga v Peña-Irala, 630 F 2d 876 (2
nd
 Circuit, 1980). See also generally, ‗Civil Rights 
Statute was Dormant for 200 Years‘ (18 May 2003) Financial Times <http://www.ft.com>. It may be 
noted that ATS was invoked only twice during the first 200 years of its existence: Adra v Clift, 195 F 
Supp 857 (D Md 1961) a matter concerning child custody dispute between two non US nationals; 
Bolchos v Darrel, 1 Bee 74, 3 F Cas 810 (DSC 1795) a suit brought for the restitution of three slaves 
on board a Spanish ship seized during war. See discussion on the relevance of these two cases in 
David D Christensen, ‗Corporate Liability for Overseas Human Rights Abuses: The Alien Tort Statute 
after Sosa v Alvarez-Machain‘ (Summer 2005) 62 Washington & Lee Law Review 1219. 
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 The Second Circuit held that the statute conveys jurisdiction for civil matters concerning violations of 
international law regardless of the nationality of the parties involved,  Filártiga v Peña-Irala, 630 F 2d 
876 (2
nd
 Circuit, 1980) 878. 
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 Filártiga v Peña-Irala, 630 F 2d 876 (2
nd
 Circuit, 1980) 880, 884, and 887.  
 –  123  –  
because it affirmed the ATS provisions and established that foreign nationals 
could invoke the statute in relation to crimes committed abroad.  
To date, the ATS has been invoked in over one hundred court cases in the 
United States. 549   The majority of tort claims were against multinational 
corporations accused of aiding and abetting torts in violation of customary 
international law. 550   Despite its popularity, cases relying on the ATS 
provisions have not seen a single judgment awarded against a corporate entity 
or its officials.551  It appears that, so far, cases brought pursuant to the ATS 
‗have been bogged down by procedural difficulties, dismissed, or settled.‘552 
There is conflicting jurisprudence emerging from the United States regarding 
corporate complicity in tort offences.  On the one hand, there is case law that 
indicates that the ATS may not be relied upon when dealing with corporate 
complicity in violation of customary international law.  The Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum judgment, recently handed down by the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, is a prime example of this.  Kiobel concerned a civil suit 
filed pursuant to the ATS in the United States by one of the wives of nine 
Nigerian human-rights activists and environmentalists executed by the 
                                                 
549
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 Faith E Gay and J Noah Hagey, ‗Corporate Liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act‘ (25 October 
2007) Law.com‘s In-House Counsel <http://www.inhousecounsel.com>. 
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 Rachel Chambers, ‗The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing Law on Corporate 
Complicity in Human Rights Abuses‘ (Fall 2005) Human Rights Brief 14, 14 
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Nigerian government in the mid 1990s. 553   The plaintiffs alleged that the 
corporations, exploring for oil in the area, aided and abetted the Nigerian 
government in the violations of the law of nations, which resulted in the death 
of the locals.554  The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was of the 
opinion that corporations were not liable for human rights violations under the 
customary international law and, therefore, could not be the subject of liability 
under the ATS.555  The Court opined that ‗… [while] international law has 
sometimes extended the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to 
individuals, it has never extended the scope of liability to a corporation.‘556  
Following this decision, the plaintiff filed a petition with the US Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit requesting a panel rehearing of the Kiobel suit; 
the petition was denied.557 
Following the Kiobel suit, there have been at least two decisions in the United 
States (John Doe VIII v Exxon Mobil Corporation558 and Boimah Flomo, et al 
v Firestone Natural Rubber Co559) handed down by the Court of Appeals for 
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 John Doe VIII v Exxon Mobil Corporation, No. 09-7125 (8 July 2011). The security forces of Exxon 
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the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, respectively, which 
differ from the Kiobel approach.  The Court of Appeals in the John Doe VIII 
and Boimah Flomo suits rejected the claim that corporations could not be held 
liable for violations of customary international law – thus, corporate liability 
fell within the scope of the ATS. 560   These inconsistencies remain to be 
resolved by the US Supreme Court.   
There are grave concerns among leading academics that these conflicting legal 
decisions could negatively impact future corporate liability suits brought 
pursuant to the ATS.561  Also, there are still a number of cases that are before 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Kiobel suit could 
negatively impact the outcome of those appeals and further shield corporations 
from liability for violation of customary international law.562   
iii. Suitability of this domestic forum 
It is undeniable that torts cases – such as those brought before Federal Courts 
in the United States pursuant to the ATS – have increased public awareness of 
corporate liability in the commission of international crimes.563  However, the 
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 For further discussion on this see, Wolfgang Kaleck and Miriam Saage-Maaβ, ‗Corporate 
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writer is of the view that it is the criminal characteristic of corporate 
involvement in international crimes that should be the focus of concern here.  
Goals of accountability in criminal prosecutions include punishment, public 
awareness, condemnation, and deterrence. 564 Criminal sanctions best reflect 
the prohibitory nature of pernicious corporate conduct.565  Hence, dealing with 
the research problem in domestic jurisdictions that apply tort principles is not 
the ideal approach.  Ideally, international criminal law should play a key role 
in bringing about corporate accountability. 
c) Other forums in domestic jurisdictions 
There are other forums in domestic jurisdictions.  For example, the current 
trend sweeping across Africa, particularly over last decade, has been the 
creation of specialised commercial courts or the introduction of commercial 
divisions within national courts. 566   These types of courts have been 
established in Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Burkina Faso, 
DRC, Ghana, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Rwanda. 567  The 
specialised courts have primarily been established to resolve commercial 
disputes.  They function predominantly as civil courts throughout parts of 
Africa.  Also, these courts in a handful of African countries, such as South 
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Africa, exercise criminal jurisdiction, but their scope seems to be confined to 
white collar crimes. 568   This thesis does not deal extensively with these 
specialised courts.  
4.2.2 Regional courts 
Regional forums are comprised of three existing regional courts: the African Court on 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights; the European Court of Human Rights; and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (there are other regional bodies, which are noted 
below).   
These regional forums are discussed to assess whether they would be in a position to 
deal with the on-going problem of corporate complicity in international crimes, 
especially where multinational corporations initiate or perpetrate such crimes within 
their jurisdiction.   
As the following discussion shows, the difficulty with these three courts is that they only 
exercise jurisdiction over matters brought regarding their own State Parties.  
Submissions concerning the prosecution of MNCs that may be complicit in crimes fall 
outside their jurisdiction.569  More than anything, these regional courts provide a forum 
for corporate entities to enforce their rights rather than have obligations imposed on 
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Modern Judiciary‘ (Paper presented at the Southern African Chief Justices Forum Conference, 
Johannesburg, South Africa, 13–14 August 2010) 4. On the approach taken in South Africa, see 
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them.570  Furthermore, the regional courts are not empowered with the jurisdiction to 
prosecute complicit persons. 
a) African Regional Courts 
There are two courts to consider here: the African Court on Human and 
Peoples‘ Rights and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. The 
former court is operational, and currently sits in Arusha, Tanzania; the latter is 
yet to commence. 
Of these two courts, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is the 
most promising as a forum to consider in the future with respect to the 
commission of international crimes in Africa.  However, much like the 
arguments made with respect to the domestic jurisdictions, it too faces some 
challenges, which are discussed in this chapter. 
i. African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights is a temporary court.571   
According to Article 3 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples‟ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
People‟s Rights, the ACrtHPR shall exercise its jurisdiction with respect to the 
interpretation and application of a number of instruments.  These include: the 
Protocol, the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, and any other 
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human rights instruments, which have been ratified by its member State 
Parties.   The Court‘s jurisdiction appears to be limited to cases concerning its 
own member State Parties.   
Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Protocol, access to the Court is only granted for 
submissions made by the African Commission on Human and People‘s Rights, 
State Parties, and African Intergovernmental Organisations.   
Article 5(1)(c) of the Protocol provides that a State Party whose citizen has 
been the victim of a human rights violation is entitled to submit its case before 
the ACrtHPR.  In theory, this provision could easily be relied upon by a State 
Party seeking to use this regional forum to deal with the corporate criminal 
liability of multinational businesses in human rights violations perpetrated 
against its own nationals.  However, the concern with this is that none of the 
instruments that the Court relies upon empower it with jurisdiction to 
prosecute complicit persons.  Also, the Court‘s jurisdiction is limited to 
matters with respect to State Parties.572  
Article 5(3) provides non-State actors, such as individuals and Non 
Governmental Organisations accorded observer status by the African 
Commission, with access to the ACrtHPR.  However, such access is granted in 
restricted circumstances.  With respect to this, Article 34(6) of the Protocol 
stipulates that non-State actors may only bring a case against a State Party if 
the State Party recognises the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the matter.  
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There is a concern that this provision may shield a State Party, which 
perpetrates serious human rights violations, and does so with impunity.  
ii. African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights shall be established sometime 
in the future as a permanent court.573  The ACJHR will be the result of having 
merged the ACrtHPR and the African Court of Justice.574  The ACJHR shall 
only become operational when at least fifteen of the fifty-three African Union 
member States ratify the Court‘s statutory instruments.575  To date, only three 
AU members have done so: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Libya.576  
The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
is one of the legal instruments adopted by the ACJHR.  This legal instrument 
is silent on the issue of prosecuting complicit persons.  According to Articles 
29 and 30 of the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(annexed to the Protocol), State Parties, as well as individuals, may submit 
cases before the Court.  The ACJHR will hear cases concerning human rights 
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violations perpetrated by AU members. 577   It appears that the Court will 
exercise broad powers.578  For instance, pursuant to Article 28(d) of the Statute, 
the Court is empowered to exercise jurisdiction over cases and legal disputes 
that include offences relating to ‗any question of international law.‘579  Though, 
it seems that this does not include jurisdiction over international crimes.580  
Recently, the AU consulted with member States and resolved to further 
investigate how to extend the ACJHR‘s jurisdiction to include jurisdiction 
over international crimes.  Specifically, the AU made the following 
declaration to:  
… reflect on how best Africa‘s interests can be fully defended and protected 
in the international judicial system, and to actively pursue the 
implementation of the Assembly‘s Decisions on the African Court of Justice 
and Human and Peoples‘ Rights being empowered to try serious 
international crimes committed on African soil …581  
There are concerns over the practical feasibility of the ACJHR establishing a 
criminal chamber to deal with the perpetration of international crimes.  The 
argument is made by some that, although this would be a milestone for the 
African continent, there are several factors that would hamper efforts to bring 
about accountability.  For instance, it is posited that the Court would not 
operate freely due to widespread political pressure exerted by senior State 
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officials and military commanders.582  Also, African States have tended to be 
reluctant to fulfil their international obligations with respect to triggering 
universal jurisdiction over international crimes.  For example, it appears that 
this has been the case in regards to international arrest warrants issued over 
Heads of State, such as Omar Al-Bashir.583  Finally, the argument is made that 
financial constraints may impede the criminal chamber‘s functions if member 
States fail to honour their pledges, a problem that is already faced by the 
existing courts.584 
In theory, the ACJHR is a promising forum to deal with the issues discussed in 
this thesis; though, it does, indeed, face several challenges.  The difficulty with 
the ACJHR is that the Court‘s jurisdiction is limited to human rights violations 
perpetrated by African Union members (i.e. State Parties).  The jurisdiction of 
the ACJHR would need to expand beyond State Parties to include 
multinational businesses. Presently, the corporate criminal liability of 
multinational businesses falls outside the scope of the Court‘s jurisdiction, 
much like the restricted jurisdiction exercised by the international institutions 
discussed later.  In reality, this writer recognises that the ‗weak-governance 
syndrome‘ afflicting member States – who may be unable or unwilling to 
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prosecute corporate misconduct – could also affect the ACJHR.585  Moreover, 
the ACJHR is comprised of member States from developing nations.  Even if 
the ACJHR were to become an aggressive regional institution, it may not cope 
with the challenges of prosecuting powerful global multinational businesses 
whose headquarters are primarily based in developed States.   
b) European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights586 was established in 1959,587 and has 47 
members.588  The legal instrument of the Court is the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  All State members that are parties to the Court have signed 
and ratified the Convention, 589  which is silent on the issue of prosecuting 
complicit persons.  It expressly prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment,590 slavery and forced labour,591 arbitrary and unlawful 
detention,592 among other violations.  Perpetrating any of these amounts to an 
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international crime.593  
However, the ECHR is not the ideal forum to deal with MNCs complicit in 
international crimes because, pursuant to Articles 33 and 34 of the Convention, 
the Court only exercises jurisdiction over inter-State or individual 594 
applications regarding alleged violations.  In addition, according to Article 35, 
cases can only be brought before the Court if the matter concerns a member 
State Party and, even then, only after exhausting all available domestic 
remedies.  The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to cases concerning its own 
member State Parties.  The corporate criminal liability of multinational 
businesses falls outside the scope of the Court‘s jurisdiction. 
c) Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The protection of human rights in the Inter-American system is co-ordinated 
through a dual institutional structure, which comprises the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.595  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights596 began operating in 
1979.  It functions as the sole judicial institution of the Organisation for 
American States, which has 35 members. 597   The IACHR exercises its 
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functions in accordance with the Statute of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights598 and the American Convention on Human Rights.  Neither of 
these legal instruments empowers the Court with the jurisdiction to prosecute 
complicit persons. 
The IACHR does have jurisdiction to hear cases concerning violations of civil 
and political rights, such as the right to life,599 the right to humane treatment,600 
and freedom from slavery.601  The Court also has jurisdiction to hear cases 
concerning violations of economic, social, and cultural rights pursuant to 
Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights – though this does 
not specify what these rights encompass.  
The IACHR is not the ideal forum to deal with the prosecution of MNCs that 
are complicit in international crimes, because according to Article 61 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, only State Parties and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights may refer a case to the Court.   
Moreover, the Court‘s jurisdiction is limited to cases concerning human rights 
violations perpetrated by its own State Parties.  Like the ACrtHPR and ECHR, 
the corporate criminal liability of multinational businesses falls outside the 
scope of the IACHR‘s jurisdiction. 
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d) Other regional bodies 
There are other regional institutions besides the existing regional courts.602  For 
example, the Association of South East Asian Nations established an 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights in 2009.603  There is also the 
League of Arab States,604 and the Commonwealth of Independent States.605  
These additional regional institutions exercise quasi-judicial powers.  They are 
not discussed further here.  This thesis only examines the judicial mechanisms 
of the regional courts (i.e. the African Court on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, 
the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights). 
4.2.3 International tribunals and special courts 
International forums with jurisdiction over international crimes include the ICTR, SCSL, 
                                                 
602
 For a detailed discussion on the alternative regional initiatives, see, Rhonda K M Smith, Textbook on 
International Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2007) 83–86. 
603
 Members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (hereafter referred to as ASEAN) include 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. Article 14(2) of the ASEAN Charter stipulates that the human rights body 
would operate in accordance with ‗terms of reference‘, which would be finalised by ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers.  According to Paragraph 1 of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human 
Rights‘ terms of reference, the Commission is limited to the protection and promotion of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of the peoples of ASEAN.   
604
 The League of Arab States adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 2004; its members include 
Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Somalia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, 
Sudan, Yemen, Comoros, Jordan, Mauritania, Qatar, Syria, Djibouti, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, 
and Tunisia. The Arab Charter on Human Rights was first adopted in 1994; however, it was not 
ratified. The Charter, which protects civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, was revised 
by State Parties in 2004 and that revised version seems more favourable as it has attracted 
ratifications. See, Rhonda K M Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 3
rd
 ed, 2007) 84; see also, League of Arab States official website 
<http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/index.jsp>. 
605
 The Commonwealth of Independent States adopted a Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms in 1995; its members include Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the Ukraine.  For more 
information, see, http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm. The Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms safeguards human rights. For example, the right to life, freedom from torture, 
and prohibitions on slavery stipulated respectively in Article 2, 3, and 4 of the Convention. 
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ICTY, IHT, and ECCC.  Of these, only two have been established in Africa: the ICTR 
and the SCSL.  There are other international institutions, which are noted below.   
These international forums are discussed to assess whether they would be in a position to 
deal with the on-going problem of corporate complicity in international crimes, 
especially where MNCs initiate or perpetrate such crimes within their jurisdiction.   
As the following discussion shows, a number of these institutions are unsuitable to deal 
with this on-going problem because their jurisdiction is limited by temporal and 
territorial factors.  Furthermore, the ad hoc international tribunals and special courts are 
limited by completion strategies.  Also, though much like the ICC, most of these only 
exercise jurisdiction over natural persons liable for the commission of international 
crimes. 
a) ICTR 
i. About the Tribunal 
The UN Security Council enacted Chapter VII provisions of the UN Charter 
in response to the serious violations of humanitarian law committed in 
Rwanda in 1994.606  At that time, it is estimated that between half a million to 
a million civilians died in Rwanda.607 
ii. Scope of jurisdiction over persons and offences 
The ICTR exercises jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to Article 5 of 
the ICTR Statute, and has indicted over 110 accused persons.  These have 
                                                 
606
 UN Security Council Resolution (8 November 1994) UN Doc. S/RES/955(1994). 
607
 For a detailed discussion on the Rwandan humanitarian crisis, see, Romeo A Dallaire, ‗The End of 
Innocence, Rwanda 1994‘ in Jonathan Moore (ed), Hard Choices – Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian 
Intervention (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) 71.  
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included a former prime minister, interior ministers, councillors, chiefs-of-staff, 
military leaders, politicians, bourgmestres, prefects, businessmen, journalists, 
church ministers, and priests. 608   In addition, Article 6 of the ICTR Statute 
empowers the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to prosecute complicit persons.609   
The serious violations of humanitarian law that trigger the ICTR‘s jurisdiction 
include genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 Common 
to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.  These offences are 
prohibited pursuant to Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the ICTR Statute, respectively.  
According to Article 7 of the ICTR Statute, the tribunal exercises territorial 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in the Rwandan territory, as well as crimes 
committed by Rwandan citizens in neighbouring States.  Furthermore, Article 7 
specifically stipulates that the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal is limited to 
crimes committed between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.  The ICTR 
and national courts of Rwanda share concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute the 
commission of crimes according to Article 8 of the ICTR Statute.  The ICTR 
has primacy over national courts pursuant to Article 8(2) of the ICTR Statute.  
This is a feature that differentiates the ICTR and the other ad hoc tribunals and 
special courts from the ICC, whose jurisdiction is limited by the principle of 
complementarity.610  
                                                 
608
 See, Annexes attached to ‗Letter dated 14 May 2009 from the President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President of the Security Council‘ UN Doc. S/2009/247. A 
bourgmestre is the equivalent of a modern day Mayor. 
609
 For example, according to Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute: ‗a person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred 
to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.‘ 
610
 The principle of complementarity is discussed later at 4.2.4 of this thesis. 
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The ICTR is approaching the completion of its work.  The Tribunal will finalise 
all trials in the first instance at the end of 2012, and appeals by the end of 
2014.611  The Tribunal has also referred a number of cases that will be heard in 
the domestic courts of Rwanda.612 
b) SCSL 
i. About the Court 
Sierra Leone experienced a decade-long civil war during the 1990s, generally 
regarded as the most deplorable of all civil conflicts. 613   The SCSL was 
established as a joint initiative between the Sierra Leonean Government and 
the United Nations.614  The Court is an internationalised or hybrid court – that 
is, a court that adopts a blend of both international criminal law and domestic 
criminal law in its legal instruments, as well as a mix of local and international 
judges.615 
ii. Scope of jurisdiction over persons and offences 
According to Article 1 of the SCSL Statute, the Court‘s jurisdiction is limited 
to serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law.  
Furthermore, the Court‘s jurisdiction is limited to offences committed in 
                                                 
611
 See, Address by Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the ICTR, to the United Nations Security 
Council – Six monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR (7 December 2011).  
612
 See, Address by Judge Khalida Rachid Khan, President of the ICTR, to the United Nations Security 
Council – Six monthly Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR (7 December 2011).  
613
 ‗Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council‘ UN Doc. S/2000/786, 2. 
614
 See generally, SCSL, About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, <http://www.sc-sl.org>. 
615
 For detailed discussion about the SCSL and other hybrid courts see, Cesare P R Romano, et al, 
Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia – International 
Courts and Tribunals Series (Oxford University Press, 2004); see also, Kate Gibson, ‗An Uneasy Co-
existence: The Relationship Between Internationalised Criminal Courts and their Domestic 
Counterparts‘ (2009) 9(2) International Criminal Law Review 275, 288–292.  
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Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. 
The SCSL has only heard a limited number of cases, though at least seven 
were brought before it.  Of these, three involved the former leaders of the Civil 
Defence Forces, 616   Revolutionary United Front, 617  and Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council.618  Also, of those brought before the Court, two were 
withdrawn upon the death of the defendants,619 and one involves an accused 
person still at large.620  The final case, the trial of the former Liberian President 
Charles Taylor, is ongoing.621 
Like the ICTY and ICTR, the SCSL Statute prohibits crimes against 
humanity
622
 and violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol II.
623
  In addition, the SCSL also exercises 
jurisdiction over persons who have committed other violations of international 
                                                 
616
 See, The Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa (CDF Case) (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Case No. SCSL 04-14-T, 2 August 2007); The Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa (CDF Case) 
(Appeal Judgment) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL 04-14-T, 28 May 2008).  
617
 The Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon & Gbao (RUF Case) (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Case No. SCSL 04-15-T, 25 February 2009); The Prosecutor v Sesay, Kallon & Gbao (RUF 
Case) (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL 04-15-A, 26 October 
2009).  
618
 The Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara & Kanu (AFRC Case) (Trial Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, Case No. SCSL 04-16-T, 20 June 2007); The Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara & Kanu (AFRC 
Case) (Appeal Judgement) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL 04-16-A, 22 February 
2008). 
619
 The Prosecutor v Foday Saybana Sankoh (Withdrawal of Indictment) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
Case No. SCSL-03-02-PT-054, 8 December 2003), case was withdrawn upon Sankoh‘s death; The 
Prosecutor v Sam Bockarie (Withdrawal of Indictment) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. 
SCSL-03-04-I-022, 8 December 2003), case was withdrawn upon Bockarie‘s death. 
620
 The Prosecutor v Johnny Paul Koroma (Indictment) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL-
03-I, 7 March 2003), the Accused is still at large. 
621
 The Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor (Indictment) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. 
SCSL-03-01-T, 29 May 2007). The Defence concluded their submissions in December 2010. See, 
SCSL, case information, <http://www.sc-sl.org>. 
622
 Article 2 of the SCSL Statute. 
623
 Article 3 of the SCSL Statute. 
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humanitarian law.
624
  According to Article 4 of the SCSL Statute, offences 
amounting to violations of international humanitarian law include attacking 
peacekeeping or humanitarian personnel and their property.  Also, Article 5 of 
the SCSL Statute prohibits the perpetration of crimes pursuant to Sierra 
Leonean law.  Offences amounting to crimes pursuant to Sierra Leonean law 
include: the abuse of girls in violation of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children 
Act; 625  and, the wanton destruction of property pursuant to the Malicious 
Damage Act.626 
Like the ICTY and the ICTR, the SCSL and national courts of Sierra Leone 
share concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute the commission of crimes according 
to Article 8 of the SCSL Statute.  Furthermore, pursuant to Article 8(2), the 
SCSL has primacy over national courts.  The SCSL exercises jurisdiction over 
natural persons pursuant to Article 6, which also empowers the Tribunal with 
the jurisdiction to prosecute complicit persons.627     
c) ICTY 
i. About the Tribunal 
Between 1991 and 2001, mass atrocities were committed in the former 
Yugoslavia – specifically, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.628  The atrocities were of 
                                                 
624
 Article 4 of the SCSL Statute. 
625
 Prohibited pursuant to Article 5(a) of the SCSL Statute. 
626
 Prohibited pursuant to Article 5(b) of the SCSL Statute. 
627
 For example, according to Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute: ‗a person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred 
to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime.‘ 
628
 See also, ICTY <http://www.icty.org>. 
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such widespread gravity, they amounted to a threat to international peace and 
security.629  This led the UN Security Council to intervene and establish the 
ICTY in 1993 pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  The Tribunal was 
created to enable the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law.630  
ii. Scope of jurisdiction over persons and offences 
The ICTY only exercises jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to 
Article 6 of the ICTY Statute.  To this end, the tribunal has indicted over 160 
accused persons for the commission of international crimes.  The accused have 
included the former head of state, army chiefs-of-staff, interior ministers, 
politicians, police, and military leaders.631  In addition, Article 7 of the ICTY 
Statute empowers the Tribunal with the jurisdiction to prosecute complicit 
persons.632  The ICTY Statute does not include jurisdiction over complicit legal 
persons, though it had the opportunity to do so.633  In hindsight, one could 
                                                 
629
 For a detailed analysis on the establishment of the ICTY, see, Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International 
Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2001) 22.  
630
 UN Security Council Resolution (25 May 1993) UN Doc. S/RES/827(1993). 
631
 See, ICTY <http://www.icty.org>. 
632
 For example, according to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute: ‗a person who planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred 
to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.‘ 
633
 This is interesting considering that the ICTY was the first ad hoc international criminal tribunal that 
was established almost 50 years after the IMTs. There were numerous reports singling out the 
international crimes perpetrated by paramilitary groups with respect to the atrocities committed in the 
former Yugoslavia. The paramilitary groups included: ‗Tigers‘, the ‗Cetniks‘ ‗White Eagles‘ and the 
‗Fire Horses‘. Nina Jørgensen notes that the ‗Tigers‘ were a Serb group commanded by Zaljko 
Raznjatovic, the ‗Cetniks‘ a Serb group commanded by Vojislav Seselj, the ‗White Eagles‘ a Serb 
group commanded by Mirko Jovic and the ‗Fire Horses‘ were a Bosnian Croat group. Jørgensen 
argues that these groups, whether acting as complicit perpetrators or principal perpetrators were not 
held liable because the idea of prosecuting paramilitary groups or even their members was dismissed 
during the drafting of the ICTY Statute. See, Nina H B Jørgensen, ‗A Reappraisal of the Abandoned 
Nuremberg Concept of Criminal Organisations in the Context of Justice in Rwanda‘ (2001) 12(3) 
Criminal Law Forum 371, 375. 
 –  143  –  
argue that had it done so, this precedent could have paved the way for other 
institutions that followed to do the same.  As the discussion that follows later 
in this thesis shows, this could have been case for the ICTR and the SCSL.634   
The ICTY exercises jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or the customs of war, genocide, 
and crimes against humanity pursuant to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively.  
According to Article 8 of the ICTY Statute, the ICTY exercises territorial 
jurisdiction by specifically dealing with crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia.  It also exercises temporal jurisdiction, investigating and 
prosecuting crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia from January 1991.  
The ICTY and national courts of the former Yugoslavia share concurrent 
jurisdiction to prosecute the commission of crimes according to Article 9 of 
the ICTY Statute; and the ICTY exercises primacy over national courts 
pursuant to Article 9(2) of the ICTY Statute.  
The ICTY has a completion strategy in place as it nears the end of its work.  
The Tribunal anticipates that it will finalise all its trials in the first instance by 
2014 and appeals by 2016.635  In the meantime, the Tribunal has been referring 
cases to national jurisdictions to reduce its workload; to date, cases have been 
sent to Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia.636 
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 See discussion on this at 5.3.2 of this thesis. 
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 See, ICTY, Completion Strategy, <http://www.icty.org/sid/10016>.  
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 ‗Letter dated 12 May 2011 from the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council‘, 
UN DOC. S/2011/316, 19, 20. 
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d) IHT 
i. About the Tribunal  
The Coalition Provisional Authority briefly governed Iraq following the fall of 
the Ba‘ath regime that had been ruled by Saddam Hussein.637  In 2003, the 
CPA authorised the Governing Council to establish an Iraqi Special 
Tribunal.638  Later in 2005, the Iraqi National Assembly amended and passed 
the original statute again.  The Iraqi National Assembly also renamed the 
Tribunal and called it the Iraqi High Criminal Court, though it is commonly 
referred to as the Iraqi High Tribunal.639  
ii. Scope of jurisdiction over persons and offences 
According to Article 1 of the IHT Statute, the Tribunal exercises jurisdiction 
over natural persons, be they Iraqi or non-Iraqi residents, for offences 
committed in violation of Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the IHT Statute during 
17 July 1968 to 1 May 2003.  Article 1 provides that the Tribunal may 
exercise jurisdiction over offences ‗in the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere.‘  The 
Tribunal has power to prosecute persons who have committed genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  These offences are prohibited 
pursuant to Articles 11, 12, and 13, respectively.  Also, pursuant to Article 14, 
the Tribunal has jurisdiction over violations of Iraqi laws.  For example, these 
offences include Article 2(g) of the Punishment of Conspirators against 
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 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 6
th
 ed, 2008) 429. Coalition 
Provisional Authority hereafter referred to as CPA. 
638
 Section 1 of the Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 48: Delegation of Authority Regarding 
an Iraqi Special Tribunal.  
639
 See, Stuart Alford, ‗Some Thoughts on the Trial of Saddam Hussein: The Realities of the 
Complementarity Principle‘ (2008) 8 International Criminal Law Review 463, 466. 
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Public Safety and Corrupters of the System of Governance Law 7 of 1958, 
which deal with the wastage and squandering of national resources. 
The IHT exercises jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to Article 1(2) of 
the IHT Statute.  In addition, Article 15 empowers the Tribunal with the 
jurisdiction to prosecute complicit persons. 640   Like the ICTY, ICTR, and 
SCSL, the IHT shares concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts of Iraq 
to prosecute the commission of crimes according to Article 29(1) of the IHT 
Statute.  Furthermore, pursuant to Article 29(2), the IHT has primacy over all 
other Iraqi courts.  
e) ECCC 
i. About the Extraordinary Chambers 
The Khmer Rouge perpetrated serious human rights violations during 1975 
and 1979 that led to the death of up to three million people in Cambodia 
(formerly known as Democratic Kampuchea). 641   Following international 
pressure, the ECCC was eventually established by agreement with the United 
Nations in 2003.642 
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 For example, according to Article 15(2) of the IHT Statute: ‗… a person shall be criminally responsible 
if he [or she]: for the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise 
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 ECCC, Introduction to the ECCC <http://www.eccc.gov.kh>.  For detailed discussion on the ECCC 
background and the crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, see, Kate Gibson, ‗An Uneasy Co-
existence: The Relationship Between Internationalised Criminal Courts and their Domestic 
Counterparts (2009) 9 International Criminal Law Review 275, 292–295. 
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 ECCC, Introduction to the ECCC <http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english>. For details see, Agreement 
Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, signed 6 June 2003 and entered into 
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ii. Scope of jurisdiction over persons and offences  
Crimes committed during 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979 fall within the 
scope of temporal jurisdiction of the Chambers pursuant to Article 2 new of 
the ECCC Law.  Furthermore, the Extraordinary Chambers exercise territorial 
jurisdiction over offences committed in violation of Cambodian law, 
international humanitarian law and custom, as well as offences in 
contravention of international conventions recognised by Cambodia pursuant 
to Article 2 new of the ECCC Law.  In addition, according to Article 3 new of 
both the ECCC Law and the ECCC Agreement,643 the Extraordinary Chambers 
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over crimes prohibited in the 1956 
Cambodian Penal Code.  Offences under the Penal Code that fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chambers include homicide, torture, and 
religious persecution.644 
Like the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ICTY, the ECCC Agreement prohibits 
genocide, 645  crimes against humanity 646  and violations of the Geneva 
Conventions. 647   Also, Article 7 of the ECCC Agreement prohibits the 
destruction of cultural property during armed conflict in violation of the 1954 
Hague Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict.  Furthermore, Article 8 of the ECCC Agreement prohibits offences 
against the Vienna Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations that result in 
                                                 
643
 The ECCC Agreement is relied upon in the judicial reasoning of the Extraordinary Chambers; see, Co-
Prosecutors v Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Case No. 1) (Trial Judgment) (Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC-TC, 26 July 2010) [2], [35]. 
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 Prohibited pursuant to Article 3 new of the ECCC Law. 
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 Article 4 of the ECCC Agreement. 
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 Article 5 of the ECCC Agreement. 
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 Article 6 of the ECCC Agreement. 
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crimes against internationally protected persons.  The ECCC Law is silent on 
the commission of these offences.  The ECCC exercises jurisdiction over 
natural persons pursuant to Article 2 new of the ECCC Law.  In addition, 
Article 29 new of the ECCC Law empowers the Extraordinary Chambers with 
the jurisdiction to prosecute complicit persons.648 
f) Other international institutions 
There are international institutions that exercise jurisdiction over legal persons – 
for example, the International Court of Justice.649  There have been several cases 
brought before the ICJ dealing with disputes over the control of natural 
resources.650  Although these disputes have concerned legal persons in the form of 
State Parties, the ICJ does not exercise criminal jurisdiction.  This thesis will not 
deal extensively with jurisprudence from the ICJ.   
The United Nations Human Rights Council 651  is another example of an 
international institution that exercises jurisdiction over legal persons.  The HRC is 
an inter-governmental body, which primarily examines complaints concerning 
human rights violations by State Parties, and provides recommendations with 
                                                 
648
 For example, according to Article 29 new of the ECCC Law: ‗Any Suspect who planned, instigated, 
ordered, aided and abetted, or committed the crimes referred to in Article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this 
law shall be individually responsible for the crime.‘ 
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 International Court of Justice hereafter referred to as ICJ.  
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 See for example, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, dealing with looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of natural 
resources in armed conflict; Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) [2005] ICJ Rep 90, dealing with the 
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 United Nations Human Rights Council hereafter referred to as UNHRC. 
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respect to such complaints.652  There are some who argue that the HRC complaints 
procedure does not expressly exclude complaints with respect to human rights 
violations perpetrated by MNCs.653  This argument is made in view of a recent 
development at the seventeenth Council session, whereby the HRC endorsed the 
Final Report of the UNSRSG,654 which is modelled on the UNSRSGs ‗Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework‘. 655   The ‗Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework‘ is seen by some as the prevailing guide for future actions by the 
United Nations with respect to businesses and human rights violations.  However, 
this thesis is concerned with (and prefers) enforceable corporate criminal liability 
models.  The reality remains that the UNHRC does not exercise criminal 
jurisdiction.656  Hence, this thesis will not deal extensively with the UNHRC with 
                                                 
652 See, UNHRC general information available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/. 
653 Alice de Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law: Accountability in the Global 
Business Environment (Edward Elgar, 2011) 177. 
654 See, UNSRSG Final Report, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
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carry out their own investigations and hold the responsible perpetrators accountable. See, UN Human 
Rights Council, Report of the International Fact-finding Mission to Investigate Violations of 
International Law, including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the 
Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance, 27 September 2010, 
A/HRC/15/21, [258] – [278]. 
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respect to complaints regarding legal persons, albeit State or non-State actors.   
There are also additional international institutions with quasi-judicial powers.  
These include, inter alia, the World Trade Organisation. 657   The WTO is a 
multilateral trading system, which has a procedure in place for settling disputes 
between its member parties.658  There are some who argue that this forum could, 
indeed, address the international human rights obligations of MNCs.659  However, a 
concern is that the WTO does not exercise criminal jurisdiction.  More than 
anything, this forum could positively influence the governance of natural resources 
through the environmental or social principles at the core of the WTO‘s 
multilateral treaties.660  Regardless, this thesis will not deal extensively with rulings 
from the WTO.   
4.2.4 ICC 
a) About the Court 
The ICC is a permanent international criminal court that was created to end 
impunity and bring about accountability for the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community.661  In 1998, 120 State parties adopted 
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this procedure, a panel is convened, which prepares an official report that is presented to the parties. 
The report is then presented to WTO members, and adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body, if there 
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659 See discussion in, Alice de Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law: Accountability 
in the Global Business Environment (Edward Elgar, 2011) 181–182. 
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the Rome Statute, an international treaty, establishing the Court.662  The Statute 
entered into force in 2002 subsequent to ratification by at least 60 countries.663 
b) Scope of jurisdiction over persons and offences 
Crimes of most serious concern to the international community include 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression664 
pursuant to Article 5(1) of the ICC Rome Statute.  Considering that MNCs are 
most often accused of complicity in crimes against humanity,665 these crimes 
fall squarely within the scope of the Court‘s jurisdiction.666  
Article 12 of the ICC Rome Statute provides the preconditions to the exercise 
of the Court‘s jurisdiction with respect to situations where a State Party has 
referred a matter to the Prosecutor or where the Prosecutor has initiated an 
investigation pursuant to Article 13. Specifically, according to Article 12(2)(a) 
of the ICC Rome Statute, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if dealing 
with the ‗State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if 
the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration 
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of that vessel or aircraft.‘667  Also, Article 12(2)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute 
provides that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if the matter concerns the 
‗State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.‘668  
Article 13 of the ICC Rome Statute stipulates that the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over most serious crimes of concern in one of three ways.  One 
way is that a State Party may refer a situation in which crimes have been 
committed to the ICC Prosecutor.669  For example, Uganda, DRC, and the 
Central African Republic all referred situations to the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes committed within their territories.670   Another way is 
that the UN Security Council may refer a situation in which crimes have been 
committed to the ICC Prosecutor pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.671  For example, the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur, 
Sudan, to the ICC672 and, more recently, the situation in Libya.673  Yet another 
way is that the ICC Prosecutor may initiate an investigation into allegations 
that crimes have been committed.674  The Prosecutor initiates an investigation, 
proprio motu, in accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of the ICC 
Rome Statute.  The proprio motu powers of the ICC Prosecutor are a unique 
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feature of the ICC, especially when compared to the other ad hoc 
institutions.675  In essence, Article 15 ‗creates a new autonomous actor on the 
international scene‘.676  The Prosecutor may initiate investigations on the basis 
of information received concerning crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Court.677  The Prosecutor may then formally request the Pre-Trial Chamber 
for authorisation to investigate those crimes.678  The Chamber may authorise 
the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation where it considers that there is 
a reasonable basis to do so.679  An example of this is when ICC Prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, exercised his jurisdiction to initiate an investigation 
into crimes committed during Kenya‘s violent post-election period in 2007 to 
2008.680 
The ICC does not exercise primary jurisdiction over most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community.  Instead, the Court‘s jurisdiction is 
limited by the principle of complementarity.681  Both Article 1 and paragraph 
10 of the Preamble of the ICC Rome Statute stipulate that the Court ‗shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.‘  According to this principle, 
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the ICC can only determine that a case is admissible before the Court when 
there has been inactivity on the part of a State; and, in such circumstances the 
inactivity is because a ‗State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution‘ pursuant to the provision stipulated in Article 
17(1) of the ICC Rome Statute. 
The ICC is also limited by temporal jurisdiction.  According to Article 11(1) 
of the ICC Rome Statute, the Court‘s jurisdiction is limited to crimes 
committed after the Statute came into force (i.e. 2002).  Furthermore, 
according to Article 11(2), when the Court is dealing with States that have 
become parties to the Statute after its entry into force, it may only exercise its 
jurisdiction after the Statute has entered into force for that particular State.682 
In terms of who may be prosecuted before the Court, Article 25(1) of the ICC 
Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC only exercises jurisdiction over natural 
persons.  This provision would need to be amended to accommodate legal 
persons.  Also, Article 25 of the ICC Rome Statute empowers the Court with 
the jurisdiction to prosecute complicit persons, which includes aiders and 
abettors of international crimes.  It is widely accepted in customary 
international law that corporate personnel could be held liable for complicit 
perpetration of international crimes. 683   However, the specific wording of 
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Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute is a major barrier to the prosecution 
of corporate personnel, such as senior executives and the members of the 
board of directors, who bear the most responsibility as decision-makers (as 
well as the prosecution of corporate entities).  According to this Article, only 
those complicit perpetrators that aided and abetted a crime for the purpose of 
facilitating such crime shall be criminally responsible.684 
4.3 Most appropriate forum for dealing with complicit organisational liability 
As the discussion above has shown, domestic forums ultimately exercise primary 
jurisdiction over the type of crimes discussed in this thesis.  However, the reality seems 
to be that given the lagging prosecutions to date, the States where these MNCs are 
headquartered appear disinterested.  Also, the domestic courts in conflict-affected areas 
or weak-governance zones where these crimes take place face numerous administrative 
and socio-legal challenges.  Moreover, the nature of foreign direct investments made by 
MNCs in such domestic jurisdictions far outweighs the need to prosecute them.   
The regional courts face several challenges too.  The most pressing being that the courts 
are limited by geographical constraints.  Also, of those in Africa, the ACJHR – which 
shall operate as the region‘s permanent court – is yet to commence, and there are still 
concerns as to whether or not it will possess criminal chambers.   
The ad hoc international tribunals and special courts are shutting down soon, and are all 
working towards completion strategies.  For example, the SCSL is currently hearing its 
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last case.  Also, all existing international institutions that exercise jurisdiction over 
international crimes are restricted by geographical constraints, and are limited by their 
specificity (for example, the ICTR only deals with serious violations of humanitarian law 
specifically committed in Rwanda in 1994).685 
Hence, the writer is of the view that the ICC would be the preferred forum, but only 
where domestic jurisdictions are unwilling or unable to exercise jurisdiction over the 
complicit MNCs.  This Court is a permanent institution; it is not restricted by 
geographical constraints. However, as previously noted, a major drawback for the ICC 
(as a desirable forum to deal with complicit organisational liability in international 
crimes) is that, currently, it only exercises jurisdiction over natural persons.  It does not 
have provisions for organisational liability, whereas the doctrine of corporate criminal 
liability is well established in most domestic jurisdictions.  Ideally, the ICC State Parties 
should revisit the ICC Rome Statute in order to amend its provisions to include 
jurisdiction over complicit legal persons, specifically multinational corporations.  Also, 
there is a need to amend Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute to accommodate the 
characteristic forms through which corporations usually operate. 
There is still a real possibility that the ICC may amend its jurisdiction to include legal 
persons at some point in the future.  This may be carried out pursuant to Articles 121 and 
123 of the ICC Rome Statute.  The manner in which a State Party to the Statute may go 
about amending the statutory provisions is discussed later in this thesis.686 
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4.4 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter investigated where an organisation that is complicit in international crimes 
could be prosecuted.  In doing so, the writer examined the existing international, regional, 
and domestic jurisdictional forums to determine the preferred forum to deal with the 
problem of complicit organisational liability.  As the discussion above has shown, the 
writer identified that the ICC was the most appropriate forum for this purpose where 
domestic jurisdictions proved inadequate. 
The next chapter discusses organisational liability doctrine. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Scope of Liability for Organisational Complicity:  
Organisational Liability Doctrine 
„There are far too many examples of companies which are complicit in or profit 
from appalling human rights abuses in conflict areas – but no successful 
prosecutions to date … There is no moral, legal or economic argument for this 
status quo. For it to change, we must equip prosecutors and the courts with the 
tools to bring the guilty to justice and discourage other companies from becoming 
involved in these appalling crimes.‟ 687 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
In the previous chapter, the writer investigated jurisdictional forums to determine the 
most appropriate for the prosecution of multinational corporations for conduct occurring 
in Africa. 
This chapter commences the discussion on how an organisation that is complicit in 
international crimes could be prosecuted.  The writer discusses organisational liability 
doctrine by examining the models applied in domestic jurisdictions.  Furthermore, this 
chapter examines missed opportunities of what could have been the attribution of 
corporate liability in international criminal law over the last sixty years.  Finally, the 
writer identifies the preferred model of corporate liability to transplant internationally 
within the ICC Rome Statute to deal with MNCs that are complicit in international 
crimes. 
The doctrine of organisational liability is generally discussed in the context of 
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corporations unless otherwise indicated.  This is not to say other legal entities should be 
exempt from liability.  Rather, the nature of the organisational liability models developed 
within domestic jurisdictions tends to focus on corporate entities.  A number of the legal 
principles discussed here could, by extension or analogy, be applied to other legal 
persons; however, the focus of this thesis is multinational corporations in the extractive 
industries. 
5.2 Attributing corporate liability in domestic jurisdictions 
5.2.1 Brief historical examination on the birth of the corporation 
Corporations have grown in stature in most domestic jurisdictions over the last few 
centuries.  There is a wealth of literature that traces the birth of the corporation and the 
law governing corporate activities in a number of domestic legal systems.688  The manner 
by which corporations have developed has played a significant role in shaping corporate 
criminal liability in most domestic legal systems.  In particular, the developments in 
common law jurisdictions have largely influenced the corporate liability models that are 
applied today.  The emergence of corporations in common law jurisdictions is briefly 
examined here.  
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Common law jurisdictions were largely influenced by the British Empire.  A significant 
number of statutory instruments dealing with corporations originated in the United 
Kingdom, and these were received throughout the British colonies in Africa, the Indian 
subcontinent, Asia, and the Caribbean. 689  Although the United States was a former 
British colony, it significantly influenced the development of company law in the 
Philippines and Japan (immediately after WWII).  In more recent times, US company 
law influences have been felt in parts of the Caribbean, Central and South America and, 
to some extent, in Canada, New Zealand, and some jurisdictions in the Pacific Rim.690  
With regard to corporations in England, trade up until the sixteenth century was 
controlled through a system of guilds that were issued with a Royal Seal of approval.691  
These guilds managed the right to engage in specific trade dealings.692  By the sixteenth 
century, England and much of Europe began a rapid trade expansion throughout eastern 
and western territories in search of natural resources.693  At that time, monarchs were the 
only authorities vested with the power to create companies.694  They did so by granting 
what was known as a Royal Charter.  This Royal Charter enabled merchants to engage in 
trade through what became known as regulated companies, 695  because although the 
company‘s members engaged in trade individually, the trade itself was actually regulated 
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by the State.696  There were a number of distinguishing features of the Royal Charter that 
later became the founding legal principles with respect to the incorporation of companies.  
The Royal Charter included provisions: that the company was capable of suing and being 
sued; the company could hold a common seal; merchants could acquire property in the 
company name; and, the company name could also enjoy perpetual succession. 697  
Leading up to the seventeenth century, Parliament began to play a more prominent role 
in the creation of companies, when merchants, instead, brought their petitions to 
Parliament if they sought a grant of incorporation.  Parliament responded to each 
individual request and delivered a specific Act of Parliament granting incorporation.698  It 
was only during the nineteenth century that Parliament enacted legislation that showed 
early signs of regulating companies.699  For example, the British Parliament passed the 
Companies Act (UK) in 1844, which not only indicated how a group of individuals could 
register a company, but also put provisions in place that required the appointment of 
auditors, the reporting of company accounts and, more significantly, the personal 
liability of corporate directors in circumstances where the company traded while 
insolvent.700 
5.2.2 The emerging nature of corporate liability 
The emerging nature of corporate criminal liability has curiously been described as a 
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‗weed … nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it.  It just grew.‘701  Indeed, 
the gradual recognition of corporate criminal liability has been a lengthy and somewhat 
patchy process.  It has resulted in what Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern describe as 
‗an ad hoc doctrine of law at best and rudimentary at worst‘.702  This may be attributed to 
a number of factors.  Lawmakers were traditionally averse to the notion of recognising 
corporate activities as criminal.  Granted, this traditional view has gradually diminished; 
however, this kind of attitude toward the notion of corporate criminal conduct stunted 
the manner in which the law developed. 703   In the past, corporate activities were 
generally regulated by statutory regimes containing criminal provisions that dealt with 
corporations.  A major shortcoming of these statutory regimes is that they were not based 
on a prosecutorial model, but rather administered on a compliance model.704  The result 
was the courts and legislative bodies failed to clearly develop provisions dealing with 
corporate criminal liability.  This lacuna has led to the practise of enforcing specific 
offences as opposed to developing a consistent body of law.705  
Tracing historical developments in common law jurisdictions 
Incorporated companies emerged as early as the sixteenth century.706  At the time, there 
were no provisions in place to deal with corporate criminal liability in common law 
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jurisdictions.  In fact, as early as 1701, Sir John Holt C.J., in obiter dictum, reflected 
upon the existing common law position when he said that corporations were incapable of 
committing criminal offences.  According to Holt C.J., only particular members of the 
corporation could be indicted for criminal offences, but not the corporate entity itself.707  
This approach changed at the turn of the century.  Historical examination shows that 
there was a significant difference between the corporate form which existed in the early 
1700s from that which emerged much later in the 1800s.708  When Holt C.J. dismissed 
the idea of corporate criminal liability, the idea of corporate entities was still taking 
shape.  Developments in the body of company law really unfolded in 1862 with the 
introduction of the Companies Act.709 
Looking back, it is apparent that the idea of corporate criminal liability is not a novel one.  
In common law jurisdictions, the earliest forms of corporate criminal liability were 
formulated in the nineteenth century.710  Despite corporations having existed in common 
law for centuries, it was not until the nineteenth century that their regulation became 
imperative. 711  At that time, the rapid industrialisation of society and the increasing 
materialisation of limited liability companies created a dilemma.  How would criminal 
law impute the commission of criminal offences to a corporation when it was 
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predominantly seen as an artificial entity?712   
Traditionally, criminal liability primarily dealt with the responsibility of natural persons 
for the commission of crimes against other natural persons or their possessions.713  The 
common law courts were confronted with a challenge.  How, if at all, could they apply 
general principles of criminal law, such as actus reus and mens rea, to convey corporate 
criminality. 714   The argument is also made that corporate criminality would have 
developed less strenuously if the courts had not distracted themselves with ‗fitting 
corporate square pegs into the round holes of existing criminal law dogma.‘715  Historical 
examination reveals that the earliest semblance of corporate prosecutions during the 
nineteenth century showed a narrow regard for corporate criminal liability, which was 
restricted in its application to public nuisance, criminal libel, and breach of statutory 
duties.716  It was only in the twentieth century that corporate criminal liability became 
well established in common law jurisdictions.  By this time, the common law courts had 
formulated a solution for attributing corporate criminal liability, which stemmed from 
the doctrine of derivative liability; they applied vicarious liability and identification 
liability (discussed below).717  
Tracing historical developments in civil law jurisdictions  
In contrast, continental Europe had embraced forms of corporate criminal liability 
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throughout much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.718  The French Criminal 
Code, which dealt in great detail with the criminal sanctioning of corporations, largely 
influenced the European continent. 719   However, this all changed during the French 
Revolution of 1789; individualism dominated the revolutionary era while any concepts 
of corporate liability were swept away.720  The doctrine of corporate criminal liability 
was thwarted in France and throughout much of Europe on account of the legal maxim: 
societas delinquere non potest.  At the time, this principle was entrenched in most 
European legal systems; the principle insinuated that legal entities were incapable of 
being found blameworthy.721  This principle dominated most civil legal systems, and it 
was only in the late 1970s that it began to be challenged by legal scholars in Western 
Europe.722  The criticism is attributed primarily to the growing influence exerted by 
corporations in Western Europe and the increasing instances of corporate misconduct 
that posed unique challenges for European society. 723   By 2000, many European 
countries were forced to reassess their position on corporate criminal liability in light of 
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a number of international and regional conventions. 724   These conventions were 
important milestones that obliged signatory States to implement whatever necessary 
measures to punish corporate entities engaged in unlawful conduct. 725   Presently, a 
number of countries in civil law jurisdictions have abandoned the principle of societas 
delinquere non potest and adopted at least one of the corporate liability models discussed 
below. 
Jurisdictions that have not adopted the traditional corporate liability models  
Not all domestic jurisdictions apply models of corporate criminal liability.  For instance, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Luxembourg, and the Slovak Republic are among the domestic 
jurisdictions that do not recognise any form of criminal liability for corporate entities.  
Also, countries like Germany, Greece, Hungary, Mexico, and Sweden have no specific 
provisions for corporate criminal liability, but they impose administrative penalties for 
the criminal acts of employees.726  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a more 
detailed discussion on these domestic jurisdictions.  This chapter focuses on corporate 
criminal liability and the identification of an appropriate model to transplant 
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Recommendations on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions (2004).   
726
 On jurisdictions that have not adopted the traditional corporate liability models, see generally, Allens 
Arthur Robinson, „Corporate Culture‟ as a Basis for the Criminal Liability of Corporations (2008); 
Lex Mundi Business Crimes and Compliance Practice Group, Business Crimes and Compliance 
Criminal Liability of Companies Survey (2008); Anita Ramasastry and Robert C Thompson (eds), 
Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of 
International Law – A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions (FAFO, 2006); FAFO, Business and 
International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of International 
Law (2004). 
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internationally within the ICC Rome Statute. 
5.2.3 Models of corporate liability 
The legal doctrine of corporate liability has long been problematic and debated widely 
among academics, international bodies, and law enforcement agencies.727  The focus of 
the debate is shifting.  Some academics, such as Celia Wells, have taken the view that 
‗the debate is no longer whether to have corporate liability but what form it should 
take.‘728  The emerging issue is whether the corporation‘s wrongs are attributable to the 
corporate entity itself, or whether the wrong only lies with an individual within the 
corporation.729  
Most domestic legal systems have developed at least one of the two models of corporate 
liability. These models are summarised in Table 5 and discussed below.  They are the 
‗derivative liability model‘ (which comprises vicarious liability and identification 
liability) and the ‗non-derivative liability model‘.730  These models are not mutually 
exclusive.   Some jurisdictions apply both models of corporate criminal liability.  For 
example, Australia applies a combination of both identification liability and non-
derivative liability.731 
  
                                                 
727
 See generally, Celia Wells and Juanita Elias, ‗Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players 
on the International Stage‘ in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
728
 Celia Wells, ‗International Trade in Models of Corporate Liability‘ (2002), The Centre for Business 
Relationships, Accountability, Sustainability and Society <http://www.brass.cf.ac.uk>. 
729
 Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2001) 75. 
730
 It is noted in Chapter 1 that the term ‗non-derivative liability‘ is used to avoid confusion with the term 
‗organisational liability‘. The writer also noted that non-derivative liability is generally described by 
academics as ‗organisational liability‘. Finally, this thesis uses the term ‗non-derivative liability‘ to 
distinguish it from derivative liability.   
731
 See, Part 2.5, Division 12 of the Criminal Code (Cth). 
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Table 2 – Corporate liability models within most domestic jurisdictions 
Note: information in the table compiled from the following sources: Allens Arthur Robinson, „Corporate Culture‟ as 
a Basis for the Criminal Liability of Corporations (2008); Lex Mundi Business Crimes and Compliance Practice 
Group, Business Crimes and Compliance Criminal Liability of Companies Survey (2008); Anita Ramasastry and 
Robert C Thompson (eds), Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave 
Breaches of International Law- A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions (FAFO, 2006); FAFO, Business and International 
Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of International Law (2004). 
a) Derivative liability model 
Legal theorists who support the derivative liability model tend to favour the 
nominalist view of legal personality, which suggests that legal persons, 
specifically corporations, are fictitious, artificial persons and essentially 
nothing more than a collection of individuals.732 
The derivative liability model is the traditional model applied in most 
domestic jurisdictions.  It has two approaches: vicarious liability, or 
identification liability.  Vicarious liability is a broad principle, while 
                                                 
732
 Jonathan Clough and Carmel Mulhern, The Prosecution of Corporations (Oxford University Press, 
2002) 4–5. 
Type of Model 
[These models are not mutually exclusive] 
Prime examples of domestic jurisdictions reflecting 
these models 
Non-derivative liability 
(favours realist personality) 
Jurisdictions incorporating ‗corporate culture‘ 
concept 
Jurisdictions borrowing some aspects of non-
derivative model 
 
 
Australia and Switzerland 
 
United Kingdom, Canada, United States, Finland, 
and Japan 
Derivative liability (two types) 
(favours nominalist personality) 
1. Vicarious Liability 
 
 
2. Identification Liability: 
Narrow application 
Wider application (broader approach)  
 
 
United States, parts of Western Europe and South 
Africa 
 
United Kingdom, Canada and most Commonwealth 
countries  
Primarily throughout continental Europe 
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identification liability is quite narrow. 733   The vicarious and identification 
liability approaches are similar in that the organisational liability is established 
through an individual whose culpable actions are imputed to the 
organisation.734  The main difference between these two approaches is that, 
with vicarious liability, the actions of an individual are imputed to the 
organisation insofar as the individual was acting in the course of his/her 
employment – whereas, with identification liability, it is only the actions of 
those individuals said to be the directing minds that are imputed to the 
organisation.735   
i. Overview of the derivative liability model 
Vicarious liability 
The legal theory of vicarious liability, commonly referred to as respondeat 
superior, has been developed as a matter of common law by Federal Courts in 
the United States. 736  To date, there are at least three hundred thousand federal 
offences that a corporate entity could be charged with.737  Vicarious liability 
                                                 
733
 Celia Wells, ‗Appendix C – Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring Some Models‘ in United 
Kingdom, The Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, Consultation Paper No 
195 (2010) 198–199. 
734
 See generally, Eric Colvin and Sanjeev Anand, Principles of Criminal Law (Thomson Carswell, 3
rd
 ed, 
2007) 122–133; Celia Wells, ‗Corporate Criminal Responsibility‘ in Stephen Tully (ed), Research 
Handbook on Corporate Legal Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 2005) 147–152; James Gobert and 
Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003) 146–153. 
735
 See generally, Eric Colvin and Sanjeev Anand, Principles of Criminal Law (Thomson Carswell, 3
rd
 ed, 
2007) 122–133; Celia Wells, ‗Corporate Criminal Responsibility‘ in Stephen Tully (ed), Research 
Handbook on Corporate Legal Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 2005) 147–152; James Gobert and 
Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003) 146–153. 
736
 On the evolution of corporate criminal law in the United States, see generally, William S Laufer, 
Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds: The Failure of Corporate Criminal Liability (University of 
Chicago Press, 2006) 3–44. 
737
 Edward B Diskant, ‗Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American 
Doctrine through Comparative Criminal Procedure‘ (2008) 118 Yale Law Journal 126, 139. The 
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has been embraced in the US,738 unlike the common law jurisdictions that have 
rejected this theory within the body of criminal law.739 
The respondeat superior theory has a number of attributes that have been 
shaped over the last century, in particular by US Federal Courts.  The theory 
was transplanted from tort law and applied in criminal law as early as 1909 in 
the matter of New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v United 
States.740  New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company brought their 
case before the US Supreme Court.  The company challenged the 
constitutionality of a federal statute (the 1907 Elkins Act), which regulated 
railway rates and imposed corporate criminal liability on any corporations that 
violated the federal provisions.741  This landmark decision established that a 
corporate entity could be held vicariously liable for an offence committed by 
its employee if the employee was acting within the scope of their employment 
– and even in circumstances where the principal had strictly forbidden that 
                                                                                                                                                
author lists a number of statutory instruments that contain provisions for the prosecution of corporate 
criminal offences including, inter alia: ‗mail and wire fraud statutes, money laundering statutes, 
extortion statutes or for almost any other conduct that might fall within the purview of what is 
considered white-collar crime.‘ For an analysis on whether the sheer volume of criminal provisions 
have gone overboard, see Sara Sun Beale, ‗Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?‘ (Fall, 2007) 44 
American Criminal Law Review 1503, 1506. 
738
 It may be noted that in the United States, states have jurisdiction over criminal law matters. 
Consequently, some states adopt federal rules while others, namely those that have adopted the Model 
Penal Code, have aligned themselves with the English common law approach. See, Celia Wells, 
‗Corporate Criminal Responsibility‘, in Stephen Tully (ed), Research Handbook on Corporate Legal 
Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 2005) 150. 
739
 See, A P Simester and Warren J Brookbanks, Principles of Criminal Law (Brookers Ltd, 2007) 197. 
Corporate criminal liability, on the basis of respondeat superior, was rejected in the leading House of 
Lords decision in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, HL. For further discussion on 
this impact see, Sara Sun Beale, ‗A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability‘ (2009) 46 
American Criminal Law Review 1481, 1495–1497.  
740
 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v United States, 212 US 481(1909), 494. 
741
 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v United States, 212 US 481(1909), 490–491.   
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particular course of action.742  A number of policy considerations were applied 
in this judgment.743  At the time the matter was decided, business entities were 
growing in stature and dominating industrialised society.  The prospect of 
looming corporate criminal liability was supposed to act as an incentive for 
businesses to curtail illegal practices, no matter how profitable, and restrain 
ambitious employees that were out to increase corporate profitability.744 
Subsequent to the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company 
decision, there were a number of cases brought before the US Federal Courts 
that, in effect, narrowed the scope of the corporate liability standard.  The US 
Federal Courts imposed limitations on the respondeat superior theory when 
they indicated that, in order to apply the theory:  
                                                 
742
 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v United States, 212 US 481(1909), 493–495. See 
detailed discussion of this case in Edward B Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: 
Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine through Comparative Criminal Procedure (2008) 118 Yale 
Law Journal 126, 135–136. It should also be noted that the status of the employee within the 
organisation is irrelevant. See, James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime 
(Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003) 56. 
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 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v United States, 212 US 481(1909), 494–495.  For 
commentary, see Albert W Alschuler, ‗Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations‘ 
(2009) 46 American Criminal Law Review 1359, 1363. 
744
 James Gobert and Maurice Punch, Rethinking Corporate Crime (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2003) 56. 
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Although vicarious liability for corporations has been developed as a matter of 
common law by Federal Courts in the United States, the theory has also been 
adopted in other domestic jurisdictions in parts of Africa and Europe.747  For 
example, Section 332 of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
adopts corporate criminal liability provisions that reflect the vicarious liability 
theory. 748   Also, the theory is adopted in Denmark, 749  Finland, 750  and The 
Netherlands.751  Additionally, vicarious liability provisions are also applied in 
a limited capacity in France752 and Switzerland.753  
                                                 
745
 Standard Oil Co. of Texas v United States, 307 F 2d 120, 128 (5
th
 Circuit, 1962) and Steere Tank Lines 
v United States, 330 F 2d 719, 722–24 (5th Circuit, 1964) discussed in John Hasnas, ‗The Centenary of 
a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability‘ (2009) 46 American Criminal Law 
Review 1329, 1338. 
746
 United States v Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F 2d 1000, 1004, 1007 (9
th
 Circuit, 1972), discussed in John 
Hasnas, ‗The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability‘ (2009) 46 
American Criminal Law Review 1329, 1338.  
747
 See generally, Sara Sun Beale and Adam G Safwat, ‗What Developments in Western Europe Tell Us 
about American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability‘ (2004) 8 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 89, 
155–158; also Lex Mundi Business Crimes and Compliance Practice Group, Business Crimes and 
Compliance Criminal Liability of Companies Survey (February, 2008) 288–296. 
748
 It is interesting to note that the South African Government has devoted considerable resources 
investigating and prosecuting serious economic offences by corporate entities. This is evidenced by 
the Governments initiative in opening ‗Specialised Commercial Court Centres‘, see discussion on this 
at 4.2.1 of this thesis.    
749
 Section 306 of the Danish Criminal Code. 
750
 Section 9 of Finland‟s Penal Code. 
751
 Paragraph 51 of the Dutch Penal Code. 
752
 Article 121–122 of the French Penal Code. 
1. …that the employee must act, at least in part, for the purpose of 
benefitting the corporation, or with the belief that the corporation will 
benefit from his or her conduct;745 and  
2. …that the employee need have only apparent authority to act on behalf of 
the corporation; and then by underscoring that the employee‘s actions and 
mental states will be attributed to the corporation despite being in 
violation of corporate policy and explicit instructions to the contrary.746 
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Identification liability 
Essentially, under the traditional legal theory of identification liability, 
organisational liability is only established through the culpability of specific 
individuals that act as the ‗directing minds‘ of the organisation.754  Hence, the 
responsibility for corporate conduct and fault lies with the board of directors, 
the managing director, or any other person that the board of directors has 
conferred power upon.  That person is said to be acting as the company.755  
Literally, ‗what the senior executive does and thinks in the performance of his 
(or her) duties is identified with, and becomes the acts and thoughts of, the 
company itself.‘ 756 
The House of Lords in the United Kingdom has developed identification 
liability as a matter of common law.757  The doctrine originated in civil law 
matters,758 and only found its way into criminal law in the 1940s.759 
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 Article 100 of the Swiss Penal Code. 
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 Simon Parsons, ‗The Doctrine of Identification, Causation and Corporate Liability for Manslaughter‘ 
(2003) 67 Journal of Criminal Law 69, 69–71. 
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 Matthew Goode, Corporate Criminal Liability, 3 <http://www.aic.gov.au> discussing Tesco 
Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, HL. 
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 Russell Heaton, Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2006) 466. Gender neutral terms 
added.  
757
 Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans, Corporate Criminal Liability (Sweet & Maxwell, 2
nd
 ed, 2008) 56.  
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 See, United Kingdom, The Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, Consultation 
Paper No 195 (2010) 89, discussing Lennard‟s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] 
AC 705, where per Viscount Haldane, the court found that the privity of the Manager was the in fact 
the privity of the company. 
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 See, United Kingdom, The Law Commission, Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts, Consultation 
Paper No 195 (2010) 89–92. The Law Commission point to three criminal law cases, Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Kent & Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146, R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] 
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adoption of identification liability in criminal law.  However, the Law Commission is guarded in their 
analysis. They remark ‗we question how decisive these cases really are in establishing a generalised 
identification doctrine … none of them provide guidance on the extent of the identification doctrine. 
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Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass760 is widely viewed as the authoritative 
leading case from the United Kingdom that deals with identification 
liability. 761  Tesco Supermarkets, a large chain of supermarket stores, was 
penalised for breaching the UK Trade Descriptions Act 1968.  The Manager of 
the Northwich store was responsible for ensuring that products were available 
for sale, as per the corporate advertisements.  The Manager failed to check the 
availability of the products, resulting in a complaint filed against Tesco 
Supermarkets and the ensuing penalty.  The Trade Descriptions Act provided a 
defence that would apply if the store could satisfy two requirements.  First, the 
store had to show that the Manager was ‗another person‘ within the meaning 
of the Act, as opposed to an individual with delegated authority acting on 
behalf of the company.  Second, the store had to show that it had exercised 
due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence. 762   Although Tesco 
Supermarkets owned over a hundred stores, the board of directors and senior 
management were able to show that they had taken reasonable precautions and 
exercised due diligence by putting an elaborate system of supervision and 
training in place to safeguard against any of its employees violating the Act.763  
Of particular significance to this thesis is the discussion by Lord Reid in Tesco 
on the manner in which the liability of an individual is imputed to a corporate 
                                                                                                                                                
None of them specifically address the category of persons whose acts and states of mind may be 
imputed to the company in this way. Moreover, … the judges are at pains to emphasise the context-
sensitive nature of a decision to attribute liability to the company for the acts of the particular agents 
…‘ (ibid 92). 
760
 [1972] AC 153, HL. 
761
 The test adopted in Tesco has been followed in most common law jurisdictions – for example, it was 
accepted by the High Court in Australia in Hamilton v Whitehead (1988) 161 CLR 121.   
762
 [1972] AC 153, HL, 167–168. 
763
 [1972] AC 153, HL, 171.   
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entity.  According to his Lordship, so long as the individual represents ‗the 
directing mind and will of the company, and controls what it does‘,764 then that 
individual is not speaking or acting on behalf of the company, they are the 
company.765  Lord Reid identified which individuals were said to speak and act 
as the directing minds of the company.  These included the board of directors 
and senior management, as well as any other persons that were delegated 
authority to act or speak on behalf of the company.766  Lord Reid concluded his 
judgment by applying a strict interpretation of the identification liability 
theory, finding that the store Manager had not acted on behalf of the company 
because there had been no authority delegated to the Manager.767  In fact, as 
Lord Reid observed, there was actually an elaborate chain of command 
whereby senior management had effectively remained in control of the 
regional and district stores.768 
In later years, there were significant developments which built upon the 
identification liability test laid down in Tesco.  This test was seen as far too 
stringent in the scope of persons that it considered to be acting as the directing 
mind and will of the corporation.  A broader interpretation of the theory began 
to emerge in the 1990s.769  The Privy Council decision in Meridian Global 
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 See generally, Celia Wells, ‗Corporate Criminal Responsibility‘ in Stephen Tully (ed), Research 
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Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission770 is an example of such 
developments.  This matter involved an appeal brought before the Privy 
Council from the Court of Appeal of New Zealand.  In New Zealand, the 
Securities Commission had brought the company before the High Court for 
failing to comply with legislative provisions stipulated in the Securities 
Amendment Act of 1988.  Prior to this, the company‘s chief investment officer 
and senior portfolio manager had used funds which were managed by the 
company to purchase a substantial security holding in a public issuer, 
unbeknown to the board of directors.  The company had not given notice of 
their acquisition of shares in compliance with the legislative provisions.771  The 
High Court found that the corporate personnel had acted on behalf of the 
company and, therefore, breached the legislative provisions.  The Court of 
Appeal upheld the ruling on the basis that the chief investment officer had 
acted as the company‘s directing mind and will.772  On appeal in the Privy 
Council, their Lordships held that, ordinarily, the actions of natural persons 
that were attributable to a company were determined by the company‘s rights 
and obligations.  These were contained in its constitution and also pursuant to 
company law.  However, in exceptional circumstances, particularly when 
dealing with statutory offences, a true construction of the relevant substantive 
provision would determine whose knowledge or state of mind is attributable to 
the company. 773   In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd, a true 
construction of the legislative provision would be that the company knew it 
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had become a substantial holder when the person with authority to construct 
the deal knew, in this case, the chief investment officer.774  Their Lordships 
were also of the view that it was not necessary to determine whether the chief 
investment officer had acted as the directing mind and will of the company.  
Suffice to say, this did not mean that the knowledge of a servant of a company 
who was authorised to act on its behalf was automatically attributed to the 
company.  According to their Lordships, ‗it is a question of construction in 
each case as to whether the particular rule requires that the knowledge that an 
act has been done, or the state of mind with which it was done, should be 
attributed to the company.‘775 
The approach taken in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd has been 
adopted in most common law jurisdictions.  There are also legislative 
initiatives that adopt the much broader interpretation of the theory of 
identification liability than the one set down in Tesco.776 
In essence, identification liability is the traditional model of corporate liability 
applied in most Commonwealth jurisdictions. The broader interpretation of 
identification liability, which emerged in the 1990s, has been adopted in parts 
of continental Europe.777 It had, however, been adopted earlier in the 1980s in 
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the American Model Penal Code.778 
ii. Limitations of the derivative liability model 
The derivative approach to corporate liability, that is, identification and 
vicarious liability, is derived from the culpable actions of an individual acting 
within the corporate entity.  There are a number of limitations posed by this 
model. 
Vicarious liability  
Generally, vicarious liability has been labelled as ‗indeterminate in its 
sweep.‘779  In the United States, in particular, leading academics generally 
agree that the current standard for attributing corporate criminal liability at a 
federal level is ‗flawed‘.780  A major concern with the vicarious liability theory, 
stemming from the judicial precedent set down in New York Central & 
Hudson River Railroad Company, is that it is too broad in its application.781  
The criminal acts of lower-level employees, such as clerks, drivers, or manual 
labourers, spell the downfall of the corporate entity. 782  Also, the criminal 
actions of employees with apparent authority, such as middle and lower-level 
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managers, could be imputed to the corporate entity even in circumstances 
where the employee acted outside the scope of their actual authority. 783  
Furthermore, the criminal actions of employees may be imputed to the 
corporate entity despite the existence of a corporate compliance program that 
had been put in place to safeguard against such criminal actions in the first 
place.784 
The American Model Penal Code provides a more stringent test of the 
vicarious liability standard than that set down by the US Federal Courts.785  
Given that the existing vicarious liability theory is so broad in its application, 
the Model Penal Code approach seems to be favoured by leading academics 
and legal commentators in the United States.786  It limits corporate criminal 
liability to circumstances where ‗the commission of the offense was 
authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the 
board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting on behalf of the 
corporation within the scope of his office or employment.‘ 787   The Model 
                                                 
783
 Pamela Bucy, ‗Corporate Criminal Liability: When does it Make Sense?‘ (2009) 46 American Criminal 
Law Review 1437, 1441.  
784
 Barry J Pollack, ‗Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability‘ 
(2009) 46 American Criminal Law Review 1393, 1396.  
785
 Section 2.07 of the American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Official Draft and Explanatory Notes, 
Complete Text of Model Penal Code as Adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law 
Institute at Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962 (1985). For commentary see generally, John Hasnas, 
‗The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability‘ (2009) 46 
American Criminal Law Review 1329, 1356. 
786
 See generally, John Hasnas, ‗The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal 
Liability‘ (2009) 46 American Criminal Law Review 1329, 1356. 
787
 Section 2.07 of the American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Official Draft and Explanatory Notes, 
Complete Text of Model Penal Code as Adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law 
Institute at Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962 (1985). Section 2.07 of the Model Penal Code contains 
corporate criminal liability provisions for both vicarious liability and identification liability, see, ibid 
32–34. 
 –  179  –  
Penal Code, in its entirety, is not applied as the law in US jurisdictions.788  
However, it has influenced State penal codes and it has been cited extensively 
in judicial matters as persuasive authority when interpreting existing statutes 
and developing criminal law doctrine.789 
Identification liability  
James Gobert describes identification liability theory as both over and under-
inclusive.790  According to Gobert, the theory is over-inclusive because the 
company is liable for the criminal activities of its top corporate officials 
regardless of whether they were acting contrary to the company policy. 791  
Gobert argues it is under-inclusive because in many large companies there are 
only a relatively small percentage of top corporate officials in comparison 
with the size of the company.792  Gobert rightly points out the limitations with 
derivative liability.  This is one of the reasons the writer favours the non-
derivative liability approach in this thesis. 
Another difficulty with the identification liability theory is the claim that it 
does not take into account the complex nature of modern corporations.793  It 
could be said that the theory does not embrace the shift in corporate decision-
making strategies found in modern corporations.  It appears that, nowadays, 
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corporate policies and procedures, as opposed to individual decisions, are the 
force spurring the corporation forward.794  While this is probably true of the 
large MNCs operating globally, it could also be that the policy or strategic 
decision-making in a number of the modern corporations are not always 
centralised.  They could, in fact, take place at various regional offices rather 
than national ones.795  Invariably, how an MNC operates its global business 
activities is driven by factors such as products, services, and the location of its 
business enterprises. 
Furthermore, in modern corporations it is not always easy to determine what 
responsibility is actually attributable to a single individual due to the complex 
hierarchical structure of the emerging forms of corporations.796  Identification 
liability hinges on imputing the culpable acts of those acting as the directing 
minds to the corporate entity.  Celia Wells proposes that the theory of 
identification liability be derived on the basis of the corporate official‘s actual 
responsibility, as opposed to his/her formal duties.797  Wells makes a valid 
point about the shortcomings of the theory of identification liability. 
Another concern with identification liability is that corporate entities may be 
keen to lay blame on lower-level employees that are not the controlling 
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officers.798  This could occur for several reasons.  One reason could be the 
corporation‘s desperate attempt to escape organisational liability.799  In doing 
so, the corporation is shielded because, according to the theory of liability, 
only the actions of those who act as the directing minds of the corporate entity 
may be imputed to the corporation.  This means that the culpable actions of 
lower-level employees who might be blamed for committing an offence would 
not be imputed to the corporation. 
Yet another difficulty with this theory of corporate liability is that there could 
be no individual identified as the embodiment of the corporation whose 
liability is then imputed to the organisational entity itself.  This was the case in 
P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd800 where there was no specific individual 
responsible for reviewing ‗safety‘.  The matter involved the sinking of a vessel 
owned by P&O, Herald of Free Enterprise.  The vessel capsized because it 
sailed off with its bow doors open, resulting in the death of 192 passengers.801  
This was the first case in the United Kingdom to determine that corporate 
entities could, in fact, be indicted for a manslaughter offence, provided that 
there was an individual within the company who was in charge of controlling 
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the specific activities that resulted in those deaths.802  Despite reaching this 
finding, Justice Turner dismissed the manslaughter charges against P&O.  
Applying the identification liability test, Justice Turner found insufficient 
evidence against any specific corporate official.803 
Ultimately, some of the challenges posed by the theory of identification 
liability could be overcome by, instead, attributing non-derivative liability 
(discussed below).  With non-derivative liability, one examines the corporate 
culture that developed.  
b) Non-derivative liability model 
i. Overview of the non-derivative liability model 
Legal theorists who support the non-derivative liability model tend to favour 
the realist view of legal personality.  This view suggests that corporations are 
real entities that exist independently and possess a separate legal personality in 
their own right. 804   Essentially, under the legal theory of non-derivative 
liability, because the corporation is treated as a separate real entity in its own 
right, the culpability of the corporation itself, as opposed to the culpability of 
its individuals, is of primary concern. 
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Eli Lederman argues that the non-derivative liability model, which he refers to 
as the self-identity model, could replace all other liability models because of 
its scope in application.  Lederman suggests that each of the derivative 
liability models was fashioned to widen the scope of its predecessor ‗when it 
had proven unsuitable for application in a defined set of offenses or in a 
particular set of situations.‘805  Following from this, Lederman proposes that, 
in a sense, the non-derivative liability model brings what he refers to as the 
‗circle of theoretical development‘ to completion. 806   Hence, as Lederman 
observes, the beauty of the non-derivative liability model is that it takes into 
account a basic principle of company law; that is, the corporate entity is 
distinct and separate from its founders and operators.807 
There are times when the corporate form is used to avoid responsibility, either 
intentionally or unintentionally.808  This could be the result of the operating 
method, or a complex organisational structure adopted by the corporate 
entity.809  In such instances, it is difficult to locate the culpable individuals; 
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hence, imposing criminal liability on the corporate entity in the first place is 
more favourable. 810  John Ruggie, the UNSRSG, has argued that the non-
derivative liability model could help enforce a rights-respecting corporate 
culture because it examines the corporate ‗policies, rules, and practices to 
determine criminal liability and punishment, rather than basing accountability 
on the individual acts of employees or officers.‘811  
The Australian model of non-derivative liability contained within the Criminal 
Code (Cth) is the leading corporate liability model.812  This organisational 
liability model has been described by Celia Wells as ‗the best known and the 
most comprehensive example‘. 813   The organisational liability provisions 
found within the Criminal Code came about, in part, as a result of 
recommendations proposed by the Model Criminal Code Officers‘ 
Committee.814  The MCCOC was created under the Standing Committee of 
Attorneys-General, which was tasked with drafting the model law that became 
the basis of the Federal Criminal Code Act (1995).  One reason for amending 
the legislative provisions that dealt with organisational liability, as noted by 
MCCOC in its Final Report, was that the identification liability theory fell 
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short.815   The problem lay with the emerging organisational structures found 
in modern corporations, where junior personnel were increasingly granted 
greater responsibility.816  Therefore, the MCCOC stated its belief that:  
… the concept of ‗corporate culture‘ … supplies the key analogy. 
Although the term ‗corporate culture‘ will strike some as too diffuse, it is 
both fair and practical to hold companies liable for the policies and 
practices adopted as their method of operation. There is a close analogy 
here to the key concept in personal responsibility-intent.817 
Under the non-derivative liability model of the Australian Criminal Code (Cth) 
s12.1, the general principles of criminal responsibility apply to both body 
corporates as well as individuals.818 
Section 12.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) deals with the physical elements 
(actus reus) that constitute an offence.  The provision attributes the physical 
element of the offence to the corporation if that offence was committed by an 
employee, agent, or officer of the body corporate acting within the scope of 
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his/her employment or authority.819 
Section 12.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) establishes the fault elements (mens 
rea), other than negligence, which constitute the offence. 820   Specifically, 
Section 12.3(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) stipulates that when dealing with 
offences where the requisite mens rea is intention, knowledge, or recklessness, 
then the fault element attributed to the body corporate is that it authorised or 
permitted the offence.  Furthermore, authorisation may have been express, 
tacit, or implied according to Section 12.3(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth). 
In addition, Section 12.3(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth) stipulates the manner 
in which authorisation or permission for the commission of the offence could 
be attributed to the body corporate.  Accordingly, there are four alternative 
means by which this may occur pursuant to Section 12.3(2)(a) to (d) of the 
Criminal Code (Cth): where the board of directors has authorised or permitted 
the commission of the offence; 821 where a high managerial agent authorised or 
permitted the commission of the offence;822 the existence of a corporate culture 
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that directed, encouraged or tolerated the offence;823 and, the failure to create 
and maintain a culture of compliance that adhered to the law.824  This provision 
requires further consideration.  Regarding the first two subsections, Section 
12.3(2)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code (Cth), these appear to take a broader 
approach of the identification liability test laid down in Tesco.825  Clearly, the 
range of persons who could be said to represent the body corporate is much 
wider under Section 12.3(2)(a) and (b).  This is evidenced by the definition of 
a high managerial agent, and includes an employee, an agent, or officer of the 
body corporate.826  As for the remaining subsections, Section 12.3(2)(c) and (d) 
of the Criminal Code (Cth), the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill provides 
that the rationale for the provisions lay in the idea that:  
… the policies, standing orders, regulations and institutionalised practices 
of corporations are evidence of corporate aims, intentions and knowledge 
of individuals within the corporation. Such regulations and standing orders 
are authoritative, not because any individual devised them, but because 
they have emerged from the decision making process recognised as 
authoritative within the corporation.827 
The idea of prosecuting a corporation on the basis of its corporate culture is a 
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unique feature of the non-derivative liability model.  Regarding corporate 
culture, Section 12.3(4) (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code (Cth) takes into 
account instances where: a high managerial agent of the body corporate 
authorised the offence or similar conduct; 828  and, the employee, agent, or 
officer believed a high managerial agent had authorised the commission of the 
offence.829  It could be said that Section 12.3(4)(b) catches situations where ‗it 
was common knowledge that management would encourage or turn a blind 
eye to the conduct even though it was ostensibly prohibited by corporate 
policy‘. 830   The Section also lays a both objective and subjective test by 
requiring that the employee, agent, or officer believed on reasonable grounds 
that the offence was authorised.831 
Section 12.3(6) of the Criminal Code (Cth) provides definitions for what 
constitutes a board of directors, corporate culture, and a high managerial agent.  
Specifically, the phrase ‗board of directors‘ is defined as: ‗the body (by 
whatever name called) exercising the executive authority of the body 
corporate.‘  The phrase ‗corporate culture‘ is defined as: ‗an attitude, policy, 
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rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally 
or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities takes place.‘  
The phrase ‗high managerial agent‘ is defined as: ‗an employee, agent or 
officer of the body corporate with duties of such responsibility that his or her 
conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the body corporate‘s policy.‘  
Switzerland also applies the theory of non-derivative liability.832  Article 102 
of the Swiss Penal Code reflects to some degree the kind of approach taken in 
the Australian Criminal Code (Cth).  The Swiss provision generally draws 
from the non-derivative liability theory and the realist conception of 
organisational personality.  However, the Swiss non-derivative liability 
provisions dealing with corporate criminal liability are much narrower than 
those contained in the Australian Criminal Code (Cth).  Non-derivative 
liability is only imputed to the corporate entity if the liability of corporate 
individuals cannot be established. 
A number of European jurisdictions have adopted the non-derivative liability 
model, but the tendency has been that the model is tailored to offences of 
negligence.833  In the United States, non-derivate liability is applied in relation 
to prosecutorial discretion with respect to holding corporations accountable 
and in the sentencing of corporate criminal conduct for ineffective compliance 
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and ethics programs.834  However, this approach rests on corporate negligence.  
The fault element of negligence is not discussed further in this thesis, as it is 
not relevant to international crimes pursuant to the ICC Rome Statute.  Article 
30(1) of the ICC Rome Statute stipulates that, unless otherwise provided, 
intent and knowledge constitute the mens rea requisite for criminal offences.835  
ii. Limitations of the non-derivative liability model 
Of the corporate liability models applied within domestic jurisdictions, this 
thesis favours the non-derivative liability model.  As the discussion below 
shows, this is the most appropriate model to transplant internationally within 
the ICC Rome Statute.  However, the model has a number of limitations that 
should be considered here.  
Critics who strongly advocate for a truly realist approach to corporate criminal 
liability have criticised the actus reus stipulated in Section 12.2 of the 
Criminal Code (Cth).  Proponents of the realist approach question the need to 
show that an employee, agent, or officer was acting within the scope of their 
employment or authority, when the provision is primarily concerned with 
corporate fault.836  The reasonableness of imputing the agent‘s actions to the 
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body corporate given the complex, formal, structure of modern corporations is 
also queried.837 
Critics of the mens rea requisite that is established pursuant to Section 
12.3(2)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code (Cth) question just how realistic the 
provision is.  For example, a board of directors (who are specifically singled 
out in Section 12.3(2)(a) as body corporate actors) are not likely to take a vote 
expressly authorising or permitting the commission of an offence.  In reality, 
the board resolutions or minutes may tend to show tacit or implied authority or 
permission to commit an offence.838  Instead, imputing the conduct of high 
managerial agents in such circumstances is more realistic and would likely 
result in corporate prosecutions.839 
There are also opposing views regarding the manner in which Section 
12.3(2)(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code (Cth) should apply.  The legislative 
provision is somewhat unclear.840  On the one hand are those who advocate 
that ‗intention, knowledge and recklessness cannot be attributed to a 
corporation unless an agent acted with intention, knowledge or 
recklessness.‘ 841   Conversely, there are those who argue that ‗the fault 
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element … can be located in the culture of the corporation even though it is 
not present in any individual.‘ 842   Of these competing views, the latter 
approach is preferred as a matter of policy.  This is especially the case when 
dealing with the liability of MNCs, which often have complex organisational 
structures coupled with corporate personnel that frequently come and go.  
Another limitation with the non-derivative liability model that is provided in 
the Australian Criminal Code (Cth) is that its application may be far too wide 
for offences requiring subjective fault.  Pursuant to Section 12.3(2)(c) and (d), 
corporate culture is established on the basis of showing that the body corporate 
had a culture of noncompliance with the law, or the body corporate failed to 
develop a culture of compliance.  This approach overlooks the distinctions 
between forms of subjective fault; consequently, it applies an equal scheme of 
liability to all offences. 843   This criticism should be borne in mind when 
identifying an appropriate organisational liability model to transplant 
internationally within the ICC Rome Statute.844   
To illustrate, at a time when the idea of ‗corporate complicity‘ for human 
rights violations was practically unheard of, Human Rights Watch adopted a 
policy of stigmatising corporations as a means of pressuring corporate entities 
to change.  HRW Executive Director, Kenneth Roth, discusses HRW reports 
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concerning corporate complicity of Enron in India845 and Shell in Nigeria.846  
The idea that Shell, or even Enron, should have developed ‗standards of 
behaviour‘ largely reflects the non-derivative approach to organisational 
liability.  Roth states:  
Shell knew of the possibility that the Nigerian army was going to 
come in and start shooting; they called them nevertheless.  They 
should not have done that.  They should develop standards of 
behaviour, so that they do not do that in future – so that their security 
does not depend on that kind of abuse.  In the case of Enron … [it] 
responded by calling Indian police, who used force against the 
protesters.  It was not even clear that there was a crime here, but there 
was clearly a human rights violation and, again, to call Enron 
complicit in this violation because of the role it was playing was 
sufficient for our purposes. Both of these reports stigmatized the 
corporations concerned, which is what we wanted to do. People read 
them and said, ‗this is wrongful conduct, corporations should not be 
doing this,‘ and we were thus able to apply pressure on the 
corporations to change, which was our aim.847 
Within a framework of non-derivative liability, corporate liability for Shell or 
Enron would stem from their corporate cultures, which lacked policies, 
procedures, and practices that ensured their security did not depend on the 
kind of abuse that resulted in human rights violations.  Granted, the argument 
could be made that they were merely negligent.  This would still be sufficient 
for liability under the Australian non-derivative liability model.  Negligence 
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would also be sufficient under the UNSRSG ‗Protect, Respect and Remedy‘ 
Framework, which takes into account ‗a human rights due-diligence process to 
identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how [business enterprises] address 
their impacts on human rights.‘ 848   However, as reiterated previously, a 
negligence-based approach would fail under the ICC Rome Statute, because 
pursuant to Article 30(1), the Statute adopts intention and knowledge as the 
requisite mens rea; negligence is excluded.   
Ideally, a non-derivative liability model applied at the ICC should reflect the 
distinctive nature of subjective fault and also the distinctions between forms of 
subjective fault.  The liability model should incorporate forms of intention and 
knowledge, even though the corporate forms may differ, in some respect, from 
those formulated for individuals.849   
With respect to the requisite mens rea form of intention, corporate policy 
should be considered because corporate culture alone cannot provide sufficient 
grounds to conclude that a corporation committed an offence intentionally (i.e. 
purposefully).850  A corporate policy to commit an offence purposefully may 
be shown in a number of ways.  Corporate policy may be identified where 
there are specific instructions to commit the offence. 851   Admittedly, such 
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cases will be rare; most corporations would shy away from directly ordering 
their personnel to commit an offence.852  In addition, it may be difficult to 
isolate specific instructions in the context of a complex organisation.  As 
James Gobert has explained, corporate ‗policy, like a statute, is more likely to 
be the product of a multitude of inputs than the brain-child of a single 
individual.‘ 853   On this view, although an idea may be initiated by an 
individual within the corporate entity, the idea may only be officially seen as 
company policy when it has been subjected to scrutiny by a working party or 
committee within the entity.  Also, the idea may require sanction by senior 
management or even ratification by a board of directors.854 
Even where specific instructions cannot be identified, corporate policy might 
also be established on the basis that it provides the most rational explanation 
for the corporation‘s actions.  This seems a sensible approach because 
presumably corporate personnel would view this as implied authorisation.855  It 
has been argued that this constructive form of intention is already well-
established in legal doctrine, in the concept of legislative intent. 856   The 
legislative intent which is routinely diagnosed by later courts is not usually the 
intent of the original legislators (few of whom may have read the legislation 
for which they voted). It is a constructive intent which is subsequently 
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imposed by courts attempting to make sense of what the legislation said.857  
Legislative intent is the intent which provides the best explanation for what 
has been enacted.858  In the same way, corporate policy can be the policy 
which provides the best explanation for what the corporation has done.859     
For example, assume that Shell (in the illustration provided earlier) developed 
a pattern of calling the army as soon as they were faced with any civil 
demonstrations disrupting their oil extraction activities in Nigeria.  Assume 
also that the army routinely arrived and responded with acts of violence 
violating human rights.  One could argue that corporate policy was to respond 
to the challenge of civil demonstrations by initiating violence violating human 
rights.  This would provide the most rational explanation for the corporation‘s 
conduct because no other explanation would make sense of the corporation 
repeatedly calling the army in the face of the blindingly obvious consequences 
which would follow.  
Mens rea in the form of knowledge, rather than purpose, will mostly be the 
issue for corporate complicity.  Arguably, it could be possible to establish 
corporate knowledge on the basis that the knowledge is located somewhere 
within the corporation.  In addition, the notion of collective knowledge could 
be invoked where the knowledge is divided among corporate personnel. 860 
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According to the theory of collective knowledge, the knowledge possessed by 
one employee may be combined with the knowledge of several other 
employees, i.e. aggregated, in order to construct the requisite mens rea form 
required to deal with the commission of an offence.861   
The theory of collective knowledge is not new. 862   It has largely been 
developed in the United States; though, other domestic legal systems have 
been somewhat wary. 863   The leading case authority, which endorsed this 
theory, is United States v Bank of New England. 864   With respect to its 
application to a large corporation, this approach was seen as ‗ … not only 
proper, but necessary.‘865  United States v Bank of New England dealt with the 
conviction of the bank for wilfully infringing specific legislation that required 
it to report cash transactions, which exceeded a stipulated amount.  The Court 
relied upon the theory of collective knowledge in order to satisfy the question 
of the bank‘s knowledge and its intent to commit the offence.  Specifically, the 
Court held:  
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A collective instruction is entirely appropriate in the context of 
corporate criminal liability ... Corporations compartmentalize 
knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations 
into smaller components. The aggregate of those components 
constitutes the corporation‘s knowledge of a particular operation. It is 
irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an 
operation know of the specific activities of employees administering 
another aspect of the operation. 866 
 
To illustrate by reference to Shell again, collective knowledge could be shown 
if, for example, a corporate member had telephoned the army as soon as they 
were faced with civil demonstrations disrupting their oil extraction activities, 
while another member within the same corporate group knew that the army 
would respond with violence violating human rights.  In such circumstances, 
the corporate institution as a whole would be deemed to possess the requisite 
mens rea. 
Therefore, on the issue of identifying an appropriate scheme for a non-
derivative liability model to transplant within the ICC, as the discussion here 
has shown, a model which reflects distinctions between forms of subjective 
fault is preferred.   Though, in most instances, knowledge, not purpose, will be 
the mens rea in issue for corporate complicity in international crimes.   
5.3 Organisational liability in the sphere of international criminal law: missed 
opportunities 
International criminal law does not recognise any forms of organisational liability, let 
alone corporate criminal liability.  Neither does international criminal law have any 
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provisions in place for corporate complicity in international crimes.  This is not to say 
that the opportunity never arose; it did.  In fact, the opportunity arose on a number of 
occasions at the ad hoc tribunals and special courts.  What is interesting is how the 
international community responded.  The approach taken by the international community 
begs further discussion here. 
5.3.1 Laying the foundations for organisational liability at the International Military 
Tribunals established in the aftermath of WWII 
Following World War II, the international community established International Military 
Tribunals to prosecute major war criminals.  Establishing the IMTs was a critical step in 
advancing the body of international criminal law.  Prior to the IMTs, there had only ever 
been isolated incidents addressed by the international community to bring accountability 
for what would be seen today as international crimes.867  
The IMTs relied upon the Charter for the International Military Tribunal,868 and the 
Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East869 – created in 1945 and 
1946, respectively – as well as the 1946 Control Council Law No. 10. 870   These 
instruments were significant for a number of reasons that are considered here.  
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On the one hand, these legal instruments expanded the scope of international criminal 
law to include the criminal prosecution of legal entities such as groups or 
organisations.871  For example, relying on Articles 9872 and 10873 of the IMT Charter, the 
IMT declared the following groups as criminal: the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, 
the Gestapo, the SD (Sicherheitsdienst), and the SS (Schutzstaffel).874  Initially, simply 
being a member of a criminal organisation that had perpetrated international crimes was 
viewed as a criminal act.875 
On the other hand, the instruments also provided the means by which to deal with the 
individual criminal liability of the German industrialists and Japanese government 
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officials who had supported the Nazi regime and Japanese government, respectively, 
during the war.876  The argument is made by leading academics that the jurisprudence 
which emerged from the International Military Tribunals laid the foundations for the 
concept of corporate complicity in international crimes. 877   Although the actual 
companies were not prosecuted, their business activities were closely examined and their 
personnel were held accountable pursuant to international criminal law.878  The Zyklon 
B879 case is a prime example dealing with the complicity of German industrialists in the 
mass murder of civilians – it involved criminal charges laid against Bruno Tesch, an 
owner of the manufacturing company Tesch and Stabenow, as well as two other accused 
persons.  The prosecution alleged that Bruno Tesch, working through his company, 
distributed gas and gassing equipment to a number of Nazi-controlled facilities, and this 
included supplying SS concentration camps.  The prosecution further alleged that Bruno 
Tesch knew that the supplies would be used in the gas chambers.  The company also 
provided technical assistance and trained the SS on how to use the gases, which included 
Zyklon B.  Bruno Tesch was found guilty by the IMT of aiding and abetting crimes 
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against humanity.880 
5.3.2 The question of organisational liability at the ad hoc international institutions  
The existing ad hoc international institutions with jurisdiction over international crimes 
do not exercise jurisdiction over legal persons.  Dealing solely with the individual 
criminal responsibility of natural persons, these ad hoc international institutions include 
the ICTR, the SCSL, the ICTY, the ECCC, and the IHT.881  The argument should be 
made that a number of these ad hoc international institutions, created subsequent to the 
IMTs, should have been empowered with jurisdiction over legal persons, specifically 
corporations.  Of the ad hoc institutions found in Africa, the ICTR and the SCSL are 
prime examples supporting this argument. 
a) ICTR 
Although the ICTR Statute contains provisions for complicit liability in 
international crimes, it does not include jurisdiction over complicit legal 
persons.  It is alleged that there were a number of organisational entities 
involved in the Rwandan atrocities. 882   The extent of their involvement, 
whether as complicit perpetrators or principal perpetrators, was never fully 
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investigated.883 
The issue of whether or not the ICTR should have included jurisdiction over 
legal persons, be it complicit or principal perpetrators, continues to be 
controversial. For example, there was a recent panel discussion on the issue of 
‗Corporate Criminal Liability and the Rwandan Genocide‘ at the New Vistas 
of International Criminal Justice Conference. 884   One of the panellists, 
President Erik Møse, former Judge and President of the ICTR, commented on 
the Rwandan genocide and the role that economic actors played.  Describing 
the situation as ‗complicated‘, President Møse argues that there were good and 
bad people in both the public and private sectors.885  Although the majority of 
offenders indicted were public officials, they perpetrated crimes in their 
personal capacities.  Hence, President Møse notes, in the public sector, Prime 
Minister Kambanda pled guilty to genocide, several Ministers and 
bourgmestres were convicted or acquitted, and some cases were still 
ongoing.886  With regards to the private sector, President Møse makes the point 
that some businessmen were convicted, though the majority of complaints 
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concerned state-run commercial entities. 887   Three persons were convicted 
from the Radio Station, RTLM, and the newspaper, Kangura, had ceased to 
operate after the genocide.  President Møse concludes his arguments by stating 
that his views should not be seen as a reflection on whether or not there should 
have been corporate criminal liability.  Rather, as far as President Møse is 
concerned, ‗the ICTR has managed reasonably well without such provisions in 
its Statute.‘888 
Paola Gaeta and Andrew Clapham were also present at the panel discussion 
for the New Vistas of International Criminal Justice Conference.  They 
differed with President Møse‘s position.  Paola Gaeta argues, and rightly so, 
that if any corporation facilitated the genocide, and there was the slightest 
possibility of bringing a criminal case before the Rwandan national courts, 
then holding the corporations liable should have been of paramount 
importance to enable the victims to claim some kind of compensation. 889  
Gaeta makes a crucial point.  Given the gravity of crimes of genocide, the 
ICTR (not just the Rwandan national courts) should have prosecuted those 
corporations who were responsible for such crimes.  Andrew Clapham 
specifically recounted the view expressed by the Tanzanian Ambassador 
regarding the situation in Rwanda.  The Ambassador: ‗… referred to the fact 
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that some of the coffee companies had stored the machetes and, in addition, he 
mentioned the fact that some companies had been hired to use their bulldozers 
to dig mass graves.‘890  In light of this, Clapham suggests it would have been 
meaningful to the victims if they had received reparation from the corporate 
entities.  Clapham rightly suggests that the funds for this reparation could have 
been the result of a corporate death penalty – a type of corporate punishment 
that is commonly adopted in national jurisdictions.  With a corporate death 
penalty, the corporate charter is cancelled, the entity is dissolved, and the 
corporate assets are seized.891 
b) SCSL 
Although the SCSL Statute contains provisions for complicit liability in 
international crimes, it does not include jurisdiction over complicit legal 
persons.  A major shortcoming of the SCSL‘s competence was that the Court 
did not hold corporations liable for complicit perpetration in international 
crimes committed by rebel forces in Sierra Leone during the civil war.892  The 
United Nations Panel of Experts to Sierra Leone reported that the 
Revolutionary United Front sustained their military activities through income 
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generated from the sale of rough diamonds.
893
  The Panel of Experts estimated 
that the RUF pocketed as much as up to $125 million per annum from 
diamond sales alone.
894
  Despite such findings, the extent of any corporate 
involvement in RUF‘s dealings in the diamond industry was never fully 
investigated. 
5.3.3 The question of organisational liability at the ICC  
The draft proposals for the ICC Rome Statute initially included jurisdiction over legal 
persons (discussed further below), though these were consequently abandoned by the 
Rome Statute signatories.895  The argument should be made that the decision to exclude 
legal persons from the ICC‘s jurisdiction has had grave consequences.  For example, the 
ICC is currently hearing cases concerning international crimes perpetrated in the Central 
African Republic,896 DRC,897 Uganda,898 Sudan,899 Kenya,900 Libya, 901 and Côte d‟Ivoire.902  
All seven countries appear on the list of Extreme- and High-Risk Countries regarding 
human rights violations in Africa.  Had the ICC introduced organisational liability 
provisions, then legal persons that aided and abetted the principal perpetrators in such 
violations may have been held liable for their complicity in international crimes.903    
a) Drafting process leading up to the ICC Rome Statute 
i. Preliminary work of the International Law Commission 
In the aftermath of the grave atrocities committed during the Second World 
War, the UN General Assembly mandated the International Law 
Commission 904  with the task of drafting provisions for a Draft Code of 
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01/09-02/11, 8 March 2011). 
901
  See, The Prosecutor v Saif-Al Islam Gaddafi (Warrant of Arrest for Saif-Al Islam Gaddafi) 
(International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-01/11-01/11-3, 27 June 2011); The Prosecutor v Abdullah 
Al-Senussi (Warrant of Arrest for Abdullah Al-Senussi) (International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-
01/11-01/11-4, 27 June 2011). 
902
 See, The Prosecutor v Laurent Koudou Gbagbo (Decision on the „Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to 
Article 58 for a Warrant of Arrest against Laurent Koudou Gbagbo‟) (International Criminal Court, 
Case No ICC-02/11-01/11, 30 November 2011). 
903
 See, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2002) UN Doc S/2002/1146; Human 
Rights Watch Report, The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo (2005), 1 
<http://www.hrw.org>; John K Roth, ‗The Church and Complicity: Nothing Guaranteed‘ in Carol 
Rittner, et al (eds), Genocide in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches? (Aegis in Association with 
Paragon House, 2004).  
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Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind.905  The ILC prepared 
Draft Codes in 1954,906 1991,907 and 1996.908  Each of their drafts contained 
provisions dealing with individual criminal responsibility of natural persons.  
ii. Draft proposals considered by UN Plenipotentiaries at the Rome Conference 
In 1994, the General Assembly tasked the ILC with the role of drafting a 
statute with the view to establishing the first permanent international criminal 
court. 909  The ILC‘s Working Group prepared a Draft Statute for the 
International Criminal Court that contained provisions dealing with the 
individual criminal responsibility for natural persons.910 
In 1994, the General Assembly also established a Preparatory Commission to 
convene a Conference of Plenipotentiaries to discuss the establishment of an 
                                                                                                                                                
904
 International Law Commission hereafter referred to as ILC. 
905
 For an overview on the drafting process, see, International Law Commission, ‗Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Part II) – including the Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court‘ <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_4.htm >. Hereafter referred to as Draft 
Codes. 
906
 ILC Report on Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind [1954] 2 Yearbook 
International Commission 150. Specifically, Article 1 states: ‗Offences against the peace and security 
of mankind, as defined in this Code, are crimes under international law, for which the responsible 
individuals shall be punished.‘ 
907
 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law 
Commission on its Forty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46
th
 Sess., Supp. No10, 238, U.N. Doc A/46/10 
(1991). Specifically, Article 3(1) states: ‗An individual who commits a crime against the peace and 
security of mankind is responsible therefor and is liable to punishment.‘ 
908
 ILC Report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, text adopted by 
the Commission at its forty-eighth session, in 1996, and submitted to the General Assembly, Report 
(A/48/10) published in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II(2). Specifically, 
Article 2(1) states: ‗A crime against the peace and security of mankind entails individual 
responsibility.‘  
909
 See, General Assembly Resolution (9 December 1994), UN Doc. A/RES/49/53. 
910
 ILC Report on the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc: 
A/CN.4/L.491 and Rev.1 and 2 and Rev.2/Corr.1 and Rev.2/Add.1-3 (mimeograph) – ILC Report, 
A/49/10.  
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international criminal court.911  The Preparatory Commission relied upon the 
ILC‘s 1994 Draft Statute for the proposed international criminal court; 
however, the Preparatory Commission‘s own 1998 Draft Statute, discussed 
below, included legal persons within the Court‘s jurisdiction.  
Delegates from at least 160 States, along with members of international 
organisations, met in Rome, Italy, for the United Nations Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 
commonly referred to as the Rome Conference.912  The Rome Conference, 
held from 15 June 1998 to 17 July 1998, concluded with delegates adopting 
the ICC Rome Statute.913 
The deliberations at the Rome Conference on whether or not the Court should 
exercise jurisdiction over legal persons were controversial. 914  In the first 
instance, the Preparatory Commission for the ICC had initially prepared a 
draft statute that included jurisdiction over legal persons. 915   According to 
                                                 
911
 See, General Assembly Resolution (9 December 1994), UN Doc. A/RES/49/53.  
912
 The Rome Conference was attended by 160 States, 17 international organisations, 14 UN specialised 
agencies, and 124 Observers from various non-governmental organisations. For general reading on the 
Rome Conference deliberations, see: Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court – Observers‟ Notes, Article by Article (C.H. Beck, 2nd ed, 2008);  
Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and John R W D Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary – Volume II (Oxford University Press, 2002); Flavia Lattanzi and 
William A Schabas (eds), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Volume 1 
(Il Serente, 1999).  
913
 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Rome Italy, 15 June–17 July 1998. A/CONF.183/10*, 17 July 1998.  
914
 Kai Ambos, ‗Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility‘ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers‟ Notes, Article by Article (C.H. Beck, 
2
nd
 ed, 2008) 746.  
915
 This was in addition to the provisions dealing with the individual criminal responsibility of natural 
persons; see, Article 23(1) – (4) of the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court prepared by 
the Preparatory Commission in 1998. 
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Article 23(5) and (6) of the 1998 Draft Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: 
5. The Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the 
exception of States, when the crimes committed were committed on 
behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or representatives. 
6. The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the 
criminal responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or 
accomplices in the same crimes. 
N.B. In the context of paragraphs 5 and 6, see also articles 76 
(Penalties applicable to legal persons) and 99 (Enforcement of fines 
and forfeiture measures).916 
It appears that the assumption could be made that the Preparatory Commission 
draft provisions apply to all forms of legal persons, as it does not define legal 
persons, aside from excluding States, unlike the French draft statute (discussed 
below) that specifically defines juridical persons. 
After much deliberation, delegates at the Rome Conference rejected Article 
23(5) and (6) of the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court, at 
which time the French Delegation presented a Working Paper with a revised 
proposal that dealt with the Court‘s jurisdiction over juridical persons.917 
The French Delegation at the Rome Conference revised the controversial 
Article 23(5) and (6) of the Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court 
                                                 
916
 United Nations Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Report of 
the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, „Draft Statute for 
the International Criminal Court‟, Rome, Italy (15 June–17 July 1998) UN Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, 
14 April 1998 (bold highlight appears in the original text). 
917
 See, Douglas Cassel, ‗Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the 
Courts‘ (Spring 2008) 6(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 304, 315-316. 
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and submitted the following provision instead: 
5. Without prejudice to any individual criminal responsibility of natural 
persons under this Statute, the Court may also have jurisdiction over 
a juridical person for a crime under this Statute. 
Charges may be filed by the Prosecutor against a juridical person, and 
the Court may render a judgement over a juridical person for the 
crime charged, if:  
(a) The charges filed by the Prosecutor against the natural person and 
the juridical person allege the matters referred to in subparagraphs 
(b) and (c); and  
(b) The natural person charged was in a position of control within the 
juridical person under the national law of the State where the 
juridical person was registered at the time the crime was 
committed; and 
(c) The crime was committed by the natural person acting on behalf 
of and with the explicit consent of that juridical person and in the 
course of its activities; and 
(d) The natural person has been convicted of the crime charged. 
For the purpose of this Statute, ‗juridical person‘ means a 
corporation whose concrete, real or dominant objective is seeking 
private profit or benefit, and not a State or other public body in the 
exercise of State authority, a public international body or an 
organization registered, and acting under the national law of a 
State as a non-profit organization. 
6. The proceedings with respect to a juridical person under this article 
shall be in accordance with this Statute and the relevant Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. The Prosecutor may file charges against the 
natural and juridical persons jointly or separately. The natural and the 
juridical person may be jointly tried. 
If convicted, the juridical person may incur the penalties referred to in 
article 76. These penalties shall be enforced in accordance with the 
provisions of article 99.918 
                                                 
918
 United Nations Working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law, Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Working Paper on Article 
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A common feature between the French Draft Statute and the Preparatory 
Commission‘s draft is that both drafts consider derivative liability.  However, 
the French draft is more detailed than the Preparatory Commission‘s draft in 
its approach.  A distinguishing feature between the draft statutes is that Article 
23(5) of the French Draft Statute provides a specific strict definition of a 
juridical person.  This person is defined as: ‗a corporation whose concrete, real 
or dominant objective is seeking private profit or benefit …‘.919  Regrettably, 
the French withdrew their proposal before the conclusion of the Rome 
Conference due to lack of support.920 
The idea of including legal persons in the jurisdiction of the impending 
International Criminal Court was opposed by delegates at the Rome 
Conference for a number of reasons.  One reason was that there was a lack of 
consensus over the substantive law.  This issue was contentious because 
‗governments were unable to find common legal standards for holding legal 
persons responsible, when different countries appraise this issue differently.‘921  
Also, Kai Ambos, an observer at the Rome Conference, notes that the French 
proposal was not supported because the delegates felt strongly that corporate 
                                                                                                                                                
23, Paragraphs 5 And 6: Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court (3 July 1998), UN Doc. 
A/Conf./183/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2. 
919
 The difficulty with the French Delegation‘s definition of juridical persons is discussed further in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis, which deals with complicity. The chapter examines the aiding and abetting 
provisions stipulated in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute; the provision provides a mens rea 
‗purpose‘ test and, in doing so, it would exclude the liability of juridical persons whose primary 
purpose is seeking profit. 
920
 Douglas Cassel, ‗Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts‘ 
(Spring 2008) 6(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 304, 315–316.     
921
 Anita Ramasastry, Mapping the Web of Liability: The Expanding Geography of Corporate 
Accountability in Domestic Jurisdictions (2008), 4 <http://198.170.85.29/Anita-Ramasastry-
commentary.pdf>.   
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liability was not commonly recognised in most domestic jurisdictions.  This 
would impede upon the Court‘s principle of complementarity, which was 
already another contentious issue during the negotiations.922   Per Saland, yet 
another observer at the Rome Conference, discusses these concerns as he 
recalls: 
… whether to include criminal responsibility of legal entities … This matter 
deeply divided the delegations. For representatives of countries whose 
legal system does not provide for the criminal responsibility of legal 
entities, it was hard to accept its inclusion, which would have had far-
reaching legal consequences for the question of complementarity. Others 
strongly favored the inclusion on grounds of efficiency … Among the last 
opponents were Nordic countries, Switzerland, the Russian Federation and 
Japan. Some other countries opposed inclusion on procedural … grounds. 
Time was running out …  Eventually, it was recognized that the issue 
could not be settled by consensus in Rome … 923 
The final outcome of the Rome Conference deliberations on the ICC Rome 
Statute provisions dealing with criminal responsibility was that delegates 
agreed upon a statutory provision for criminal participation, though it only 
allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction over natural persons.  Article 25 of 
the ICC Rome Statute, in its entirety, states:  
1.  The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this 
Statute. 
2.  A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall 
be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with 
                                                 
922
 Kai Ambos, ‗Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility‘ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers‟ Notes, Article by Article (C. H. Beck, 
2
nd
 ed, 2008) 746. 
923
 Per Saland‘s comments appear in Douglas Cassel, ‗Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights 
Violations: Confusion in the Courts‘ (Spring 2008) 6(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human 
Rights 304, 315–316. 
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this Statute. 
3.  In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if 
that person: 
(a)  Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another 
or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible; 
(b)  Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in 
fact occurs or is attempted; 
(c)  For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission; 
(d)  In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted 
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall 
either: 
(i)  Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court; or 
(ii)  Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime; 
(e)  In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites 
others to commit genocide; 
(f)  Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur 
because of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. 
However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or 
otherwise prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for 
punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if 
that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose. 
4.  No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall 
affect the responsibility of States under international law. 
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A major feature that distinguishes the final draft of Article 25 of the ICC Rome Statute 
from the Preparatory Commission and French draft statutory provisions is that it only 
deals with the individual criminal responsibility of natural persons.  Hence, the final 
draft reflects no express provisions dealing with the liability of legal persons.  The Rome 
Conference deliberations that rejected the inclusion of legal persons within the ICC 
Rome Statute were regrettable.  One reason for rejecting corporate criminal liability at 
the Rome Conference was that this principle was not recognised in most domestic 
jurisdictions.  Today, only thirteen years after such deliberations, corporate criminal 
liability is recognised in most domestic jurisdictions.924  A number of jurisdictions – 
particularly civil law jurisdictions – have adopted corporate liability provisions since the 
Rome Conference.925  For example, in 1999, Belgium reintroduced corporate criminal 
liability provisions into the Belgian Penal Code.926  In 2003, Switzerland introduced 
corporate criminal liability provisions in its Criminal Code. 927  In 2006, Austria 
                                                 
924 For example, the OECD‘s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions opened for signature in December 1997 and entered into force in 
February 1999. Article 1(2) specifically criminalises corporate complicity, including aiding and 
abetting, and the bribery of foreign public officials. The signatories of the Convention were all 
required to adopt National Implementing Legislation. A number of these signatories did not have 
corporate liability provisions in place at the time. For a list of the Member State‘s National 
Implementing Legislation, see generally, <http://www.oecd.org>. For discussion on domestic 
jurisdictions and their approaches to corporate liability, see generally, Allens Arthur Robinson, 
„Corporate Culture‟ as a Basis for the Criminal Liability of Corporations (2008); Lex Mundi 
Business Crimes and Compliance Practice Group, Business Crimes and Compliance Criminal 
Liability of Companies Survey (2008); Anita Ramasastry and Robert C Thompson (eds), Commerce, 
Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International 
Law – A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions (FAFO, 2006).  
925 For discussion on this see, Joanna Kyriakakis, ‗Corporate Criminal Liability and the ICC Statute: The 
Comparative Law Challenge‘ (2009) LVI Netherlands International Law Review 333, 340–342. 
926
 Corporate criminal liability provisions had existed in Belgium, but were removed in 1934; see, ‗Survey 
Response, Laws of Belgium (Bruno Demeyere), Commerce, Crime and Conflict: A Survey of Sixteen 
Jurisdictions Fafo AIS, [accessed 8 February 2008] 2006‘.  
927 See, Article 102 of the Swiss Penal Code; also, Sara Sun Beale and Adam G Safwat, ‗What 
Developments in Western Europe Tell Us about American Critiques of Corporate Criminal Liability‘ 
(2004) 8 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 89, 113–115.  
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implemented EU and OECD requirements with respect to the criminal responsibility of 
legal entities.928   
5.4 Preferred model of corporate liability to transplant internationally and 
adopt within the ICC Rome Statute 
Having examined the position on corporate liability in both domestic and international 
jurisdictions, the writer in this thesis is of the view that there is, indeed, a need for a 
doctrine of corporate liability in international criminal law.  If the ICC were to respond 
to misconduct by multinational corporations in Africa, then this thesis proposes that the 
theory of non-derivative liability is the better model to transplant internationally and 
adopt within the ICC Rome Statute. 
In essence, although the model of non-derivative liability found in the Australian 
Criminal Code (Cth) is not faultless, it does exemplify an ideal model.929  With non-
derivative liability, the organisation is treated as a separate real entity in its own right.  
Hence, the culpability of the organisation itself, as opposed to the culpability of its 
individuals, is of primary concern.  This is because non-derivative liability is established 
on the basis of: ‗corporate policies, procedures, practices and attitudes; deficient chains 
of command and oversight; and corporate ‗cultures‘ that tolerate or encourage criminal 
                                                 
928 See, the Verbandsverantwortlichkeitsgesetz (VbVG). This legislation, which was introduced in 2005 
and came into effect in 2006, stipulates that a Verband – legal persons, partnerships, registered 
associations, and the European Economic Interest Group – can be held liable for offences pursuant to 
the Austrian Penal Code. For discussion, see, Gudrun Stangl, ‗Corporate Criminal Liability‘ (2005) 
24(11) International Financial Law Review 75, 75–76; Lex Mundi Business Crimes and Compliance 
Practice Group, Business Crimes and Compliance Criminal Liability of Companies Survey (2008) 6. 
929
 Jonathan Clough, ‗Bridging the Theoretical Gap: The Search for a Realist Model of Corporate Criminal 
Liability‘ (2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 267, 299. 
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offences.‘ 930   Non-derivative liability is established in sharp contrast to derivative 
liability.  With derivative liability, it is the culpable actions of individuals within the 
corporation that are imputed to the corporate entity.  This approach is not desirable.  
Multinational corporations are peculiar in their nature.931  Large modern MNCs have a 
high turnover of corporate personnel who can be replaced with ease.  MNCs are multi-
layered complex corporate entities that operate globally.932  At times, it is challenging to 
prove the specific actions of specific corporate personnel in such turbid business 
structures. 933   Furthermore, MNCs operate through complex networks that establish 
contractual relationships and create separate legal entities, which go on to form other 
business entities.934  Hence, non-derivative liability is preferred in this thesis. 
5.5 Chapter conclusion 
To reiterate briefly, this chapter commenced the discussion on how an organisational 
entity that is complicit in international crimes could be prosecuted.  The writer examined 
the corporate liability models applied in most domestic jurisdictions.  This chapter also 
discussed how international criminal law missed opportunities for what could have been 
the attribution of organisational liability over the last sixty years.  Finally, the writer 
argued for the theory of non-derivative liability as the preferred liability model to 
                                                 
930
 Allens Arthur Robinson „Corporate Culture‟ as a Basis for the Criminal Liability of Corporations, 
(2008) 4. See also, Eric Colvin, ‗Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability‘ (1995) 6(1) Criminal 
Law Forum 1, 1. 
931
 Menno T Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi, ‗Liability of Multinational Corporations Under 
International Law: An Introduction‘ in Menno T Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds), Liability of 
Multinational Corporations Under International Law (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 2. 
932
 James Gobert, ‗Corporate Criminality: Four Models of Fault‘ (1994) 14(3) Legal Studies 393, 395. 
933
 Wolfgang Kaleck and Miriam Saage-Maaβ, ‗Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
Amounting to International Crimes: The Status Quo and its Challenges‘ (2010) 8(3) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 699, 716. 
934
 John Gerard Ruggie, ‗Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda‘ (2007) 101 
American Journal of International Law 819, 824. 
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transplant internationally and adopt within the ICC Rome Statute. 
The next chapter continues the discussion on how to prosecute an organisational entity; 
and the writer discusses organisational complicity doctrine.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Scope of Liability for Organisational Complicity:  
Organisational Complicity Doctrine 
„The impact of the pursuit of economic interests in conflict areas has come under 
increasingly critical scrutiny. Corporations have been accused of complicity with 
human rights abuses, and corporate royalties have continued to fuel wars. It has 
become common knowledge that by selling diamonds and other valuable minerals, 
belligerents can supply themselves with small arms and light weapons, thereby 
prolonging and intensifying the fighting and the suffering of civilians.‟935 
6.1 Chapter introduction 
The previous chapter discussed organisational liability doctrine by examining forms of 
corporate liability that may be suitable with respect to multinational corporations for the 
commission of international crimes. 
Corporations are not ordinarily the principal perpetrators of the kinds of crimes 
discussed in this thesis.  Instead, they tend to be complicit perpetrators in egregious 
human rights violations. 936  Complicit perpetration in international crimes by 
multinational businesses is alleged to have included the provision of finance, 
infrastructure, materials, and logistical support.937 
In this chapter, the writer continues the discussion on how such an organisational entity 
could be prosecuted.  Specifically, this chapter discusses organisational complicity 
                                                 
935
 ‗Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict‘ (30 March 2001) UN Doc. S/2001/331, [61].  
936
 FAFO, Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave 
Violations of International Law (2004) 12. 
937
 See generally, ICJ, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) volume 2, 19 
<http://www.icj.org>. 
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doctrine.  The writer provides a brief overview of the complicit modes of participation in 
international crimes.  MNCs are often accused of aiding and abetting crimes; hence, the 
writer generally traces the historical development of complicity by aiding and abetting in 
international criminal law in comparison with the ICC Rome Statute provisions.  The 
writer also examines complicity by contributing to a crime by a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose. 
6.2 Complicit modes of participation in international crimes 
Complicity in crimes committed by others is widely recognised in international criminal 
law as well as national criminal law.938  International and domestic jurisdictions have 
identified modes of participation in criminal activities that incur individual criminal 
responsibility. Used interchangeably, these modes of participation amount to 
‗complicity‘, when spoken of in a strict legal sense,939  and have grown expansively to 
include, inter alia: ordering, instigating, soliciting, inducing, inciting, aiding and abetting, 
joint criminal enterprise, planning, preparing, attempting, and conspiracy. These modes 
of participation, summarised in Table 3 (further below), are all prohibited in 
international criminal law.940 
                                                 
938
 For comparative analysis see, Anita Ramasastry and Robert C Thompson (eds), Commerce, Crime and 
Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law – A 
Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions (2006) 17–22; Markus D Dubber, ‗Criminalizing Complicity: A 
Comparative Analysis‘ (2007) 5(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 977, 979–944.  
939
 ICJ, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) volume 2, 2, <http://www.icj.org>. See also, 
William A Schabas, ‗Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices‘ (June, 
2001) 83(842) International Review of the Red Cross 439; Andrea Reggio, ‗Aiding and Abetting in 
International Criminal Law: The Responsibility of Corporate Agents and Businessmen for ―Trading 
with the Enemy‖ of Mankind‘ (2005) 5 International Criminal Law Review 623. 
940
 See, Article 6 of the IMT Charter, Article 2 of the CCL 10, Article 5 of the IMTFE Charter, Article 7 
of the ICTY Statute, Article 6 of the ICTR Statute, Article 25 of the ICC Rome Statute, Section 14, 
Regulation No. 2000/15 for the Panels of Judges with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal 
Offences Established within the District Courts in East Timor (hereafter referred to as Regulation 
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The IMT Charter was among the earlier international instruments to expressly 
criminalise complicit modes of participation in international crimes.941  Although viewed 
as containing archaic-sounding provisions criminalising complicit perpetration, 942  the 
Charter laid the foundations for the development of a doctrine that is now widely 
recognised in international criminal law. 
Article 25(3) of the ICC Rome Statute is the first international criminal law treaty to 
provide detailed provisions on modes of criminal liability,943 though most of these modes 
of participation already existed in domestic criminal law.944  Article 25(3) of the ICC 
Rome Statute states:  
3.  In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person: 
(a)  Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible; 
(b)  Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact 
occurs or is attempted; 
(c)  For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means for its commission; 
(d)  In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of 
                                                                                                                                                
2000/15); Article 29 new of the ECCC Law, Article 6 of the SCSL Statute and Article 15 of the IHT 
Statute. 
941
 See, Article 6 of the IMT Charter. 
942
 Albin Eser, ‗Individual Criminal Responsibility‘ in A Cassese, P Gaeta and J R W D Jones (eds) The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
volume 1, 784.  
943
 Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 312.  See also, 
Antonio Cassese, ‗The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections‘ 
(1999) 10(1) European Journal of International Law 144, 150.  
944
 See for example, A P Simester and W J Brookbanks, Principles of Criminal Law (Brookers Ltd, 2007) 
166. 
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such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such 
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
(i)  Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the 
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii)  Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime; 
(e)  In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to 
commit genocide; 
(f)  Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because 
of circumstances independent of the person's intentions. However, a person 
who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the 
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute 
for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily 
gave up the criminal purpose. 
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Table 3 – Summary of modes prohibited in international criminal law 
Key: ICTY – International Military Tribunal; CCL 10 – Control Council Law No. 10; IMTFE – International Military Tribunal for the Far East; ICTY- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia; ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; ICC – International Criminal Court, Regulation 2000/15 – Regulation No. 2000/15 for the Panels of Judges with Exclusive Jurisdiction 
over Serious Criminal Offences Established within the District Courts in East Timor; ECCC – Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; ECCC Law – The Law on the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea; SCSL – Sierra Leone Special Court; and IHT – Iraq High 
Tribunal. 
 
Mode of Participation 
IMT 
Charter 
Article 6 
CCL 10 
Article 2 
IMTFE 
Charter 
Article 5 
ICTY Statute 
Articles 4 & 7 
ICTR Statute 
Articles 2 & 6 
ICC Rome 
Statute 
Article 25 
Regulation 
2000/15 
Section 14 
ECCC Law 
Article 
29new 
SCSL 
Statute 
Article 6 
IHT Statute 
Article 15 
Ordering           
Instigating           
Soliciting           
Inducing           
Inciting genocide           
Common purpose (joint 
criminal enterprise) 
          
Planning (formulating)           
Preparation           
Attempting           
Attempting genocide           
Conspiracy           
Conspiracy to commit genocide           
Aiding and abetting           
Complicity in genocide           
Other terminology:           
- Providing means           
- Otherwise assists           
- Organisers           
- Accomplices/accessories           
- Participation in genocide           
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Of these forms, the mode of complicity most often alleged against multinational 
corporations is aiding and abetting.945   
6.3 Complicity by aiding and abetting 
Liability for aiding and abetting is well established in international criminal law.946  This 
mode of complicit perpetration in crimes is not a new concept; however, ‗there have 
been, and remain, greater controversies about its precise ambit rather than its 
existence.‘947 
The actus reus constituting this mode of participation in crimes is well established by 
customary international law emerging from the ad hoc international tribunals and special 
courts.  Aiding and abetting primarily involves the provision of practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support for the perpetration of a crime or the underlying 
offence.948  Furthermore, it must be shown that the provision of such had a substantial 
effect on the crime.949  The customary international law requirement for a substantial 
                                                 
945
 ICJ, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) volume 1, 27 <http://www.icj.org>. 
946
 For example, see, Article 2(2) of Control Council Law No.10, Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, Article 
6(1) of the ICTR Statute, Article 29 new of the ECCC Law, Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute, Article 
25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute, Section 14(3)(c) of Regulation 2000/15, and Article 15(2)(c) of the 
IHT Statute.  The law on complicity by aiding and abetting is also well established in domestic 
jurisdictions; see generally, Lex Mundi Business Crimes and Compliance Practice Group, Business 
Crimes and Compliance Criminal Liability of Companies Survey (2008); FAFO, Business and 
International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of International 
Law (2004). 
947
 Robert Cryer, et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge 
University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2010) 374. 
948
 For discussion on underlying offences see 4.2.1 of this thesis. Essentially, an underlying offence for 
crimes against humanity includes, for example, murder. See generally, Gideon Boas, James L Bischoff 
and Natalie L Reid, Elements of Crimes under International Law: International Criminal Law 
Practitioner Library, Volume 2 (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 57. 
949
 See, Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, 10 December 1998) [249]. 
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effect has been read into the ICC Rome Statute.950 
The mens rea standards in the international institutions have differed.951  The ICTY, the 
ICTR, the SCSL, and the ECCC all apply a ‗knowledge‘ test when assessing the liability 
of an aider and abettor.952  Accordingly, the complicit perpetrators must have knowledge 
that their actions would assist the commission of the offence.  In contrast, Article 25(3)(c) 
of the ICC Rome Statute applies a ‗purpose‘ test to establish the liability of an aider and 
abettor.  Here, the complicit perpetrator must have acted ‗for the purpose of facilitating 
the commission of such a crime.‘953  The mens rea purpose test is not unique to the ICC.  
The provisions for complicity by aiding and abetting – which appear in the legal 
instruments of the East Timor Panels of Judges954 and the IHT955 – substantially mirror 
                                                 
950 See, The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) 
(International Criminal Court, Case No ICC-01/04-01/10, 16 December 2011) [279]. 
951
 For discussion on this see, Douglas Cassel, ‗Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights 
Violations: Confusion in the Courts‘ (Spring 2008) 6(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human 
Rights 304, 308. 
952
 See, Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, Article 29 new of the ECCC 
Law, and Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute. There was no uniform case law applied by the IMTs 
immediately after the WWII when assessing the mens rea standard for the liability of an aider or 
abettor; the IMTs applied either a ‗knowledge‘ or a ‗purpose‘ test, see Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss 
and Thirty-nine Others (‗Dachau Concentration Camp Trial‘), 15 November–13 December 1945, Law 
Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, Vol XI, 5, 13 and United States v von Weizsaecker (The 
Ministries Case) 14 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control 
Council Law No 10, 308, 622, respectively. Hence, the ICTY rejected what it regarded as a high 
standard imposed by the ‗purpose‘ test and instead opted to apply a ‗knowledge‘ test; see Prosecutor v 
Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. 
IT-95-17/I-T, 10 December 1998) [243], [249], discussed further below. This ‗knowledge‘ test has 
since been applied by the ICTR, the ECCC, and the SCSL. For detailed discussion on the lack of 
uniform case law on this issue, see, Douglas Cassel, ‗Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights 
Violations: Confusion in the Courts‘ (Spring 2008) 6(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human 
Rights 304, 308–309.    
953
 Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute. 
954
 Section 14(3)(c) of Regulation 2000/15. East Timor was annexed as a province to Indonesia from 1975 
up until 1999 when the East Timorese population voted for their independence. Following a violent 
campaign allegedly perpetrated by pro-Indonesian militias against the Timorese population, East 
Timor gained its independence in 2002. UNTAET, the provisional authority established in East Timor 
in the aftermath of Indonesia‘s withdrawal, set up Panels of Judges with Exclusive Jurisdiction over 
Serious Criminal Offences Established within the East Timor District Courts to deal with the grave 
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those provided in the ICC Rome Statute.  Also, a similar purpose test is applied in a 
number of domestic jurisdictions.956  Moreover, the wording for the purpose test was 
inspired by the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute.957  
A major criticism of the ‗purpose‘ test, further discussed below, is that it poses a major 
barrier to the prosecution of the corporate entities through which individual business 
persons commonly operate.  MNCs could simply argue that whatever assistance they 
provided the principal perpetrators was in the normal course of their business activities, 
and done for the purpose of making a profit, not to perpetrate crimes.958  Article 25(3)(c) 
of the ICC Rome Statute should be amended to accommodate the characteristic forms of 
corporate involvement in international crimes.  
                                                                                                                                                
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights that were committed in East Timor 
during 1999 (see generally, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor <http://www.un.org>). 
The Special Panels for Serious Crimes ceased working in mid 2005. They completed 55 trials during 
their mandate. For information on the work of the Panels of Judges see the official website created by 
special agreement with the Deputy Prosecutor General for Serious Crimes and the U.C. Berkeley War 
Crimes Studies Center 
<http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/Serious%20Crimes%20Unit%20Files/default.html>. 
955
 Article 15(2)(c) of the IHT Statute.  
956
 See, Canada‘s Section 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 and New Zealand‘s Section 
66(1) Crimes Act 1961.  
957
 See, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Official Draft and Explanatory Notes, Complete Text 
of Model Penal Code as Adopted at the 1962 Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute at 
Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962 (1985). Also, on this issue see, Kai Ambos, ‗Article 25: Individual 
Criminal Responsibility‘ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court – Observers‟ Notes, Article by Article (C. H. Beck, 2nd ed, 2008) 757. 
958
 The arguments regarding how best to interpret the purpose test have generated much debate among 
leading academics and international criminal law practitioners; see generally, Doug Cassel, ‗Corporate 
Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts‘ (Spring 2008) 6(2) 
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 304, 312; Hans Vest, ‗Business Leaders and the 
Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law‘ (2010) 8(3) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 851, 862. 
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6.3.1 Tracing historical developments of aiding and abetting in customary 
international law  
a) Aiding and abetting at the IMTs established immediately after WWII 
The International Military Tribunals established immediately after WWII 
relied upon the IMT Charter, the CCL 10 and the IMTFE Charter.  
Specifically, Article 6 of the IMT Charter, Article 2(2) of CCL 10 and Article 
5 of the IMTFE Charter all prohibited the complicit perpetration of crimes 
committed during WWII.  The precise wording adopted in these provisions 
appears in Table 4 below. 
Table 4 – Complicity provisions applied by the IMTs 
Key: IMT – International Military Tribunal; CCL 10 – Control Council Law No. 10; IMTFE – International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East 
The IMT Charter, commonly referred to as the Nuremburg Charter, did not 
expressly prohibit aiding and abetting. 959   The prohibition on aiding and 
abetting international crimes emerged from jurisprudence established during 
the Nuremburg trials.960  The Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-nine 
                                                 
959
 For discussion on the implications of this see, William A Schabas, ‗Enforcing International 
Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices‘ (June, 2001) 83(842) International Review of the Red 
Cross 439, 441–446.  
960
 William A Schabas, ‗Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices‘ (June, 
2001) 83(842) International Review of the Red Cross 439, 441. 
IMT Charter (1945) 
Article 6 
CCL 10 (1945) 
Article 2(2) 
IMTFE Charter (1946) 
Article 5 
Leaders, organizers, instigators 
and accomplices participating in 
the formulation or execution of 
a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all 
acts performed by any persons 
in execution of such plan.  
Any person without regard to 
nationality or the capacity in 
which he acted, is deemed to 
have committed a crime as 
defined in paragraph 1 of this 
Article, if he … was an 
accessory to the commission 
of any such crime or ordered 
or abetted the same … 
Leaders, organizers, instigators 
and accomplices participating in 
the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to 
commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all 
acts performed by any person in 
execution of such plan. 
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Others (‗Dachau Concentration Camp Trial‘)961 is an example of such a case.  
The Prosecution in the Dachau Concentration Camp Trial argued that the 
accused persons had wrongfully, wilfully, and deliberately aided and abetted 
the cruelties and mistreatments that took place at Dachau.962  Incidentally, this 
was the first concentration camp established in Germany. 963  The Tribunal 
found all forty accused guilty, of whom thirty-six were sentenced to death, 
reflecting the gravity of the crimes.964  In discussing the evidentiary burden 
required to show common design in a criminal activity, the Tribunal indicated 
that this included liability for aiding and abetting.965  The Tribunal applied a 
knowledge test in assessing the liability of the accomplices.  Specifically, the 
Tribunal held: 
To establish a case against each accused the prosecution had to show (1) 
that there was in force at Dachau a system to ill-treat the prisoners and 
commit the crimes listed in the charges, (2) that each accused was aware 
of the system, (3) that each accused, by his conduct ‗encouraged, aided 
and abetted or participated‘ in enforcing this system.966 
Likewise, Article 5 of the IMTFE Charter did not expressly prohibit aiding 
and abetting international crimes.  The prohibition emerged from the 
                                                 
961
 Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-nine Others (‗Dachau Concentration Camp Trial‘), 15 
November–13 December 1945, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, Vol XI, 5.    
962
 Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-nine Others (‗Dachau Concentration Camp Trial‘), 15 
November–13 December 1945, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, Vol XI, 5, 5. 
963
 Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-nine Others (‗Dachau Concentration Camp Trial‘), 15 
November–13 December 1945, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, Vol XI, 5, 5. 
964
 Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-nine Others (‗Dachau Concentration Camp Trial‘), 15 
November–13 December 1945, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, Vol XI, 5, 8. 
965
 Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-nine Others (‗Dachau Concentration Camp Trial‘), 15 
November–13 December 1945, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, Vol XI, 5, 13. 
966
 Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-nine Others (‗Dachau Concentration Camp Trial‘), 15 
November–13 December 1945, Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, Vol XI, 5, 13. 
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Tribunal‘s trial judgements.  For example, two financial leaders, Naoki 
Hoshino and Okinori Kaya, along with twenty-six other accused persons were 
brought before the IMTFE in the matter of United States, et al v Araki, et al.967  
The IMTFE examined the liability of the accused persons for aiding and 
conspiring in the waging of wars of aggression. 968   The IMTFE took into 
account the fact that Naoki Hoshino had previously worked with the Japanese 
government where he had taken up various financial positions.  The IMFTE 
found that ‗in these positions he was able to exercise a profound influence 
upon the economy of Manchukuo and did exert that influence towards 
Japanese domination of the commercial and industrial development of that 
country.‘969  Okinori Kaya had previously been appointed as Finance Minister 
on at least two separate occasions, and even advised the Japanese government 
in other financial roles.  The IMTFE found that ‗in these positions he took part 
in the formulation of aggressive policies of Japan and in the financial, 
economic and industrial preparation of Japan for the execution of those 
                                                 
967
 United States, et al v Araki, et al, 48414, International Military Tribunal of the Far East (1948) 
reprinted in, R John Pritchard (ed), The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Judgement, Separate 
Opinions, Proceedings in Chambers, Appeals and Reviews of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (Edwin Mellen Press, 1998). See also, the English translation of the Trial Judgment 
available from the University of North Carolina‘s Public Library and Digital Archive 
<http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/index.html>. 
968
 For commentary on United States, et al v Araki, et al, see, Neil Boister, ‗The Tokyo Trial‘ in William A 
Schabas and Nadia Bernaz (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law (Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group, 2011) 17–29; Kyle Rex Jacobson, ‗Doing Business with the Devil: The 
Challenges of Prosecuting Corporate Officials whose Business Transactions Facilitate War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity‘ (2005) 56 The Air Force Law Review 167, 196. 
969
 United States, et al v Araki, et al, 49793, International Military Tribunal of the Far East (1948) 
reprinted in, R John Pritchard (ed), The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Judgement, Separate 
Opinions, Proceedings in Chambers, Appeals and Reviews of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (Edwin Mellen Press, 1998) 103. 
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policies.‘ 970   Both Hoshino and Kaya were found guilty of aiding and 
conspiring in the waging of wars of aggression and sentenced to life 
imprisonment.  
In contrast to the IMT and IMTFE Charters, Article 2(2) of the CCL 10 
expressly dealt with accomplice liability for abetting, though it was silent on 
complicity by aiding. 971   The Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others 
(‗Einsatzgruppen Case‘)972 is an example of a case dealing with accomplice 
liability.  The Einsatzgruppen Case is significant to the discussion here, 
because it established what the Tribunals, such as the ICTY, have considered 
amounts to a ‗substantial effect‘ test.  The substantial effect test delineates the 
actus reus for aiding and abetting at the ad hoc international institutions.  In 
essence, with this test it must be shown that whatever assistance the 
accomplice provided to the principal perpetrator, it bore a substantial effect on 
the commission of the crime.  This test has been adopted by the ICTY (and 
followed later by other ad hoc tribunals.)973  In the Einsatzgruppen Case, there 
were twenty-two accused persons who appeared before a United States 
Military Tribunal seated in Nuremberg.  They were charged with war crimes 
and crimes against humanity pursuant to the CCL 10 provisions.  The IMT 
                                                 
970
 United States, et al v Araki, et al, 49801, International Military Tribunal of the Far East (1948), 
reprinted in, R John Pritchard (ed), The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Judgement, Separate 
Opinions, Proceedings in Chambers, Appeals and Reviews of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East (Edwin Mellen Press, 1998) 103. 
971
 For definitions of the terms ‗aiding‘ and ‗abetting‘ see customary international law discussion, which 
appears further below.  
972
 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (‗Einsatzgruppen Case‘), October 1946–April 1949, Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol IV.   
973
 See, Prosecutor v Furundžija, (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, 10 December 1998) [217] – [221] for how the ICTY adopted the 
‗Einsatzgruppen Case‘ as precedent for the ‗substantial effect‘ test.  
 –  231  –  
reasoning in the judgments of Klingelhoefer, Fendler, Ruehl, and Graf are 
particularly relevant here, as they discuss to what extent the actions of the 
accomplices had a substantial effect on the crimes committed by the principal 
perpetrators.  The Tribunal observed that although Klingelhoefer was an 
interpreter, his actions were vital in the commission of crimes.  More than 
anything, his role as interpreter did not ‗exonerate him from guilt because in 
locating, evaluating and turning over lists of Communist party functionaries to 
the executive of his organisation he was aware that the people listed would be 
executed when found.‘974  As for Fendler, the Tribunal opined that he held a 
position of authority as the second highest-ranking officer in the Kommando, 
and yet he failed to object to or do anything about the summary executions 
that he knew were being carried out. 975   In contrast, although Ruehl had 
knowledge about the criminal aspirations of the organisation, he was not in a 
position to ‗control, prevent, or modify the severity of the program.‘976  The 
Tribunal commented that Ruehl‘s low rank did not ‗place him automatically 
into a position where his lack of objection in any way contributed to the 
success of any executive operation.‘977  Similarly, the Tribunal concluded that 
there was no evidence to suggest that Graf was in a position to object to the 
criminal activities of the perpetrators and, therefore, could not be found guilty 
                                                 
974
 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (‗Einsatzgruppen Case‘), October 1946–April 1949, Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol IV, 569. 
975
 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (‗Einsatzgruppen Case‘), October 1946–April 1949, Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol IV, 572. 
976
 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (‗Einsatzgruppen Case‘), October 1946–April 1949, Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol IV, 580. 
977
 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (‗Einsatzgruppen Case‘), October 1946–April 1949, Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol IV, 581. 
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as an accessory to the crimes.978  
b) Aiding and abetting provisions at the ad hoc international tribunals and special 
courts which apply the ‘knowledge’ mens rea test 
Aiding and abetting provisions are contained in Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
Statute, Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, Article 29 new of the ECCC Law, 
and Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute.  The precise wording of these provisions 
appears in Table 5 below.  These provisions are substantially the same.  
Table 5 – Aiding and abetting at the ad hoc international tribunals and special courts 
Key: ICTY- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; ICTR – International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda; ECCC – Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; SCSL – Sierra Leone Special Court. 
i. Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute 
Prosecutor v Tadić979 is the first case that was heard before the ICTY Trial 
Chamber.  Tadić dealt with the terms ‗aiding‘ and ‗abetting‘ as collective 
rather than disjunctive terms.  The Trial Chamber describes the aiding and 
abetting modality as one that includes verbal or physical assistance that 
                                                 
978
 Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (‗Einsatzgruppen Case‘), October 1946-April 1949, Trials of War 
Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol IV, 585. 
979
 Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case 
No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997). 
ICTY Statute 
Article 7(1) 
ICTR Statute 
Article 6(1) 
ECCC Law 
Article 29new 
SCSL  Statute 
Article 6(1) 
A person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or 
execution of a crime 
referred to in articles 2 
to 5 of the present 
Statute, shall be 
individually responsible 
for the crime. 
A person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation 
or execution of a crime 
referred to in Articles 2 
to 4 of the present 
Statute, shall be 
individually 
responsible for the 
crime. 
Any Suspect who 
planned, instigated, 
ordered, aided and 
abetted, or committed 
the crimes referred to 
in article 3new, 4, 5, 
6, 7 and 8 of this law 
shall be individually 
responsible for the 
crime. 
A person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation 
or execution of a crime 
referred to in articles 2 
to 4 of the present 
Statute shall be 
individually 
responsible for the 
crime.  
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encourages or supports the commission of crimes, provided the requisite intent 
is shown.980  Since then, the ICTY has also recognised instances where aiding 
and abetting were dealt with disjunctively.  Specifically, the ICTY has found 
that the term ‗aiding‘ refers to the act of ‗giving practical assistance to the 
physical perpetrator or intermediary perpetrator‘;981 while the term ‗abetting‘, 
is said to consist of ‗―facilitating the commission of an act by being 
sympathetic thereto‖—in other words, giving encouragement or moral support 
to the physical perpetrator or intermediary perpetrator.‘982 
Customary international law that has emerged from the ICTY has established 
that the actus reus for aiding and abetting the commission of a crime occurs 
when an accused person provides practical assistance, encouragement, or 
moral support for the perpetration of such crime. 983   Furthermore, it is 
necessary to show that the provision of such practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support bore a substantial effect on the crime.984   
Also, the accused could be held liable for aiding and abetting at any point 
during the planning, preparation or execution of the crime or the underlying 
                                                 
980
 Prosecutor v Tadić (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case 
No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997) [689]. 
981
 Prosecutor v Milutinović (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Case No. IT-05-87-T, volume 1 of 4, 26 February 2009) [89] footnote 107. 
982
 Prosecutor v Milutinović (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Case No. IT-05-87-T, volume 1 of 4, 26 February 2009) [89] footnote 107. 
983
 Prosecutor v Milutinović (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Case No. IT-05-87-T, volume 1 of 4, 26 February 2009) [89]; see also, Prosecutor v Blaškić (Appeal 
Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 29 July 
2004) [45] – [46]. 
984
 Prosecutor v Kvočka, et al (Appeal Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, 28 February 2005) [90]. 
 –  234  –  
offence.985  Provision of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support 
could incur criminal liability if provided before, during or after the crime is 
committed.986  There is no requirement to show that the aider and abettor and 
the principal perpetrator had a plan or an agreement in place to commit the 
crime.987  
As for the mental element required to establish liability for aiding and abetting 
crimes, the ICTY Trial Chamber has established that the aider and abettor 
must know that their actions are assisting the commission of an offence.988  
This mental element does not have to be overtly expressed, but may be 
inferred from the surrounding circumstances.989 
ii. Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute 
The ICTR Trial Chamber notes that the terms ‗aiding‘ and ‗abetting‘ are often 
                                                 
985
 Pursuant to Section 7(1) of the ICTY Statute; see, discussion in Prosecutor v Milutinović (Trial 
Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-05-87-T, volume 
1 of 4, 26 February 2009) [91].  
986
 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Appeal Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Case No. IT-95-14-A, 29 July 2004) [48]; although, aiding and abetting by omission after the crime 
would lack the ‗substantial effect‘ requisite if it took place far too long afterwards, see discussion in 
Prosecutor v Strugar (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Case No. IT-01-42-T, 31 January 2005) [355]. 
987
 Prosecutor v Simić, et al (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Case No. IT-95-9-T, 17 October 2003) [162]. 
988
 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Trial Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, 10 December 1998) [249]; reasoning upheld in most ICTY chamber decisions, 
e.g. Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-98-32-A, 25 February 2004) 
[102]; Prosecutor v Blaškić (Appeal Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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referred to conjunctively.990  The ICTR has dealt with these terms as distinct 
concepts that are anything but synonymous.991  The ICTR Chambers define the 
term ‗aiding‘ as: ‗assisting another to commit a crime‘;992 they define ‗abetting‘ 
as: ‗facilitating, encouraging, or advising the commission of a crime.‘993 
According to the ICTR Appeals Chamber, the aider and abettor may assist the 
principal actor in a number of ways such as: providing material support; 
encouraging with verbal statements; 994  or, even by their mere presence. 995  
Such assistance need not be an indispensible element required for the 
commission of the crime.996  Like the ICTY, the ICTR Chambers were of the 
view that the aider and abettor may incur liability before, during, or after the 
commission of the crime.997  The aider and abettor may also be held liable for 
his/her participation during the planning, preparation, or execution stage of the 
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crime.998  Moreover, it is also not necessary to show that the aider and abettor 
exercised authority over the principal perpetrator.999 
Regarding the mens rea requisite, the ICTR has adopted a similar approach to 
that of the ICTY, finding that the aider and abettor must know that their 
actions are assisting the commission of a crime.  The accomplice need not be 
aware of the precise crime that the principal perpetrator intends to commit, or 
which has been committed; however, the accomplice must be aware of the 
essential elements of the crime.1000 
iii. Article 29 new of the ECCC Law 
To date, there are only four cases pending before the ECCC.1001  Of these cases, 
the ECCC has only delivered one judgment. In Co-Prosecutors v The Kaing 
Guek Eav, alias Duch,1002 the Trial Chamber relied upon jurisprudence from 
the ICTY and ICTR concerning complicity by aiding and abetting.  The ECCC 
upheld customary international law that aiding and abetting consisted of the 
perpetrator providing practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support 
that had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.1003  The ECCC 
adopted the definitions for the terms aiding and abetting that were applied by 
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the ICTY and ICTR.1004  The ECCC also adopted for the mens rea requirement, 
the knowledge test applied by the ICTY and the ICTR.  According to the 
ECCC, it must be shown that the accomplice was aware that there was a 
probability that a crime would be committed, or that a crime was actually 
committed.  The accomplice must also know that his/her actions assisted in the 
commission of a crime.  The accomplice‘s knowledge may be inferred from 
the circumstances.1005  
iv. Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute 
The first trial judgment delivered at the SCSL, the AFRC Case, relied upon 
jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR. The SCSL Tribunal applied a similar 
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approach to the aiding and abetting modality as that formulated by the ICTY 
and ICTR:1006  the accomplice‘s actions must have a substantial effect on the 
commission of the crime,1007  and the accomplice may be held liable for his/her 
role in aiding and abetting the planning, preparation or execution of a 
crime. 1008   Furthermore, ‗such contribution may be provided directly or 
through an intermediary and irrespective of whether the participant was 
present or removed both in time and place from the actual commission of the 
crime.‘1009  
The Tribunal held that it was necessary to show that the accused knew he was 
assisting in the perpetration of a crime – thus, it applied the mens rea 
knowledge test to establish aiding and abetting.1010  The Tribunal was also of 
the view that the accused did not need to know about the specific crime, just 
that a crime would probably be committed as a result of the practical 
assistance provided.1011 
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The applicable law on aiding and abetting in the AFRC Case has essentially 
been upheld in the majority of the SCSL decisions.1012 
6.3.2 Aiding and abetting provisions pursuant to Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome 
Statute  
Prior to the aiding and abetting provisions provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome 
Statute, there were a number of developments during the drafting process leading up to 
the current ICC Rome Statute provisions – these included initiatives by the International 
Law Commission and the Preparatory Commission. 
a) Preliminary work of the International Law Commission 
The ILC prepared Draft Codes of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind in 1954,1013 1991,1014 and 1996.1015  The ILC also prepared a Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Court in 1994.1016  The 1954 Draft Code 
does not contain any express provisions prohibiting the aiding and abetting of 
crimes, neither does the 1994 Draft Statute.  However, there are a handful of 
provisions dealing with aiding and abetting prohibitions that appear in the 
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appendices to the 1994 Draft Statute.1017  Only the 1991 and 1996 Draft Codes 
deal with complicity by aiding and abetting. 
According to Article 3(2) of the 1991 Draft Code, ‗an individual who aids, 
abets or provides the means for the commission of a crime against the peace 
and security of mankind … is liable to punishment.‘  The ILC commentary on 
the 1991 Draft Code indicates that the majority of members agreed that 
obvious cases of complicity (by aiding, abetting, or the provision of means) 
included those acts carried out before or during the commission of a crime.1018  
However, the ILC was deeply divided as to whether this mode of complicity 
extended to acts ex post facto (after the fact).  The dilemma was resolved by 
agreement that ex post facto acts only constituted aiding, abetting, or the 
provision of means if such acts had previously been agreed upon.1019 
Article 2(3)(d) of the 1996 Draft Code attributes individual criminal 
responsibility where the complicit perpetrator ‗knowingly aids, abets or 
otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such a crime, 
including providing the means for its commission.‘  The ILC commentary on 
the 1996 Draft Code made it clear that an individual who aided, abetted, or 
otherwise assisted without knowing that they were facilitating the commission 
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of a crime would not be liable under the Draft Code provisions.1020  This 
requisite mens rea standard was consistent with customary international law 
established pursuant to the IMTs.1021  Regarding the kind of assistance, the ILC 
commented that it must significantly facilitate the perpetration of the crime.1022  
Also, the ILC maintained the view, previously stipulated in the 1991 Draft 
Code, that complicity by aiding and abetting included ex post facto acts, but 
only if previously agreed upon. 1023   Since the 1996 Draft Code, emerging 
jurisprudence from the ad hoc international tribunals indicates that there is no 
requirement to show that the aider and abettor and the principal perpetrator 
had a plan or an agreement in place to commit the crime.1024  With respect to 
jurisprudence emerging from the ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber I was recently of the 
opinion that ex post facto acts could, indeed, incur liability if such acts had 
been previously agreed upon. 1025   Though, when the Chamber made these 
statements, it was generally commenting on the ILC and Preparatory 
Commission‘s draft provisions on ex post facto acts.1026 
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b) Preliminary work of the Preparatory Commission 
The 1998 Draft Statute prepared by the Preparatory Committee to establish an 
international criminal court1027 is particularly relevant to the discussion here.  
The Committee presented the 1998 Draft Statute at the Rome Conference.1028  
Article 23(7)(d) of the Statute dealt with individual criminal responsibility 
where the perpetrator aids or abets an international crime.  Specifically, 
Article 23(7)(d) of the 1998 Draft Statute states:  
7. [Subject to the provisions of articles 25, 28 and 29,] a person is 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime defined [in 
article 5] [in this Statute] if that person: 
(d)  [with [intent] [knowledge] to facilitate the commission of such a 
crime,] aids, abets or otherwise assists in the commission [or 
attempted commission] of that crime, including providing the 
means for its commission. 
Initially, the Preparatory Committee was unable to agree upon the Article 
23(7)(d), as evidenced by the words that appear in brackets.1029  On the one 
hand were those who favoured a mens rea requisite based on an ‗intent test‘, 
while those opposed to this approach opted for a ‗knowledge test‘.  A 
compromise was reached at the Rome Conference, which resulted in a 
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‗purpose test‘1030 being adopted from the Model Penal Code of the American 
Law Institute. 1031   Professor Cherif Bassiouni, the Chair of the Drafting 
Committee, attributed the disparity to ‗differences between civil law and 
common law lawyers and different understandings of language.‘1032  Hence, 
the purpose test that was adopted seemed the ideal compromise in both 
English and French.1033  Proponents of the intent test would have welcomed 
this outcome as a victory.  Generally, international criminal law applies a 
narrow meaning to the term ‗intent‘; it equates the term with ‗purpose‘.1034 
The final fruits of the Rome Conference treaty negotiating process prohibiting 
the aiding and abetting of crimes are reflected in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC 
Rome Statute: 
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible 
and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
if that person: 
(c)  For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission. 
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Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute deals with aiding and abetting as a 
‗facilitation-type of complicity‘.1035  This treatment distinguishes the aiding 
and abetting modality from the other modes of participation found in the rest 
of Article 25(3).1036  In addition, the aiding and abetting modality pursuant to 
the ICC Rome Statute is differentiated from the same modality at the ICTY, 
the ICTR, the ECCC and the SCSL.  These ‗seem to consider ―counselling‖ 
and ―procuring‖ as subsumed under aiding and abetting.‘1037   
c) Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute: the actus reus 
The Rome Statute provision does not expressly state what material acts are 
required to show aiding and abetting;1038 however, Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC 
Rome Statute does indicate that ‗providing means‘ for the commission of a 
crime could typically be considered a form of assisting. 1039   Provision of 
practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support, constitute aiding and 
abetting pursuant to customary international law.  The International 
Commission of Jurists has identified that forms of assisting include, inter alia: 
 the provision of goods or services used in the commission of crimes;  
 the provision of information which leads to the commission of crimes;  
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 the provision of personnel to commit crimes;  
 the provision of logistical assistance to commit crimes;  
 the procurement and use of products or resources (including labour) in 
the knowledge that the supply of these resources involves the 
commission of crimes; and 
 the provision of banking facilities so that the proceeds of crimes can 
be deposited.
1040
 
Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute does not expressly adopt the 
‗substantial effect‘ requisite.1041  However, jurisprudence emerging from the 
ICC in the matter, The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, 1042  seems to 
indicate that the Court has adopted this test.1043  Incidentally, at the time of the 
Rome Conference treaty negotiations for the ICC Rome Statute, the 
‗substantial effect‘ requisite had been established as customary international 
law.1044   
In The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I 
noted that there had been much speculation among academics as to what 
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approach the ICC would take.1045  Generally, there were those academics of the 
view that the ICC would adopt the ICTY and the ICTR approach.  For 
example, Gerhard Werle argued, and rightly so, that ‗within the ICC Statute‘s 
framework of modes of participation, it is reasonable to interpret the actus 
reus of assistance in this way.‘1046  In contrast, William Schabas argued that 
the ICC could be taken to have specifically rejected the ‗substantial effect‘ test 
when it was not expressly included in the words of the final Statute.  Schabas 
suggested that the fact the ‗substantial effect‘ test was not expressed in the 
ICC Rome Statute, despite it having appeared in the ILC Draft Codes and 
jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR, perhaps indicated that delegates at 
the Rome Conference deliberately rejected this test. 1047   However, from a 
purely practical standpoint, it would be difficult to imagine that this was the 
intention.  It would certainly make a difference whether or not a ‗substantial 
effect‘ test is required at the ICC in relation to the characteristic modes of 
corporate complicity by aiding and abetting.  By way of illustration, if a coffee 
supplier provided a perpetrator with coffee and that perpetrator went on to 
commit crimes, unless it could be shown that the consumption of the coffee 
significantly facilitated the commission of the crime (which would be highly 
unlikely under normal circumstances) then the coffee supplier would not be 
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 See, The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) 
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Responsibility‘ in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court– Observers‟ Notes, Article by Article (C. H. Beck, 2nd ed, 2008) 756. 
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considered complicit in the perpetrator‘s crimes.  Failure to read some kind of 
substantial effect test into the ICC Rome Statute aiding and abetting 
provisions would cast the net of liability far too wide; it would trivialise the 
notion of aiding and abetting.  
d) Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute: the mens rea ‘purpose test’  
Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute adopts the phrase ‗for the purpose of 
facilitating the commission of such a crime‘.  The ICC Rome Statute does not 
explain this phrase further and, to date, those who have appeared before the 
Court have not been charged with complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant 
to Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  However, the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber I in The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana, made comments in 
passing on the provisions provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  
The Chamber noted that ‗…unlike the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, 
article 25(3)(c) of the Statute requires that the person act with the purpose to 
facilitate the crime; knowledge is not enough for responsibility under this 
article.‘1048  In another part of its Judgement, the Chamber distinguished the 
mens rea for aiding and abetting from that required for common purpose 
liability.  The Chamber was of the view that: 
Differently from aiding and abetting under article 25(3)(c) of the Statute, 
for which intent is always required, knowledge is sufficient to incur 
liability for contributing to a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose, under article 25(3)(d) of the Statute.
1049
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 The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (International 
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From these brief comments passed by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, on the face 
of it, it would appear that purpose is synonymous with intent.  
This is consistent with ordinary language: 
My purpose in doing something is my reason for it, in the sense of 
what I am trying to do or what I want to accomplish by doing it. 
Hence, to specify a purpose is to give an explanation, whereas to 
specify an intention is not necessarily to do so. We do things with an 
intention, but for a purpose, since the intention may only accompany 
the action, whereas the purpose must be a reason for it. We do not 
naturally speak of ―the reason or intention‖ and ―the point or intention‖ 
in the way that we do speak of ―the reason or purpose‖ and ―the point 
or purpose‖ of an action.1050 
However, there are differing interpretations about what this purpose provision 
actually means.  The mens rea purpose test has been debated widely by 
academics and international criminal law practitioners.1051  There is still no 
clear consensus.  There are a number of domestic jurisdictions that provide a 
similar mens rea purpose test for aiding and abetting the commission of 
crimes, and these may assist our understanding. These include accomplice 
liability provisions applied in the United States, 1052  Canada, 1053  and New 
Zealand,1054 these are examined further below.   
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 Alan R White, ‗Intention, Purpose, Foresight and Desire‘ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 569, 574. 
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Washington, D.C., May 24, 1962 (1985). 
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 See, New Zealand‘s Section 66(1) Crimes Act 1961. 
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i. General observations about the mens rea purpose test by academics and 
international criminal law practitioners 
Academics and international criminal law practitioners have made several 
attempts to explain the mens rea purpose test that is provided in Article 
25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  For example, Doug Cassel applies a very 
broad interpretation of the ICC Rome Statute provision.  Cassel proposes that 
the term ‗purpose‘ does not necessarily refer to an exclusive or primary 
purpose.1055  Cassel suggests that ‗a secondary purpose, including one inferred 
from knowledge of the likely consequences, should suffice.‘1056  For example, 
in the Zyklon B case (discussed earlier), the defendant was a businessman who 
sold gas to the Nazi regime; he did so for the purpose of making a profit, 
despite knowing that the gas would be used to eliminate Jews.  Cassel argues 
that a secondary purpose may be inferred that the businessman encouraged the 
killing of the Jews in order to sell the gas so as to make a profit.1057  According 
to Cassel, this approach appears to be the only rational manner to interpret the 
mens rea requisite of Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.1058  He is of the 
view that it is hard to imagine it was the intention of those who drafted the 
ICC Rome Statute that the accomplices who knowingly supplied gas for the 
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gas chambers should not be held liable simply because they did so purely to 
make a profit.1059  This interpretation would result in an inability to punish 
most serious crimes of concern to the international community – and that 
would go against the purpose of the ICC Rome Statute.1060  Indeed, purpose is 
not refuted in circumstances where an accomplice sees it fit to bring about an 
outcome as a result of seeking some other objective. 1061   However, when 
considered in light of business dealings, a concern here is that this approach 
requires circumstances where there is an on-going relationship, whereby 
profits are generated from a series of business transactions.  This is because, 
although driven by a need to make a profit, once-off business transactions are 
not reliant on the manner by which the commercial items are used; the 
business person still acquires a profit even if those items are discarded 
anyway.1062    
The present writer is of the view that the circumstances where a secondary 
purpose can be identified will be rare.  In most cases of corporate complicity, 
the purpose of making a profit is all that will be in issue.  Robert Cryer takes a 
similar view with respect to a strict reading of the aiding and abetting 
provisions in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  Cryer adopts a narrow 
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approach to the interpretation of the mens rea requisite standard provided in 
Article 25(3)(c).  He argues that an arms dealer who supplies weapons 
knowing that they would be used in the commission of international crimes 
would escape liability if the dealer‘s sole purpose were to make a profit.1063  In 
all likelihood, if the ICC applied the purpose proviso as it currently stands, it 
would adopt a narrow interpretation similar to Cryer‘s.  This would exclude 
most corporate actors from the Court‘s jurisdiction.  Indeed, the harsh reality 
seems to be that if the ICC does not interpret the purpose proviso broadly, then 
it will most certainly dismiss cases that involve business actors who behave 
solely for economic purposes.1064  This line of thought only emphasises the 
need to amend the Statute‘s aiding and abetting provisions to accommodate 
characteristic forms of corporate involvement in international crimes – 
especially in light of the passing comments made by the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana.   
Norman Farrell queries the interpretation of the mens rea provision provided 
in Article 25(3)(c).  He suggests that there are two possible interpretations.  
Either an aider and abettor must actually share the principal perpetrator‘s 
intent1065 – for example, a corporation which assists in the forcible transfer of 
civilians by providing the principal perpetrator with weapons or equipment, 
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 Norman Farrell, ‗Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors: Some Lessons from the 
International Tribunals‘ (2010) 8(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 873, 882. 
 –  252  –  
must intend to forcibly transfer the civilians. 1066  Farrell observes that this 
approach is inconsistent with the customary international law emerging from 
the ad hoc tribunals.1067  Or, another way to interpret the provision could be 
that an aider and abettor must intend to assist in the commission of the crime.  
This interpretation looks at the motive of the aider and abettor who must have 
acted with the specific purpose of assisting the crime, but need not share the 
principal perpetrator‘s intention.1068  For example, if a corporation were to 
assist in the forcible transfer of civilians by providing the principal perpetrator 
with weapons or equipment, the corporation must not only have known that 
their actions would assist the perpetrator, but it must have acted for the 
purpose of assisting the principal perpetrator in the forcible transfer of 
civilians.1069  Farrell‘s approach here seems to be in keeping with the brief 
observations made by the Pre-Trial Chamber in The Prosecutor v Callixte 
Mbarushimana, 1070  and also the manner in which the Panels of Judges 
attributed accomplice liability in East Timor (discussed below).1071  The aiding 
and abetting provisions applied by the Panels of Judges in East Timor are 
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substantially the same as those stipulated in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome 
Statute.     
Farrell concludes that, regardless of how the provision is interpreted, it would 
be less challenging to simply apply the knowledge mens rea standard, such as 
the one adopted by the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL.1072  This could practically be 
achieved if the purpose provision were removed.  The existing aiding and 
abetting provisions pose a major barrier to the prosecution of corporations and 
their executives.   
The International Commission of Jurists adopts an entirely different approach 
and argues that it actually does not make any ‗practical difference‘ whether 
one applies a mens rea standard construed on purpose or knowledge. 1073  
According to the ICJ:  
… practically speaking, if it is established that a corporate official had 
knowledge that an act would facilitate the commission of a crime, and 
yet proceeded to act, then the purpose to facilitate could be found to 
exist. The fact that the official knowingly aided a crime in order to make 
a profit does not diminish his assistance; indeed it could be interpreted as 
providing a further incentive to facilitate the crime ‗on purpose‘. 
Accordingly, whilst there may be an apparent difference in the mens rea 
standard, there may well be very little practical difference.1074 
The manner by which the ICJ diagnoses the purpose requirements results in 
two explanations of the term.  On the one hand, when an action is done ‗on 
purpose‘, ordinarily, there is an assumption that the action was done 
                                                 
1072
 Norman Farrell, ‗Attributing Criminal Liability to Corporate Actors: Some Lessons from the 
International Tribunals‘ (2010) 8(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 873, 883. 
1073
 ICJ, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) volume 2, 22, <http://www.icj.org>.   
1074
 ICJ, Corporate Complicity in International Crimes (2008) volume 2, 22, <http://www.icj.org>. 
 –  254  –  
deliberately rather than accidentally; an assertion of this kind has nothing to 
do with what the purpose actually was.  On the other hand, an action which is 
done ‗for the purpose of‘ bringing about a specific result makes an assertion 
about the nature of the purpose.1075  Hence, the ICJ approach ignores the 
specific wording of Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  This provision 
does not assert criminal responsibility for a person who acts on purpose, but 
rather for a person who acts „for the purpose of facilitating the commission of 
such a crime‟.1076 
ii. Customary international law 
It is clear that the wording of Section 14(3)(c) of Regulation 2000/15 and 
Article 15(2)(c) of the IHT Statute 1077  substantially mirrors that found in 
Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  The precise wording of these 
provisions appears in Table 6 below.  These provisions apply the mens rea 
purpose test to establish criminal liability for aiding and abetting crimes.  The 
discussion which follows on the mens rea requisite shows that, to a large 
extent, the Panels of Judges and the IHT dealt with this issue by examining 
whether the aider and abettor knew that their actions would assist the 
commission of crimes. 
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Table 6 – Aiding and abetting at the ICC, the Panel of Judges, and the IHT 
Key: ICC – International Criminal Court, Regulation 2000/15 – Regulation No. 2000/15 for the Panels of Judges with 
Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences Established within the District Courts in East Timor, and IHT – 
Iraq High Tribunal. 
Section 14(3)(c) of Regulation 2000/15 
It appears from examining the cases that appeared before the Panels of 
Judges1078 that, in most instances, they simply restated the law on individual 
criminal responsibility and did not provide analysis or discussion of the legal 
principles.1079  Occasionally, they simply adopted the definition of aiding and 
abetting developed by the ICTY and ICTR without further explanation.1080  In 
other instances, the Panels of Judges explained that it was necessary to show 
that the aider and abettor knew his/her actions would assist the commission of 
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ICC Rome Statute 
Article 25(3)(c) 
Regulation 2000/15 
Section 14(3)(c) 
IHT  Statute 
Article 15(2)(c) 
For the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or otherwise assists in its 
commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing 
the means for its commission. 
For the purpose of facilitating 
the commission of such a 
crime, aids, abets or otherwise 
assists in its commission or its 
attempted commission, 
including providing the means 
for its commission. 
For the purpose of facilitating 
the commission of such a crime, 
aids, abets or by any other 
means assists in its commission 
or its attempted commission, 
including providing the means 
for its commission. 
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a crime.  For example, in The Prosecutor for Serious Crimes v Jose Cardoso, 
the accused was charged with aiding and abetting the rape of two victims.1081  
The Panels of Judges held: 
To establish the mens rea of aiding and abetting under Section 14.3(c), it 
must be demonstrated that the aider and abettor knew (in the sense that he 
was aware) that his own acts assisted in the commission of the specific 
crime in question by the principal offender. The aider and abettor must be 
aware of the essential elements of the crime committed by the principal 
offender, including the principal offender‘s state of mind.  However, the 
aider and abettor need not share the intent of the principal offender.1082 
The approach taken by the Panels of Judges attributed accomplice liability for 
aiding and abetting where the perpetrator was aware that his actions assisted 
the commission of the crime.  This approach stops short of the IHT 
interpretation of the purpose proviso (discussed below), which not only 
required that the accomplice knew that their actions assisted the commission 
of a crime, but that the accomplice should also have wanted to bring about the 
desired outcome.  
Article 15(2)(c) of the IHT Statute 
The Dujail Case1083 was the first matter heard before the IHT.1084  The trial 
proceedings were highly publicised and heavily criticised for procedural flaws, 
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as well as a trial judgment premised on assumptions rather than actual facts 
introduced into evidence. 1085   The Dujail Case involved eight defendants 
including Saddam Hussein.  The case concerned crimes committed in Dujail 
following an assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein, the then President of 
Iraq.  Three of the accused persons in the Dujail Case were deemed lower-
level defendants, and were charged with aiding and abetting the more senior 
defendants.1086  On the issue of the requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting 
crimes, the Trial Chamber inferred knowledge on the part of the lower-level 
defendants. 1087  According to the Trial Chamber, the defendants were well 
aware that there would have been reprisals meted out on the people of Dujail 
in the aftermath of the failed assassination. 1088   They surmised that the 
defendants were members of the Ba‘ath Party – and, as far as the Chamber 
was concerned, party membership, in effect, meant that the defendants would 
have been ‗familiar with the nature of that party, especially as regards matters 
concerning its survival and rule under its leader, defendant Saddam 
Hussein.‘ 1089   Additionally, the Trial Chamber inferred what has been 
described as a ‗common knowledge‘ concerning the character of the 
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regime.1090  The Chamber opined, ‗Iraqis, especially if they were members of 
that party, were well aware of the actions committed by party leaders since 
they came to power in 1968.‘1091   Ultimately, the Trial Chamber held: 
… the intentional involvement in the crime, which is the psychological 
element that must be present for complicity to occur, rests on the volition 
of the accomplice to be involved in realizing the conduct that constitutes 
the crime. It rests also on the cognizance of the nature of the acts in 
which the accomplice participates as well as his volition to bring about 
the outcome that the principal actor wants.1092 
It appears that the IHT required that the accomplices not only know that they 
were assisting the commission of a crime, but that they had to also desire that 
criminal outcome.  The IHT approach goes further than the Panels of Judges, 
but it closely reflects how the Model Penal Code, which is discussed below, 
interprets the term ‗purposely‘.  
iii. Domestic jurisdictions that adopt a similar approach to the ‘purpose’ mens 
rea test provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute 
There are a number of domestic jurisdictions that adopt a similar approach to 
the ‗purpose‘ mens rea test provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome 
Statute.  The ICC provisions on aiding and abetting were adopted from the 
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Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute.1093  Additionally, a number 
of domestic jurisdictions have a similar purpose test as the basis of their 
accomplice liability provisions: for example, Canada1094 and New Zealand.1095  
The approaches taken by these domestic jurisdictions with respect to the 
‗purpose‘ mens rea test are discussed below.  
United States 
The Model Penal Code1096 
Article 2.06(3) of the Model Penal Code deals with accomplice liability; it 
applies a purpose test to the mens rea requisite.  Specifically, Article 
2.06(3)(a)(ii) deals with aiding and abetting criminal offences.  The provision 
states: 
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an 
offense if: 
(a) with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of 
the offense, he 
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning 
or committing it … 
According to Section 1.13(12) of the Model Penal Code, the terms 
‗intentionally‘ or ‗with intent‘ mean: ‗purposely‘.  Additionally, criminal 
offences that are carried out purposely are defined in Section 2.02(2)(a) of the 
Model Penal Code as: 
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A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense 
when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, 
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to 
cause such a result; and 
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of 
the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that 
they exist. 
The Model Penal Code provisions on accomplice liability were modelled upon 
the approach laid down in United States v Peoni,1097 where the Court held: 
All the words used – even the most colourless, ‗abet‘ – carry an 
implication of purposive attitude towards it. [T]hey all demand that [the 
accessory] in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he 
participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he 
seek by his action to make it to succeed.1098 
The approach taken in the first limb of Model Penal Code – Section  
2.02(2)(a)(i) – and Peoni concerning how ‗purpose‘ is interpreted with respect 
to the aiding and abetting modality reflects the ordinary use of the term.  In 
essence, purpose refers to the accomplice‘s reasons for their actions.    
With respect to this, an accomplice‘s purpose may be to engage in certain 
criminal activity.  If the possibility of its occurrence exists, this may have 
determined whether or not the accomplice would act.  In such circumstances, a 
‗but-for‘ connection may be found to exist between the accomplice‘s purpose, 
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and the actual result; therefore, the argument could be made that the 
accomplice‘s purpose was the sole purpose. 1099   In contrast, a number of 
purposes may exist, whereby only one of these would need to be identified in 
order to establish criminal liability.1100 
Furthermore, the second limb of the Model Penal Code definition with respect 
to criminal offences that are carried out purposely – Section 2.02(2)(a)(ii) – 
introduces an element of recklessness.  
Canada 
In Canada, Section 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code adopts a purpose test that is 
similar to that adopted in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  Section 
21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code provides: 
(1) Every one is a party to an offence who  
(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any 
person to commit it … 
Section 21(1)(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code was considered by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in R v Hibbert.1101  The central issue on appeal was 
the applicability of the duress defence in relation to criminal charges laid 
against Hibbert.  However, of particular relevance to the discussion in this 
thesis was the Supreme Court‘s lengthy discussion on mens rea, more 
precisely the Supreme Court‘s analysis of the term ‗purpose‘.  R v Hibbert 
involved the shooting of a victim (Fitzroy Cohen) in the presence of Lawrence 
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Hibbert, the accused.  Hibbert had assisted the principal perpetrator, Mark 
Bailey, to gain access to the victim.  Hibbert claimed that the only reason he 
had done so was because he feared for his life and felt that he had no choice in 
the matter. 1102   Hibbert was charged with aiding the criminal offence that 
resulted in the victim‘s death.  The Supreme Court considered the wording of 
Section 21(1)(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code, and opined that, ordinarily, 
the term ‗purpose‘ had two distinct meanings.  Purpose could refer to a person 
who does something on purpose, not accidentally; hence, the immediate 
intention to do that thing.  Alternatively, purpose could also denote a person 
who does an act desiring to achieve a specific result.1103  Bearing in mind the 
two distinct meanings of purpose, the Supreme Court considered the Canadian 
Parliament‘s intention when it drafted the Criminal Code provision with 
respect to aiding the commission of criminal offences.  The Supreme Court 
found that equating purpose with intention best reflected the Parliament‘s 
objective. 1104   The Court held that the term ‗purpose‘ provided in Section 
21(1)(b) of the Canadian Criminal Code ‗should not be seen as incorporating 
the notion of ―desire‖ into the mental state for party liability, and that the word 
should instead be understood as being essentially synonymous with 
―intention‖.‘1105 
The Supreme Court‘s finding that purpose was synonymous with intention is 
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radical.1106 However, it is similar to the approach taken by the International 
Commission of Jurists (discussed earlier) and Section 66(1)(b)-(d) of the New 
Zealand Crimes Act 1961 (discussed below) concerning the accomplice 
liability provisions.  
New Zealand 
New Zealand has the same accomplice liability provisions as those adopted in 
Canada.  Section 66(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 provides modes of 
participation in crimes.  Specifically, Section 66(1)(b) adopts a purpose test 
that is similar to the one provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  
According to Section 66(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1961:  
(1) Every one is a party to and guilty of an offence who –  
(b) Does or omits an act for the purpose of aiding any person to 
commit the offence … 
In New Zealand, intention is the mens rea standard that has been read into the 
accomplice liability provisions provided in Section 66(1)(b)-(d) of the Crimes 
Act 1961. 1107   The accomplice must intend to participate in the crime 
perpetrated by the principal. 1108   Hence, as Andrew Simester and Warren 
Brookbanks in their summation of the mental element for accomplice liability 
show, purpose is synonymous with intention.  Simester and Brookbanks 
summarise the mens rea requisite as follows: 
(i) S must intend his own contribution (i.e. to aid, abet, incite, counsel, or 
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procure P); and  
(ii) S must know the nature of P‘s actions. That is, S must know the 
‗essential matters‘ relating to P‘s actions which make those actions an 
offence.1109 
iv. What should be the correct interpretation of the mens rea purpose test 
provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute? 
It appears from the previous discussion that there are competing views 
regarding the formulation of the mens rea purpose test for aiding and abetting 
the commission of crimes.  Academics and international criminal law 
practitioners have posed different interpretations with respect to meaning of 
the purpose proviso provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  
Differing interpretations are also found in domestic jurisdictions that adopt a 
similar approach with respect to the mens rea purpose test for the aiding and 
abetting modality. 
The writer supports the view that the term ‗purpose‘ should really be 
interpreted by its ordinary meaning.  In the broad sense of the term, purpose 
ordinarily refers to the reason for doing the act.  However, taking this strict 
approach to the ICC Rome Statute aiding and abetting provisions poses a 
number of difficulties.   For example, MNCs may be engaged in their normal 
course of business but, in doing so, happen to aid crimes while carrying out 
their business activities.  This is typically the case with MNCs that are accused 
of complicity in the commission of crimes. 1110   For another example, 
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corporations may aid principal perpetrators in the commission of crimes, but 
do so only for the purpose of making profit.  This too is typical of MNCs 
operating in the extractive industries.  It stands to reason that corporate 
offenders in the scenarios provided would fall outside the scope of Article 
25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute if the purpose proviso were read strictly.  
These difficulties will arise depending on how the ICC interprets the existing 
purpose mens rea test provided in Article 25(3)(c).  This will be the case if 
Pre-Trial Chamber‘s comments in The Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana 
are indicative of the Court‘s position on this.1111  A strict reading of the aiding 
and abetting provision poses a major barrier to the prosecution of the 
corporate entities.  Therefore, it is for this reason that Article 25(3)(c) should 
be amended in order to accommodate the characteristic forms of corporate 
involvement in international crimes.  This thesis proposes the removal of the 
purpose provision from Article 25(3)(c) to overcome this barrier. 
The discussion in Chapter 7, which deals with draft legislation, shows that by 
removing the purpose provision, the ICC Rome Statute provisions on aiding 
and abetting would be brought in line with customary international law.1112  
Also, the purpose provision creates a test that imposes a subjective threshold 
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that far outweighs the ordinary mens rea provided in Article 30 of the ICC 
Rome Statute.1113  Removal of the purpose provision would mean that Article 
30 of the ICC Rome Statute would apply instead.1114  In essence, the revised 
provisions would catch complicit perpetrators that either knowingly or 
intentionally aid or abet the commission of crimes. 
6.4 Complicity by contributing to a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose 
Some academics and international criminal law practitioners argue that complicity by 
contributing to a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose is the 
preferred mode of participation in crimes to address businesses that are complicit in 
international crimes.1115  In this chapter, the writer discusses customary international law 
and the provisions of the ICC Rome Statute relating to this mode of participation in 
crimes.  The writer is of the view that it seems doubtful this approach would succeed. 
The challenges that lie with applying this modality to MNCs are discussed further below.  
6.4.1 Overview of customary international law dealing with this mode of participation 
The ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and the ECCC legal instruments do not expressly 
provide for joint criminal enterprise or common purpose liability in international 
crimes.1116  However, this mode of criminal liability has been developed extensively in 
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the jurisprudence emerging from these ad hoc international tribunals and special 
courts.1117  
Three variations of joint criminal enterprise have been identified.1118  The leading case 
discussing JCE from the ICTY Tribunal is the Tadić Appeal Judgment.  According to the 
Tadić Appeal Chamber, the first variation, JCE 1, is a ‗basic‘ form of liability in which 
the co-perpetrators of a common purpose possess the same criminal intention.1119  JCE 2, 
the ‗systemic‘ form, involves a common system of ill-treatment that the Appeal 
Chamber likens to the concentration camp cases. 1120   JCE 3, the ‗extended‘ form, 
comprises acts that arise as a natural and foreseeable consequence outside the common 
plan of criminal activity.1121  
The Tadić Appeal Chamber further found that all 3 JCE variations share the same 
elements of crime required to establish JCE.1122  These entail: 
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a) Plurality of persons;1123 
b) Existence of a common purpose amounting to or involving the commission of a 
crime;1124 and  
c) Contribution to a common plan by the accused in violation of a crime prohibited in 
the Statute.1125  
It is the mens rea elements for the three JCE variations that differ.  JCE 1 requires intent 
to perpetrate the crimes.1126  JCE 2 requires knowledge of the ill-treatment system in 
place as well as intent to further that system of ill-treatment.1127  JCE 3 requires intention 
to participate or further the criminal activity.  In addition, JCE 3 requires that the:  
… responsibility for a crime other than the one agreed upon in the common plan 
arises only if, under the circumstances of the case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a 
crime might be perpetrated by one or other members of the group and (ii) the 
accused willingly took that risk.1128 
The three JCE variations discussed in the Tadić Appeal Judgment have subsequently 
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been affirmed in a number of cases brought before the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and 
the ECCC.1129  
In contrast, the ICC Rome Statute expressly deals with common purpose liability.  
Common purpose is also referred to as common design or joint enterprise.1130  The ICC 
Rome Statute distinguishes between the actions of the principal perpetrators and their 
accessories.1131  Principal perpetrators are dealt with pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the 
ICC Rome Statute.1132  The accessory‘s liability is dealt with in Article 25(3)(d),1133 which 
refers to this mode of liability as contributing to a crime by a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose.  The provision states that a person is criminally responsible 
when that person:  
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of 
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such 
contribution shall be intentional and shall either: 
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(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the 
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the 
crime. 
The drafting of Article 25(3)(d) was somewhat controversial.  At that time, a number of 
the Rome Conference delegates relied upon the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy 
that had been applied during the IMT trials.  The notion of conspiracy had not only been 
problematic among civil law delegates at Nuremberg, but it was equally as controversial 
during the Rome Statute negotiations.1134  The notion of conspiracy largely influenced the 
ILC‘s 1996 Draft Code, which is partly reflected in Article 25(3)(d).1135  The Statute 
provision does not expressly use the term ‗conspiracy‘; however, it was adopted in 
earlier drafts.1136  Article 25(3)(d) makes use of the phrase ‗common purpose‘, and the 
text was adopted from the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings.1137   
The final text of Article 25(3)(d) is riddled with complexities.  The provision is difficult 
to interpret.1138  This has been attributed by some to the outcome of the drafting process, 
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which was seen as ‗more compromise than craftsmanship.‘1139  At most, Article 25(3)(d) 
creates liability that is comparable to the ad hoc tribunals JCE 1 variation and perhaps, in 
part, JCE 2. 1140   Article 25(3)(d) appears to overlook the third variation of JCE 
recognised under customary international law.  The chapeau to Article 25(3)(d) poses 
another difficulty.  It adopts the phrase ‗in any other way contributes to the commission 
or attempted commission of such crime.‘  This phraseology seems to establish a low 
level of participation.1141  In doing so, ‗the requirement of a group with a purpose that is 
at least known to the defendant limits the ambit of liability.‘1142  The manner in which the 
common purpose liability provision is interpreted is another cause for concern as it may 
depend on how the indefinite and definite articles will be interpreted.1143  These appear in 
Article 25(3)(d)(i)1144 and Article 25(3)(d)(ii)1145 of the ICC Rome Statute, respectively.  
With respect to this modality, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, observed that in order to 
find a contribution to the commission of a crime pursuant to Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC 
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Rome Statute, there must be a ‗significant contribution‘ on the part of the accomplice.1146  
As for what amounts to significant contribution, this would be determined on a case-by-
case basis.1147   
In reality, the ICC have tended to rely upon the provisions of Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC 
Rome Statute as opposed to Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Rome Statute to establish a 
theory of co-perpetration.1148  With respect to how Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Rome 
Statute will operate at the ICC, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has indicated that provision 
will serve as a residual form of accessory liability.1149  The Chamber attributes this to the 
chapeau that is provided in Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Rome Statute which adopts the 
phraseology ‗in any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission 
of such crime.‘  According to the Chamber, this ‗makes it possible to criminalise those 
contributions to a crime which cannot be characterised as ordering, soliciting, inducing, 
aiding, abetting or assisting within the meaning of article 25(3)(b) or article 25(3)(c) of 
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the Statute …‘1150 
6.4.2 Mode of participation and its application to complicit multinational corporations 
Hans Vest is of the view that businesses are likely to be held liable pursuant to the 
second limb of Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Rome Statute, whereby ‗knowledge of the 
intention of the group to commit the crime‘ satisfies the mens rea requisite.1151  Vest 
makes the argument that this mode of participation may be relied upon as ‗a rescue 
clause‘ to overcome the difficulties posed by Article 25(3)(c).1152  However, this raises a 
few concerns.  Firstly, Article 25(3)(d) contains a provision that limits its application.  
The words, ‗in any other way contributes‘, which appear in the chapeau to Article 
25(3)(d) of the ICC Rome Statute seem to create a supplementary form of liability as 
opposed to a form of liability that could be applied as a way of getting around the 
difficulties of Article 25(3)(c).1153  Consequently, Article 25(3)(d) seems to deal with 
contributions that may be seen as far too remote (for example, assisting with the 
arrangements for group meetings)  to actually amount to assisting the commission of 
crime.1154  Secondly, the two limbs of Article 25(3)(d) of the ICC Rome Statute contain 
different standards of mens rea requisites which amount to having contributed to the 
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commission of a crime by a group of persons.1155  Pursuant to Article 25(3)(d)(i), the first 
limb, the aider of the crime is acting to further the group‘s criminal activities or criminal 
purposes.  This requires a specific intent on the aider‘s part to engage in activities that 
advance the group‘s criminal activities and ideological objectives.1156  With respect to 
business persons, it is unlikely they would aim to further, by their contributions, the core 
criminal activities and purposes of a group; though they may accept this as a 
consequence of attaining their business interests.1157  Pursuant to Article 25(3)(d)(ii), the 
second limb, this requires ‗knowledge of the intent of the group to commit – not a, but 
clearly – the crime‘1158 prohibited in the chapeau to Article 25(3)(d). This would mean 
that the aider needs to have specific knowledge about the crime intended by the group.1159  
Indeed, it is unlikely that a business aider, albeit a financier, supplier, or beneficiary of a 
core crime, would be a member of the criminal group or possess specific knowledge of 
the group‘s intention to commit the crime.1160  
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6.5 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter continued the discussion on how an organisation that is complicit in 
international crimes could be prosecuted. Specifically, the writer discussed 
organisational complicity doctrine.  The chapter provided a brief overview of the 
complicit modes of participation in international crimes, and examined several forms of 
corporate complicity in the commission of crimes.  In particular, the writer examined 
aiding and abetting as well as contributing to a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose.  Of these modes of participation, multinational corporations are most 
often accused of complicity by aiding and abetting. However, the current aiding and 
abetting provisions provided in the ICC Rome Statute pose a major barrier to the 
prosecution of corporate actors. 
The next chapter concludes the discussion on how an organisational entity could be 
prosecuted for the commission of international crimes by proposing draft legislation to 
amend the ICC Rome Statute. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Scope of Liability for Organisational Complicity:  
Draft Legislation 
„… the architecture and plumbing of the ICC is taking shape and becoming effective. 
However, the main structure has to be consistently and effectively maintained, 
supported and improved. That will require political will on the part of the major 
nations that support the Court.‟1161 
7.1 Chapter introduction 
The previous chapter discussed organisational complicity doctrine.  In this chapter, the 
writer concludes the discussion on how an organisation that is complicit in international 
crimes could be prosecuted.  This thesis recommends that the ICC is the preferred forum 
to deal with complicit organisational liability where domestic jurisdictions are unwilling 
or unable to address the research problem.  Hence, this thesis recommends that the ICC 
State Parties should revisit the ICC Rome Statute in order to amend its provisions to 
include jurisdiction over complicit legal persons, and the writer provides draft legislation 
to address this issue.  Finally, this chapter also examines how the State Parties to the ICC 
Rome Statute could go about amending its provisions. 
The draft provisions generally discussed here would apply to accomplices. This is not to 
say principals would be excluded; aspects of these draft provisions would have a wider 
application and catch both modes of participation in international crimes. Furthermore, 
with respect to the mens rea requisite for complicit perpetration in the commission of 
international crimes, indeed there might be conflict where these draft provisions pose 
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challenges for some State Parties to the ICC Rome Statute. So be it. Those State Parties 
would need to revisit their legislation implementing the Rome statutory provisions and 
amend it accordingly.   
7.2 Draft legislation dealing with organisational liability 
7.2.1 Discussion on the proposed provision – Article 25B 
The organisational liability provisions proposed here could be included in the ICC Rome 
Statute as Article 25B.  These proposed provisions would only deal with perpetration, 
while the general provisions on complicity (discussed further below) would apply to 
those legal persons accused of complicity in international crimes. 
There are a number of factors that should be considered regarding the drafting of the 
proposed Article 25B provision.  These are discussed here: 
Jurisdiction of the Court 
At present, Article 25 of the ICC Rome Statute deals solely with individual criminal 
responsibility.  The Court‘s limited jurisdiction poses a major barrier to the prosecution 
of organisational entities.  This is a major concern, especially when allegations of 
corporate complicity in international crimes are increasing.  For this reason, the writer 
proposes draft legislation (Article 25B) to enable the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over 
legal persons. 
Prohibition, punishment, and penalties 
The writer proposes that, in Article 25B, a legal person who commits a crime within the 
jurisdiction of this Court shall be responsible and liable for punishment in accordance 
with Article 77B of this Statute.  Similar wording prohibiting the commission of crimes 
by legal or juristic persons is expressed in Article 23(6) of the Preparatory Commission‘s 
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1998 Draft Statute 1162  and Article 23(6) of the French Delegation‘s draft corporate 
liability provisions,1163 which were both presented at the Rome Conference. 
Regarding the commission of crimes, Article 5 of the ICC Rome Statute stipulates which 
crimes fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  Specifically, Article 5(1) prohibits the 
crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  These crimes are defined 
in Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the ICC Rome Statute, respectively.  Article 5(1) also prohibits 
the crime of aggression, which is yet to be defined by ICC State Parties.1164  In essence, 
the proposed provision for Article 25B would prohibit a multinational corporation and its 
related business enterprises from committing any crimes that fall within the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
Regarding the applicable punishments and penalties meted out against legal persons who 
commit crimes pursuant to Article 25B, the proposed provision would stipulate that 
Article 77B would apply.  Article 77B is an additional statutory provision which the 
writer adopts in this thesis.  The proposed provision is addressed later in this Chapter.  
Liability model applied 
Earlier in this thesis, the writer examined the competing models of corporate criminal 
                                                 
1162
 United Nations Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Report of 
the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, „Draft Statute for 
the International Criminal Court‟, Rome, Italy (15 June–17 July 1998) UN Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, 
14 April 1998. 
1163
 United Nations Working Group on General Principles of Criminal Law, Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Working Paper on Article 
23, Paragraphs 5 And 6: Draft Statute of an International Criminal Court (3 July 1998), UN Doc.  
A/Conf./183/WGGP/L.5/Rev.2. 
1164 Recently, participants at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute held in Kampala, Uganda in 
2010 engaged in deliberations over a definition for the crime of aggression. See generally, ICC, 
Assembly of State Parties, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, <http://www.icc-cpi.int>. 
 –  279  –  
liability that are applied in domestic jurisdictions.1165  Of these, the writer identified that 
the theory of non-derivative liability is the appropriate model to transplant 
internationally within the ICC Rome Statute.  Australia currently boasts the leading 
model for non-derivative liability.1166  As shown previously, the organisation is treated as 
a separate real entity in its own right with non-derivative liability.  Hence, the culpability 
of the organisation itself, as opposed to the culpability of its individuals, is of primary 
concern.  This is because non-derivative liability is established on the basis of ‗corporate 
policies, procedures, practices and attitudes; deficient chains of command and oversight; 
and corporate ―cultures‖ that tolerate or encourage criminal offences.‘1167   However, a 
major concern with the Australian non-derivative liability model is that it overlooks the 
distinctions between forms of subjective fault.  The result of this is that the model 
applies an equal scheme of liability to all offences.1168   The difficulty with this approach 
is that intention and knowledge are the only requisite subjective elements pursuant to 
Article 30(1) of the ICC Rome Statute.  Negligence and recklessness are not subjective 
fault elements required to establish individual criminal responsibility for crimes that fall 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  Therefore, an ideal non-derivative liability model to 
transplant internationally within the ICC Rome Statute is one which best reflects 
corporate intention and corporate knowledge.1169  As the discussion earlier in this thesis 
has shown, corporate policy to commit an offence intentionally (i.e. purposefully) may 
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be considered where there are specific instructions issued to personnel to commit an 
offence; though, this is likely to be rare.  Corporate policy may also be shown where it 
provides the most rational explanation for the corporation‘s actions.  However, with 
respect to corporate complicity in international crimes, the mens rea form that is more 
likely to be in issue will be knowledge, not purpose.  On this, the notion of collective 
knowledge could be invoked; this includes knowledge divided among corporate 
personnel.  This could be surmised as follows: 
 (1) (a)  Corporate intention to commit an offence may be established by proof that 
it was the policy of the corporation to commit the offence. 
 (b)  A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most 
reasonable explanation of the conduct of that corporation. 
 (2) (a)  Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may be established 
by proof that the relevant knowledge was possessed within the corporation 
and that the culture of the corporation caused or encouraged the 
commission of the offence. 
 (b)  Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even though the 
relevant information is divided between corporate personnel.1170 
Legal persons defined 
The writer provides a definition of a legal person in Article 25B.  The definition is 
somewhat specific simply because this thesis has been concerned with the liability of 
multinational corporations in particular.  This is not to say that the proposed provisions 
should not apply to other legal persons.  Hence, a definition of a legal person proposed in 
Article 25B is: ‗For the purpose of this Statute, a legal person shall include, but not be 
limited to, a publicly or privately owned multinational corporation and its related 
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business enterprises whether incorporated or not.‘  This is a practical approach given that 
MNCs that operate in the extractive industries largely do so through a number of 
business forms, such as joint ventures, partnerships and no-liability companies.  The 
Court will find ‗piercing the veil‘, a basic tenet of company law, an indispensible tool in 
dealing with the doctrine of limited liability when faced with MNCs trying to escape 
liability by hiding behind complex organisational structures and superficial business 
forms. 
Liability of natural persons not excluded 
The writer proposes that Article 25B should stipulate that the criminal liability of natural 
persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the same crimes should not be excluded.  
Similar wording dealing with the liability of natural persons is expressed in Article 23(5) 
of the Preparatory Commission‘s 1998 Draft Statute,1171 and Article 23(5) of the French 
Delegation‘s draft corporate liability provisions.1172 
The term ‗natural persons‘ could generally include corporate actors such as: members of 
the board of directors, managers, employees, and agents of multinational businesses or 
other related business associates.  It stands to reason that natural persons who aid and 
abet crimes should be dealt with pursuant to the existing provisions provided in Article 
25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  However, the current mens rea purpose test provided 
in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute poses a major barrier to prosecuting 
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individual corporate actors (as well as corporate entities).  Hence, the purpose test should 
be removed to overcome this difficulty.  The proposed amendments to Article 25(3)(c) 
of the ICC Rome Statute are dealt with further below.  
Joint or separate trials 
The writer also recommends that the legal person and the natural person may be charged 
and tried jointly or separately.  Similar wording on joint or separate trials is expressed in 
Article 23(6) of the French Delegation‘s draft corporate liability provisions.1173 
This is a practical approach.  A joint trial of a corporate offender and its corporate actors 
would be cost effective and timely; especially if the charges relate to the same offence 
and the Court is dealing with the same evidence.  Alternatively, the Court could order 
separate trials in the interests of justice if a joint trial would be prejudicial to the 
accused,1174 whether the legal or natural person. 
7.2.2 Proposed provisions for organisational liability 
Taking all the factors that have been discussed here into consideration, this thesis 
proposes the following provision for inclusion in the ICC Rome Statute:  
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Article 25B 
Organisational liability 
 (a) (i)  Corporate intention to commit an offence may be established by 
proof that it was the policy of the corporation to commit the 
offence. 
(ii)  A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the 
most reasonable explanation of the conduct of that corporation. 
 (b) (i)  Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may be 
established by proof that the relevant knowledge was possessed 
within the corporation and that the culture of the corporation 
caused or encouraged the commission of the offence. 
(ii)  Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even though 
the relevant information is divided between corporate personnel. 
 
7.3 Draft legislation dealing with complicity by aiding and abetting crimes 
7.3.1 Discussion on the proposed amendments to Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome 
Statute 
The writer in this thesis proposes the removal of the mens rea purpose test provided in 
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons pursuant to this Statute. 
2. A legal person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of this Court shall be 
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with Article 77B of this 
Statute. 
3. Where the requisite subjective element for the commission of a crime is intention 
or knowledge: 
4. For the purpose of this Statute, a legal person shall include, but not be limited to, 
a publicly or privately owned multinational corporation and its related business 
enterprises whether incorporated or not.  
5. The criminal responsibility of a legal person shall not exclude the criminal 
responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in the same 
crimes. 
6. The legal person and the natural person may be charged and tried jointly or 
separately.   
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Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  This approach would accommodate the 
characteristic forms of corporate involvement in international crimes. 
There are a number of factors to consider regarding the proposed amendments to Article 
25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  These are discussed here. 
The effect of removing the purpose test means that, unless otherwise provided, the 
subjective element stipulated in Article 30 of the ICC Rome Statute would apply.  Article 
30 codifies the subjective element required to establish individual criminal responsibility 
for crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.1175  According to Article 30(1), 
intent and knowledge are the subjective elements by which a person shall be criminally 
responsible and liable for punishment of a crime.1176 
Article 30(1) adopts the conjunctive use of the term ‗and‘ – that is, the provision 
prohibits the commission of crimes perpetrated with intent and knowledge (these 
subjective terms are defined below).  Read strictly, the assumption could be made that 
the statutory provision requires both intent and knowledge to satisfy the subjective 
element.  However, a strict reading of the provision raises some concerns. 1177   For 
instance, what would become of a complicit perpetrator who knowingly aided and 
abetted crimes but did not intend the consequences, i.e., purposefully?  Assuming that 
the ICC Rome Statute provision were read strictly, that complicit perpetrator would fall 
outside the statutory provision because both subjective elements, that is, intent and 
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knowledge, were not present.  One could argue that such concerns may be overcome by 
relying upon Paragraph 2 of the General Introduction to the Elements of the Crimes.  
This provision provides some insight into what the drafters of the ICC Rome Statute had 
in mind.  Paragraph 2 takes a broad approach; it provides for intent, knowledge, or both.  
According to the provision:  
Where no reference is made in the Elements of Crimes to a mental element for any 
particular conduct, consequence or circumstance listed, it is understood that the 
relevant mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge or both, set out in article 30 
applies.1178 
Therefore, it would appear upon reading Paragraph 2 that the intention of those who 
drafted the Rome Statute provisions was to deal with these subjective mental elements 
disjunctively rather than conjunctively.  Moreover, Antonio Cassese argues that the term 
‗and‘ could be construed as including the word ‗or‘.1179  Cassese attributes this to the 
international law principle of effectiveness, ut res magis valeat quam pereat, whereby 
the grammatical interpretation gives way to effective interpretation.1180  Hence, Cassese 
rationalises that the subjective elements of Article 30 of the ICC Rome Statute should be 
read as intention or knowledge, or even both. 
These mens rea standards, intent and knowledge, are defined in Article 30 of the ICC 
Rome Statute.  Specifically, Article 30(2) defines the term ‗intent‘ as:  
a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is 
aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
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This means that pursuant to Article 30(2)(a) of the ICC Rome Statute, the mens rea 
standard for accused persons who aid and abet crimes is that they must mean to engage 
in such conduct.  The accused person must mean to provide the principal perpetrator 
with, for example, transportation for the commission of the crime.  Additionally, 
pursuant to Article 30(2)(b), the accused person must mean to cause that consequence, or 
be aware that it would occur in the ordinary course of events.  So, an accused person 
who provides transportation in order to cause the perpetration of the crime, or is aware 
that the crime will be perpetrated in the ordinary course of events as a result of the 
provision of such transportation, will be liable.  
Article 30(3) of the ICC Rome Statute defines the term ‗knowledge‘ as: ‗awareness that a 
circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.‘1181  
This means that pursuant to Article 30(3), the mens rea standard for accused persons 
who aid and abet crimes is that they must be aware that a circumstance exists, or a 
consequence will occur, in the ordinary course of events.  So, an accused person who 
knowingly provides a principal perpetrator with transportation that enables the 
perpetrator to commit crimes, or knowing the consequence of such will occur, will be 
liable.  
It would appear that Article 30(3) requires a lower fault element than that prescribed in 
Article 30(2).  The former requires an awareness that a circumstance exists, or its 
consequence; whereas the latter requires not only the intent to engage in such conduct, 
but also intent to cause the consequence, or awareness that the consequence will occur. 
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Additionally, Paragraph 3 of the General Introduction to the Elements of the Crimes 
provides that ‗existence of intent and knowledge can be inferred from the relevant facts 
and circumstances.‘1182    
Proving what the aider and abettor knew about the criminal activities of the principal 
perpetrator may not be so easy.1183  With respect to this, the International Commission of 
Jurists proposes that evidence relating to the relevant state of mind (of the corporate 
actors) may be shown by the following: 
 Information readily available to the company representative at the time the 
company provided assistance. 
 Specific information provided to company officials to the effect that the 
company‘s products or services were being used to commit crimes, could be 
relevant. 
 There could be widespread knowledge that crimes are being committed using a 
company‘s goods or services, which could also be relevant to the question of 
whether company officials knew their acts were facilitating crimes. 
 The context of the business transaction would also be relevant. 
 The past behaviour of the principal perpetrator, and the duration and nature of 
the business relationship between the principal perpetrator and the company 
official may also be relevant.  
 Knowledge can also be imputed from the position and experience of the 
accomplice in the company.1184 
7.3.2 Proposed provisions for complicity by aiding and abetting 
Having taken all these factors into account, this thesis proposes the following 
amendments to Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute:  
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3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
(c)  For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or 
otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including 
providing the means for its commission. 
Therefore, the reworded provision would read: 
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
(c)  Aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission. 
7.4 Draft legislation dealing with punishments and penalties for legal persons 
7.4.1 Discussion of the proposed provision – Article 77B 
The writer proposes the inclusion of an Article 77B in the ICC Rome Statute.  The 
proposed provision would stipulate the appropriate punishments and penalties meted out 
on legal persons, and extend the scope of the existing provision provided in Article 77, 
which deals with the applicable penalties meted out on natural persons.  
Most domestic jurisdictions have corporate punishments and penalties in place.  These 
criminal sanctions include measures such as: fines; imprisonment of senior management 
or members of the board of directors; corporate probation; and, corporate capital 
punishment.1185  In more recent years, there have been additional measures adopted in 
domestic jurisdictions to penalise corporations, such as: instructing a convicted 
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 See generally, Allens Arthur Robinson, Brief on Corporations and Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific 
Region (2006); Lex Mundi Business Crimes and Compliance Practice Group, Business Crimes and 
Compliance Criminal Liability of Companies Survey (2008); Anita Ramasastry and Robert C 
Thompson (eds), Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for 
Grave Breaches of International Law – A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions (FAFO, 2006); FAFO, 
Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of 
International Law (2004). 
 –  289  –  
corporation to substitute its directors, or change its senior management; execute 
corporate compliance plans; carry out community service; and, engagement of corporate 
monitors.1186 
The idea of corporate punishments is not a new concept in international criminal law.  
The Preparatory Commission, which was tasked with drafting a statute for the 
establishment of an international criminal court, actually considered corporate 
punishments. 1187   Its 1998 Draft Statute included proposals for penalties that were 
applicable to legal persons, and reflected the corporate punishments already meted out in 
most domestic jurisdictions today.  Article 76 of the 1998 Draft Statute states: 
A legal person shall incur one or more of the following penalties: 
(i)  fines; 
[(ii)  dissolution;] 
[(iii) prohibition, for such period as determined by the Court, of the 
exercise of activities of any kind;] 
[(iv)  closure, for such a period as determined by the Court, of the 
premises used in the commission of the crime;] 
[(v)  forfeiture of [instrumentalities of crime and] proceeds, property and 
assets obtained by criminal conduct;] [and] 
[(vi)  appropriate forms of reparation.] 
N.B. Subparagraph (vi) should be examined in the context of 
reparation to victims.
1188
  
It appears that the Rome Conference delegates were unable to reach an agreement 
concerning the provisions in Article 76, and this dissention is evidenced by the words in 
                                                 
1186
 See generally, Pamela H Bucy, ‗Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?‘ (Fall, 
2007) 44 American Criminal Law Review 1437, 1439. 
1187
 United Nations Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Report of 
the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, „Draft Statute for 
the International Criminal Court‟, Rome, Italy (15 June–17 July 1998) UN Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1, 
14 April 1998. 
1188
 Bold emphasis and brackets appear in the original text. 
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brackets.1189  Interestingly, the only penalty that seems to have won accord was fines.  
Regarding the enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures, Article 99 of the 
Preparatory Commission‘s 1998 Draft Statute addressed this issue.  Articles 99(1) and (2) 
state: 
1.  States Parties shall [, in accordance with their national law,] enforce fines and 
forfeiture measures [and measures relating to compensation or [restitution] 
[reparation]] as fines and forfeiture measures [and measures relating to 
compensation or [restitution] [reparation]] rendered by their national 
authorities. 
[For the purpose of enforcement of fines, the [Court] [Presidency] may order 
the forced sale of any property of the person sentenced which is on the 
territory of a State Party. For the same purposes, the [Court] [Presidency] may 
order the forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets and instrumentalities of 
crimes belonging to the person sentenced.] 
[Decisions by the Presidency are implemented by States Parties in conformity 
with their domestic laws. 
[The provisions of this article shall apply to legal persons.]] 
2.  Property, including the proceeds of the sale thereof, which is obtained by a 
State Party as a result of its enforcement of a judgement of the Court shall be 
handed over to the [Court] [Presidency] [which will dispose of that property in 
accordance with the provisions of article 79 [paragraph 5 of article 54].] 
The kinds of enforcement measures proposed in the 1998 Draft Statute are largely 
reflected today in the existing ICC Rome Statute provisions,1190 as well as the ICC Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.1191  Suffice to say that the provisions dealing with these 
                                                 
1189
 The Preparatory Committee was also unable to agree upon a number of provisions in the Draft Statute. 
For example, Article 23(7)(d), again evidenced by the words in brackets. See generally, Doug Cassel, 
‗Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts‘ (Spring 2008) 
6(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 304, 310. 
1190
 See, Part X of the ICC Rome Statute, which deals with Enforcement. 
1191
 See, Section IV of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence which deals with Enforcement of Fines, 
Forfeiture Measures and Reparation Orders; International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Doc No ICC-ASP/1/3 (adopted 9 September 2002). 
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enforcement measures are applicable to what the ICC Rome Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence commonly refer to as the ‗sentenced person‘.  If the ICC were 
to exercise jurisdiction over legal persons, then the provisions dealing with these 
enforcement measures would also apply to MNCs.  With regards to prison sentences, the 
ICC could follow the lead of domestic jurisdictions where a legal person is fined for an 
offence that only specifies a term of imprisonment.1192 
7.4.2 Proposed provisions for punishments and penalties 
Bearing all the factors discussed here in mind, this thesis adopts Article 76 of the 
Preparatory Commission‟s 1998 Draft Statute.  The provision is amended in the 
following manner: 
Article 77B 
Punishments and penalties 
A legal person shall incur one or more of the following penalties: 
(i)  Fines; 
(ii)  Dissolution; 
(iii) Prohibition, for such period as determined by the Court, of the 
exercise of activities of any kind; 
(iv)  Closure, for such a period as determined by the Court, of the 
premises used in the commission of the crime; 
(v)  Forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime and proceeds, property 
and assets obtained by criminal conduct; and 
                                                 
1192
 As stated previously, for example, Section 12.1 of the Australian Criminal Code (Cth) stipulates that a 
body corporate may be found guilty of any offence including those that impose a term of 
imprisonment and notes that there are legislative provisions where a fine may be imposed for an 
offence that only specifies a term of imprisonment. Specifically, Section 4B(3) of the Crimes Act 
1914. Pursuant to this provision, a single year of imprisonment would amount to the equivalent of a 
$33,000 fine for a corporate entity based on the pecuniary penalty unit system adopted in the Act. For 
commentary see, John Thornton, First Deputy Director, Office of Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Australia, ‗Criminal Liability of Organisations‘ (Paper presented at the 22nd 
International Conference of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal Law held in Dublin, 
Ireland from 11 July–15 July 2008) 7. 
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(vi)  Appropriate forms of reparation examined in the context of 
reparation to victims. 
7.5 Amending the ICC Rome Statute provisions 
State Parties to the ICC Rome Statute are well positioned to revisit the international 
treaty and negotiate amendments to its provisions.  The ICC Rome Statute may be 
amended in the future to allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction over legal persons that 
are complicit in international crimes. 
Article 123 of the ICC Rome Statute contains enabling provisions that set out the 
procedure to be followed by any State Parties considering amending the ICC Rome 
Statute.  The Statute provides that at the initial stage, a Review Conference would be 
convened to consider proposed amendments to it.  Pursuant to Article 123(1), a Review 
Conference could only take place seven years after the Statute had entered into force.  
The first of such review conferences was held in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010.1193  Prior to 
the 2010 Review Conference, academics had speculated that the Assembly of State 
Parties would discuss the inclusion of corporate offenders in the Rome Statutory 
provisions, as well as the expansion of the Court‘s inherent jurisdiction over core crimes 
at the Review Conference.1194  Regrettably, the 2010 Review Conference did not consider 
                                                 
1193
 See generally, ICC, Assembly of State Parties, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int>.  
1194
 See discussions by The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 
International Criminal Court: Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute, 
(3
rd
 ed, March 2008), 110 <http://www.iccnow.org>; Astrid Reisinger Coracini, ‗―Amended Most 
Serious Crimes‖: A New Category of Core Crimes within the Jurisdiction but Out of the Reach of the 
International Criminal Court‘ (2008) 21(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 699, 709–710; also, 
James Podgers, ‗Corporations in the Line of Fire‘ (January 2004) American Bar Association Journal 
13; see also, John Ruggie, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development: Clarifying the Concepts of „Sphere of 
Influence‟ and „Complicity‟, UNSRSG Report, UN DOC: A/HRC/8/16 (15 May 2008) 10.  
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corporate crime; however, the issue could still be raised in the near future.1195 
Article 121 of the ICC Rome Statute provides further clarification on the procedure that 
should be followed by any State Party that desires to amend it.  Specifically, Article 
121(1) states that seven years after the Statute enters into force, a State Party need only 
submit the text of any proposed amendments to the Rome Statute to the UN Secretary-
General. The Secretary-General is then required to promptly distribute the proposed 
amendments to State Parties.  Article 121(2) stipulates that the Assembly of State Parties 
may either vote at an Assembly meeting, or convene a Review Conference to determine 
whether or not to take up the proposed amendments.  Furthermore, Article 121(3)–(7) 
provides details on the voting procedures for any proposed amendments and the entry 
into force regarding such amendments.1196 
On the whole, complaints about the complicity of multinational corporations in human 
                                                 
1195
 According to Article 123(2) of the ICC Rome Statute Review Conferences may be held in the future at 
any time after the first one, effectively removing the seven year waiting period from future 
conferences. 
1196
 Specifically, Article 121(3)–(7) of the ICC Rome Statute states:  
(3)  The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review 
Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority of 
States Parties. 
(4) Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties 
one year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them. 
(5)  Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States 
Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, 
the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when 
committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory. 
(6)  If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths of States Parties in accordance with 
paragraph 4, any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this 
Statute with immediate effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 
127, paragraph 2, by giving notice no later than one year after the entry into force of such 
amendment. 
(7)  The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to all States Parties any 
amendment adopted at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference. 
 –  294  –  
rights violations are increasing.  In theory, it seems inevitable that the ICC Rome Statute 
will need to be revisited to deal with this impunity gap.  
7.6 Chapter conclusion 
To reiterate briefly, this chapter concluded the discussion on how an organisation that is 
complicit in international crimes could be prosecuted.  The writer in this thesis 
recommended draft legislation to amend the ICC Rome Statute provisions in order for 
the Court to exercise jurisdiction over complicit legal persons. 
In the next Chapter, the writer provides the thesis conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Thesis Conclusion 
„Businesses have a legal responsibility and a moral responsibility, but if you 
want to cut to the chase, it‟s good for the bottom line, … where human rights 
are respected and defended, businesses flourish. Having two-thirds of the 
world‟s population living in poverty is not good for business. That‟s a huge 
market of potential customers, staff, shareholders and investors.‟1197 
8.1 Chapter introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the need for a doctrine of corporate liability in 
international criminal law that could serve as a response to misconduct by multinational 
corporations in Africa.  The thesis also investigated the jurisdictional forums that would 
be appropriate for the prosecution of MNCs for conduct occurring in Africa.  
Additionally, this thesis set out to examine the forms of corporate liability and 
complicity that may be suitable, particularly with respect to the operations of MNCs.  
Finally, the thesis discussed the amendments that may be needed to the ICC Rome 
Statute to accommodate the characteristic forms of corporate involvement in 
international crimes.  
8.2 Thesis summary of chapters 
8.2.1 Criminal liability for business complicity in international crimes 
Chapter 2 examined the issue of whether there should be criminal liability for business 
complicity in international crimes.   
                                                 
1197
 Interview: Claire Mallinson, Director, Amnesty International Australia, in Agnes King, ‗Put People 
First‘ (August 20–26, 2009) Business Review Weekly, 46. 
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The writer discussed what it meant to allege business complicity in international crimes.  
The international community is dealing with powerful economic multinational 
businesses operating in environments where they face various socio-legal challenges.  
These businesses have, at times, carried out activities that have inflicted harm upon 
communities within which they operate.  In more recent years, there has been a global 
push to hold such businesses criminally liable, particularly with respect to those aiding 
and abetting international crimes.   
The writer examined what is currently being done to regulate the business activities of 
multinational businesses.  The writer examined regulatory initiatives initiated by multi-
stakeholders in the international community.  These included: the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises; the Equator Principles; the UN Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with regard to Human 
Rights; the UN Global Compact; the EITI Principles; the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights; and, the Kimberley Process.   
Finally, the writer discussed whether the current regulatory approach was sufficient.  In 
assessing these initiatives, it became apparent that there was a need for tougher measures 
to regulate the activities of multinational businesses.  There are a number of limitations 
to the regulatory initiatives introduced and relied upon by the international community.  
Of particular concern is the fact that these initiatives are soft law; they do not place any 
enforceable legal obligations directly on the MNCs.  The effectiveness of these 
initiatives is further prejudiced by the fact that they are voluntary.  This has created a 
need for a doctrine of corporate liability in international criminal law whose sole aim 
would be to address the criminal liability of MNCs found to be complicit in international 
crimes.   
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8.2.2 Rationale for corporate criminal liability 
Chapter 3 discussed the rationale for corporate criminal liability, and why criminal 
liability should extend to the corporate entity and not be confined to the corporate 
personnel of business enterprises.  
Critics of corporate criminal liability have tended to query what the point of such a move 
would be.  On this issue, the writer identified a number of reasons why liability should 
extend to the corporate entity and not be limited to its personnel.  Imposing liability on 
MNCs would serve as an explicit prohibition against corporate wrongdoing.  This would 
also serve to deter corporations from engaging in criminal activities.  In addition, 
imposing liability would allow for the imposition of sanctions against corporate assets; 
thus, allowing for a means to provide redress for victims.  Finally, extending liability to 
the corporate entity would be beneficial where culpable individuals are not easily 
identifiable.    
The writer also discussed some of the practical difficulties that stem from the corporate 
structure of MNCs.  The writer identified characteristic features of multinational 
corporations that pose challenges with respect to imposing liability on corporate 
individuals as well as culpable enterprises within the same corporate group.  The writer 
examined the challenges posed by the cross-border activities of multinational businesses.  
By definition, these businesses typically operate in more than one State.  MNCs exercise 
tremendous economic influence by operating globally through various business forms, 
such as joint ventures, partnerships, and no-liability companies.  MNCs and their 
business enterprises also tend to adopt complex organisational structures and internal 
control systems which make it difficult to identify ultimate decision-makers or the real 
controllers of subsidiaries and their personnel.  
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The writer examined the issue of whether it was unfair to impose criminal liability 
through acts such as sanctions on corporate assets.   Critics of corporate criminal liability 
have tended to argue that the shareholder‘s role in the business enterprise is a passive 
one; therefore, liability punishes blameless shareholders.  However, such criticism 
overlooks the critical role that shareholders can, and should, play in actually monitoring 
the activities of the corporate entities that they choose to invest in.  Also, it overlooks the 
benefits enjoyed by shareholders and ignores the fact that if they profit from successful 
corporate activities, it is only reasonable that they bear some of the costs resulting from 
corporate wrongdoing. 
In Chapter 3, the writer also examined fundamental objections to corporate criminal 
responsibility arising from the nature of criminal law.  The issue of corporate criminal 
responsibility has been controversial.  Critics of corporate criminal responsibility argue 
that corporate entities are incapable of possessing the requisite mens rea, and 
consequently are legal fictions, which cannot be punished per se.  With respect to these 
objections, the writer discussed models of corporate liability that have been adopted in 
most domestic law.  These address the issue of how corporate entities can possess the 
requisite mens rea; they include: derivative and non-derivative liability.  Also, 
corporations are not legal fictions.  Of the competing theories of legal personality, the 
realist theory of legal personality advocates that corporations are, in fact, real entities 
that exist independently.  With regards to international legal personality, States and 
individuals are subject to international law.  However, there is still much debate as to 
whether this also extends to corporations, let alone multinational corporations.  Leading 
academics argue that this concept should be applied to MNCs because, as the discussion 
demonstrated, these already possess rights and duties under international law.  Finally, 
the writer examined how corporate entities could be punished.  This discussion showed 
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that domestic jurisdictions already apply a wide range of criminal sanctions, which 
address corporate misconduct.  Fines were the most common form of corporate 
punishment. 
8.2.3 Jurisdictional forums 
Chapter 4 examined a number of existing forums with jurisdiction over international 
criminal offences.  This included a discussion of domestic, regional, and international 
forums.  Of these forums, only domestic forums exercise jurisdiction over corporate 
complicit liability for the commission of international crimes.  
The writer identified that domestic forums generally had criminal and tort legislative 
provisions in place to deal with the problem of complicit organisational liability for 
international crimes.  The writer also examined some of the traditional principles of 
jurisdiction that trigger criminal liability for international crimes – namely: the territorial 
principle, the nationality principle, the protective principle, the passive personality 
principle, and the universality principle.  Generally, there is a prima facie argument that 
these traditional principles of jurisdiction could be applied with respect to the criminal 
activities of multinational corporations wherever they operate.  The writer discussed the 
many challenges with respect to the suitability of domestic forums, and concluded that 
where domestic jurisdictions prove inadequate, legal persons should be held criminally 
responsible for their complicit role in the commission of international crimes at an 
international forum such as the ICC.  
The discussion on regional forums examined the three regional courts: the African Court 
on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights.  However, the difficulty with these courts is that they 
only deal with cases brought against the State Parties of each of the respective Courts – 
 –  300  –  
thus, corporate criminal liability falls outside the scope of the Courts‘ jurisdiction.  
Furthermore, the regional courts are not empowered with the jurisdiction to prosecute 
complicit persons.   
The discussion on international forums included the ICC as well as the ICTR, the SCSL, 
the ICTY, the IHT, and the ECCC.  Apart from the ICC, the difficulty with these forums 
is that they are limited in their jurisdiction.  These ad hoc tribunals and special courts 
were created to deal with specific crimes committed during a specific time in a specific 
conflict that was perpetrated in a specific region. 
Finally, the writer identified that the ICC was the preferred forum for addressing the 
problem of complicit organisational liability.  The writer also noted that the competence 
of the Court was limited to natural persons.  The ICC Rome Statute provisions dealing 
with individual criminal responsibility would need to be amended for the Court to be 
able to exercise jurisdiction over organisational liability, and thereby address this 
impunity gap.  Also, the aiding and abetting provisions of the ICC Rome Statute would 
need to be amended to accommodate the characteristic forms of corporate involvement 
in international crimes. 
8.2.4 Organisational liability doctrine 
In Chapter 5, the writer examined the models of corporate liability that are applicable to 
the business operations of MNCs.  In doing so, the writer commenced the discussion on 
how organisational complicity in international crimes could be prosecuted by discussing 
organisational liability doctrine. 
The writer addressed the issue of attributing corporate criminal liability in domestic 
jurisdictions.  The thesis traced the historic origins of the corporation – the earliest 
registered company emerged in common law jurisdictions during the sixteenth century.  
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The manner in which companies emerged hugely impacted upon the development of 
company law, and in turn the way that the resulting law treated these companies.   
The writer provided a brief historical overview of the emerging nature of corporate 
criminal liability, before examining two competing theories of corporate liability models 
found within most domestic jurisdictions.  The derivative liability model is comprised of 
two approaches.  The first is ‗vicarious liability‘, where the corporation is liable for the 
actions of its individuals where those individual actions fall within the ambit of their 
employment or authority.  The culpability of an individual is then imputed to the 
corporation.  Vicarious liability is criticised for being too broad in its application.  A 
more practical approach to this theory was discussed in relation to the US Model Penal 
Code, which takes a more stringent approach.  With the second approach of derivative 
liability, ‗identification liability‘, only the culpability of specific individuals, those seen 
as the directing minds of the corporation, will be imputed to the corporation.  This theory 
is criticised for being too narrow in its application and out of touch with the emerging 
complex structures of modern corporations, which make it difficult to attribute 
responsibility to specific individuals.  A broader approach of this theory, which widens 
the pool of those seen as the directing minds of the corporation, has been identified in 
some jurisdictions and applied in statutory instruments.  In contrast, with the non-
derivative liability model, the body corporate is seen as a separate legal entity in its own 
right and the culpability of the corporate entity is of primary concern.  Under the 
Australian approach, this is established by the existence of a corporate culture that 
directed, encouraged, or tolerated the offence, or the failure to create a corporate culture 
of compliance that follows established laws.  A difficulty with the Australian approach 
to this model is that it overlooks the distinctions between forms of subjective fault and 
applies an equal scheme of liability to all offences.  Because knowledge and intention 
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are the only mens rea requisites considered before the ICC, an ideal non-derivative 
liability model to transplant internationally within the ICC would be one that reflects this.   
In Chapter 5, the writer also discussed opportunities that the international community 
has missed in developing a system for organisational liability.  The International Military 
Tribunals established in the aftermath of WWII laid the foundation for organisational 
liability, but the ad hoc international institutions that were created almost fifty years later 
did not build on this any further.  Neither were they adopted at the ICC Rome Statute 
deliberations, as the State Parties failed to agree on the inclusion of corporate criminal 
liability provisions. 
Finally, this thesis identified that the theory of non-derivative liability is the preferred 
model of corporate liability to transplant internationally; a model that is easily adoptable 
with the ICC Rome Statute.   
8.2.5 Organisational complicity doctrine 
The writer continued the discussion on how organisational complicity in international 
crimes could be prosecuted by discussing organisational complicity doctrine in Chapter 
6. 
Briefly, this thesis provided an overview of the complicit modes of participation in 
international crimes.  Specifically, the writer examined two modes of complicity in the 
commission of crimes in Chapter 6: aiding and abetting; and, contributing to a crime by 
a group of persons with a common purpose. 
Aiding and abetting is the mode of complicity most often alleged of multinational 
corporations.  This thesis traced the historical development of complicity by aiding and 
abetting in international criminal law.  Additionally, the writer analysed the specific 
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provisions on aiding and abetting pursuant to Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute.  
This mode of participation is distinguished in international criminal law by the mens rea 
standard applied by the international institutions.  The ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and 
the ECCC all apply a mens rea ‗knowledge‘ test, whereas the legal instruments of the 
ICC, the Panels of Judges, and the IHT apply a ‗purpose‘ test.  This thesis examined how 
academics and international criminal law practitioners have interpreted the purpose 
provision, and examined how this mens rea standard has been interpreted pursuant to 
customary international law, as well as domestic jurisdictions that adopt a similar test.  
There is no consensus as to what the ‗purpose‘ test entails.  However, the examination 
showed that purpose is either synonymous with intention or knowledge.  Jurisprudence 
emerging from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber seems to indicate that purpose is synonymous 
with intention; however these were remarks made in passing by the Chamber.  The 
‗purpose‘ test, as it appears in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Rome Statute, narrows the 
scope of the aiding and abetting provisions.  Hence, corporate actors would fall outside 
the purview of Article 25(3)(c) if the purpose provision were read strictly.  The writer is 
of the view that the provision should be removed so as to allow the ICC to address 
organisational complicit liability. 
This thesis also examined ‗complicity by contributing to a crime by a group of persons 
with a common purpose‘.  This mode of participation in the commission of crimes has 
developed differently through the decisions of ad hoc tribunals and special courts.  
Contributing to a crime by a group of persons, commonly referred to as ‗joint criminal 
enterprise‘ at the ad hoc institutions, is not expressly included in statutory instruments, 
but it has emerged from their jurisprudence.  In contrast, the ICC Rome Statute expressly 
deals with what it refers to as common purpose liability in Article 25(3)(d).  The Statute 
provisions on this mode of participation are complex and have been debated widely.  
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Although there are those who favour this mode over aiding and abetting, it seems 
doubtful that the common purpose liability approach would succeed with respect to the 
criminal liability of business complicity in international crimes – most MNCs are often 
accused of aiding and abetting crimes instead.  Also, multinational businesses are 
unlikely to be a member of the kind of criminal group prohibited under Article 25(3)(d) 
of the ICC Rome Statute, let alone possess specific knowledge of the group‘s intention to 
commit the crime pursuant to the provisions of Article 25(3)(d)(ii). 
8.2.6 Draft legislation 
Chapter 7 concluded the discussion on how an organisation complicit in international 
crimes could be prosecuted, and discussed the required amendments to the ICC Rome 
Statute that would be necessary to allow the Court to address organisational complicity.  
The writer proposed draft legislation that dealt with the liability of legal persons, 
amendments to the existing aiding and abetting provisions, as well as applicable criminal 
sanctions and penalties for legal persons. 
Regarding the proposed provisions, the thesis proposed that legal persons who commit 
criminal offences should be held liable to punishment pursuant to Article 25B.  The 
writer is of the view that non-derivative liability is the preferred model to transplant 
internationally within the ICC Rome Statute.  Hence, the provision in Article 25B treats 
the legal person as a separate entity in its own right.  The provision also provides that the 
criminal liability of natural persons who are accomplices in the same criminal offences 
should not be excluded.  
The thesis proposed amendments to the existing ICC Rome Statute provisions that deal 
with complicity for international crimes.  The ‗purpose‘ test currently provided in Article 
25(3)(c) poses a major barrier to the prosecution of MNCs that aid and abet the 
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commission of crimes.  The existing statutory provision does not take into account the 
characteristic forms of corporate involvement in international crimes. Removing the 
mens rea purpose test would mean that, unless otherwise provided, the subjective fault 
elements of Article 30 would apply – that is, intent and/or knowledge. 
This thesis discussed corporate punishments and penalties applied in most domestic 
jurisdictions, and criminal sanctions which were also considered during the 1998 Rome 
Conference deliberations.  The writer examined Article 76 of the Preparatory 
Commission‘s 1998 Draft Statute, which addressed this issue, and the provisions of 
which largely reflect a number of the measures already applied in domestic jurisdictions, 
such as corporate fines, forfeitures, and closures.  This thesis proposed inclusion of an 
Article 77B in the ICC Rome Statute to extend the existing Article 77 that currently deals 
with the applicable penalties for natural persons.  In essence, the proposed Article 77B 
adopts the wording stipulated in Article 76 of the 1998 Draft Statute provision. 
8.3 Thesis concluding remarks 
Multinational corporations need to seriously consider how to manage the risk of 
complicity in egregious human rights violations.1198  Any MNC working with State or 
non-State actors in either Extreme-Risk or High-Risk Countries should be mindful of 
this – especially since the risk of complicity with human rights abuses is prevalent in 
countries where good governance is most challenged.1199  Granted, international criminal 
law does not presently recognise the complicit liability of corporations or any other legal 
persons.  Nevertheless, there is still a real possibility that this may change given the 
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<http://www.hrw.org>.  
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 John G Ruggie, UNSRSG, ‗Next Steps in Business and Human Rights‘ (Speech delivered at the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 22 May 2008). 
 –  306  –  
growing number of allegations of grave human rights violations levelled against business 
enterprises operating in the extractive industries. 
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APPENDIX 1: MAP OF EXTREME- AND HIGH-RISK COUNTRIES IN AFRICA [2011–2012] 
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APPENDIX 2:  
EXAMPLES OF NATURAL RESOURCES FOUND IN 
EXTREME-RISK COUNTRIES IN AFRICA 
Adapted from: United Nations Environmental Programme <http:www.unep.org> and World Reach/ Exploring Africa, 
Agricultural and Mineral Resources: African Countries <http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu>. 
 
  
Extreme-Risk  
Country 
2009–2010 
 Natural Resource 
as of 2010 
 Extreme-Risk 
Country 
2009–2010  
 Natural Resource 
as of 2010 
Chad 
Oil, gold, lime, limestone, 
salt, soda ash, stone, 
uranium, clay, sand   
 Somalia Uranium 
Central African 
Republic  
Diamonds, oil, gold  Sudan Oil, iron ore, copper 
DR Congo 
Coltan, copper, diamonds, 
cobalt, gold, zinc  
 Uganda Copper, cobalt 
Nigeria 
Oil, tin, columbite, iron 
ore 
 Zimbabwe 
Diamonds, coal, chromium, 
asbestos, gold   
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APPENDIX 3: 
EXAMPLES OF NATURAL RESOURCES FOUND IN 
HIGH-RISK COUNTRIES IN AFRICA 
Adapted from: United Nations Environmental Programme <http:www.unep.org> and World Reach/ Exploring Africa, 
Agricultural and Mineral Resources: African Countries <http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu>. 
 
High-Risk 
Country 
2009–2010 
Natural Resource 
as of 2010 
 
High-Risk 
Country 
2009–2010 
Natural Resource 
as of 2010 
 Algeria Oil  Libya Oil, gypsum 
Burkina Faso 
Gold, copper, manganese, 
zinc, limestone 
 Madagascar 
Ilmenite, graphite, 
chromite, coal, bauxite, 
uranium, cobalt 
Burundi Gold  Malawi Limestone 
Cameroon Oil, aluminium, gold  Morocco 
Phosphates, manganese, 
iron ore 
Côte D’Ivoire Oil, diamonds, manganese  Niger 
Uranium, gold, oil, coal, 
iron ore 
Egypt Oil, iron ore, phosphates  Senegal Phosphates, iron ore 
Ghana 
Oil, gold, diamonds, 
bauxite, manganese 
 Sierra Leone 
Diamonds, bauxite, iron 
ore, gold, rutile 
Guinea 
Bauxite, diamonds, iron ore, 
uranium, gold 
 Tanzania 
Tin, phosphates, iron ore, 
diamonds, gold 
Kenya Limestone, soda ash, rubies  Zambia 
Copper, cobalt, zinc, lead, 
gold 
Liberia  
Iron ore, diamonds, gold, 
timber, rubber 
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APPENDIX 4: EXAMPLES OF NATURAL RESOURCES FOUND 
THROUGHOUT AFRICA AND THEIR USES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2007): Transnational Corporation, Extractive Industries and Development) 
Energy 
Minerals 
Metallic 
Minerals 
Ferrous 
metals 
Precious 
metals 
Base 
metals 
Construction 
minerals 
Industrial 
minerals 
Precious 
stones 
Coal, gas, 
oil, 
uranium 
Iron ore, 
niobium, 
tantalum, 
titanium 
Gold, 
platinum, 
silver 
Bauxite, 
aluminium, 
cobalt, copper, 
lead, 
magnesium, 
nickel, zinc 
Brick, building, 
stone, cement, 
clay, crushed 
rock, aggregate, 
gypsum, 
materials, sand, 
gravel, slate 
Bentonite, 
industrial 
carbonate, kaolin, 
magnesia, potash, 
salt, sand, silica, 
sulphur 
Diamonds, 
gems 
Non-metallic 
Minerals 
Electricity, 
organic 
chemicals, 
plastics, 
process fuel , 
transportation 
Aerospace, 
construction, 
electronic 
engineering, 
manufacturing, 
steel making 
Jewellery, 
monetary, 
industrial 
Construction, 
electrical 
electronics, 
engineering, 
manufacturing 
Construction Ceramics, 
chemicals, foundry 
casting, filters, 
pigments, fuel, gas, 
iron, steel, 
metallurgy, water 
treatment 
Jewellery, 
industrial 
END 
PRODUCTS 
MINERALS AND 
THEIR USES 
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APPENDIX 5: 
STATE PARTIES TO THE ICC ROME STATUTE 
Source: ICC <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/> 
[As of February 2012] 
Afghanistan Fiji Niger 
Albania Finland Nigeria 
Andorra France Norway 
Antigua and Barbuda Gabon Panama 
Argentina Gambia Paraguay 
Australia Georgia Peru 
Austria Germany Philippines 
Bangladesh Ghana Poland 
Barbados Greece Portugal 
Belgium Grenada Republic of Korea 
Belize Guinea Republic of Moldavia 
Benin Guyana Romania 
Bolivia Honduras Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Hungary Saint Lucia 
Botswana Iceland Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Brazil Ireland Samoa 
Bulgaria Italy San Marino 
Burkina Faso Japan Senegal 
Burundi Jordan Serbia 
Cambodia Kenya Seychelles 
Canada Latvia Sierra Leone 
Cape Verde Lesotho Slovakia 
Central African Republic Liberia Slovenia 
Chad Liechtenstein South Africa 
Chile Lithuania Spain 
Colombia Luxembourg Suriname 
Comoros Madagascar Sweden 
Congo Malawi Switzerland 
Cook Islands Maldives Tajikistan 
Costa Rica Mali The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
Croatia Malta Timor-Leste 
Cyprus Marshall Islands Trinidad and Tobago 
Czech Republic Mauritius Tunisia 
Democratic Republic of Congo Mexico Uganda 
Denmark Mongolia United Kingdom 
Djibouti Montenegro United Republic of Tanzania 
Dominica Namibia Uruguay 
Dominican Republic Nauru Vanuatu 
Ecuador Netherlands Venezuela 
Estonia New Zealand Zambia 
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